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ABSTRACT 
 
Hyung Min Kim 
Social Network Conceptualizations of International System Structure and National Power:  
A Social Network Perspective on International Relations 
(Under the direction of Timothy J. McKeown) 
 
The central focus of this project is on the new social network conceptualizations of international 
system structure and national power. This project examines two traditional questions using the social 
network conceptualizations: (1) how do we conceive a state’s national power, and (2) how does the 
distribution of national powers define international system structure? The project also answers the 
following question by applying the above questions to the empirical phenomena of international relations: 
how does redefining “power” and “system” in this way contribute to a better understanding of 
international politics? This project argues that international system structure is more accurately depicted by 
considering different interaction networks participated in by all system members, and that a state’s power 
is more accurately conceptualized by considering how it interacts with all other states in the international 
system of different networks. The social network conception of national power, derived from the social 
network conception of international system structure, is applied to two empirical phenomena, focusing on 
their power explanations. The empirical analyses of militarized conflicts find that: (1) at the system level, 
the results do not reveal any clear support for either of power theories, but (2) at the dyadic level, the 
results strongly support power preponderance theory over balance of power theory. The analyses of 
economic sanctions find that sanction cases with disproportional network power balance between sender 
and target are far less likely to be successful, while cases with the target possessing high network power are 
far more likely to be successful. The evidence from nonparametric model discrimination statistics and 
information criteria measures shows that the conflict and sanctions models with new structural network 
power measures have greater explanatory power than or statistically outperform those with old 
attributional power measures, such as COW index and GNP. Finally, this project provides graphical 
 iii
representations of international system structure and national power to show how network conceptions 
give a radically different view of international relations than the older scalar representations do. The 
graphical representations of international conflict and sanction networks also reveal that the significant 
majority of conflicts and sanctions are indeed regional, “connected,” and “recurrent.” 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A state in the international system always interacts with other states in different issue areas. Each 
state’s power comes from interactions with other states in different networks of the international system, 
and the structure of the international system is shaped or defined by how the system members in those 
different social networks interact. When I conceptualize international system structure, I focus on these 
different interaction networks and how states are positioned in them. This project is the application of the 
social network perspective to the study of international relations. One of its main claims is that the 
international system is composed of different social networks (e.g., of arms transfers, international trade, 
international assistance, diplomatic exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and international 
telecommunication) among sovereign but interdependent states. By considering all these different social 
networks, we can more correctly depict how the structures of the international system affect each state’s 
behaviors. The project takes existing theories, applies them in network settings, and tests them using my 
network conceptions of the international system. I treat the international system as a collection of networks 
and explore how this idea leads us to recast a great deal of existing empirical work. Does a structurally 
centralized or concentrated international system induce a more peaceful world, or just the opposite? How 
is the structural network power balance between states related to their conflict behaviors? How are the 
structural network powers of sanction senders and their targets, and the structural power balance between 
the two related to the onset and success of economic sanctions? What are some distinctive characteristics 
of militarized dispute networks and economic sanctions networks? These are some of the research 
questions examined in this project. This project also explores the graphical representations of states’ 
interactions with other members of the international system, as well as how well the sociograms of 
international networks depict and highlight the distinctive characteristics of international system structure 
and the different interaction relations among system members. 
I apply social network analysis to different types of interaction relations among international 
system members. This study posits that the interactions of states are played out in the web of different 
social networks, and that the structure of different networks and the structural network power of each state 
(measured by their interactions with other states in the networks) play important parts in state behavior in 
the international system. This new conception of international system structure and of each state’s power 
as arising from its position in a network is different from previous studies in the field of international 
relations, where system structure is focused on one or a few of the most powerful (in the material-
capability sense) states in the system, and where a state’s power in the system is defined solely based on 
its attributional power (especially, material-based capability). This project argues that international system 
structure is more accurately depicted by considering different types of interaction networks participated in 
by all the member states in the international system, and that the power of each state is more accurately 
conceptualized by considering how it interacts with all other states in the international system of different 
networks. This produces a richer way of depicting international system structure and of conceptualizing 
each state’s national power in the international system. By focusing on the network characteristics of 
interaction patterns of states, we can present a more complete picture of the structure of the international 
system, each state’s structural power in the system, the distribution of the structural power in the system, 
and the changes of both a state’s structural power and its distribution.  
 
The Motivation of this Dissertation 
 Tellis et al. (2000, 30–31) point out, 
Since the late 1970s, no new attempts at developing aggregate power measures of the 
kinds [during the 1960s and the 1970s] have materialized (or at least none have received 
widespread visibility), in part because such aggregate measures have been perceived as 
having reached the limits of their success. Scholarship since then seems to have focused 
on using the preexisting measures of power to answer other questions...or to refine the 
preexisting measures through better quantitative techniques. 
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My project posits that we have to go back to our old efforts and examine whether we have truly reached 
the limits of our power studies. The answer from my study is obviously “no;” we need better 
conceptualizations of national power and international system structure based on a relational (rather than 
an attributional) power concept using interactive behaviors of all (rather than a few important) system 
members in a web of network relations.  
We need these new social network concepts because the old power concept is limited and rather 
inappropriate. If we think that an individual state’s power comes from its attributes, and if we think that 
international system structure is defined by the attributional power distribution among a handful of major 
states in the system, the new social network concepts of system structure and national power will add little 
to the study of international relations. However, if we think that an individual state’s power comes instead 
from its interactions with all other system members in different social networks of international relations, 
and if we think that the international system is a set of networks, the attribute-based theories will be 
neither empirically accurate nor theoretically fruitful. This study also provides graphical representations 
(using sociograms in the social network analyses) of networks of the international system. These 
sociograms give a radically different view of the international system than the older scalar representations 
do. 
The social network perspective is not just applying a new measurement technology to 
international phenomena, but is a different conceptualization of how to understand international politics 
and a different way of perceiving international relations. Unlike previous theories, the notion of structure 
in this project is multidimensional, rather than one-dimensional ordering from strong to weak or rich to 
poor, and it focuses on interactions rather than on attributes. I apply the network power concept to two 
old but still unresolved empirical phenomena in world politics (on militarized conflicts and on economic 
sanctions): the contributions of this project are not only the introduction of this new social network power 
concept (focused on relational rather than attributional power) but also how this new power concept is 
applied to the two old power theories in the field (balance of power theory and power preponderance 
theory) to understand militarized conflicts and economic sanctions. The key concept of social network 
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power is a tool to examine the existing theories in the field; the project uses social network power to 
address/examine the empirical puzzles that are raised by previous research and theories.  
 
The Outline of this Dissertation 
 This project proceeds in the following manner. In Chapter 2, the first section reviews the major 
theories of international relations of international system structure (focusing on polarity theory) and 
previous attempts to measure individual states’ national power (focusing on the COW material capability 
index), emphasizing what is missing from those previous conceptualizations of system structure and 
national power, as well as how social network conceptualizations improve our understanding of the two 
concepts. The next section reviews research on the two international phenomena examined in the later 
empirical chapters of this study, namely militarized conflict studied at systemic and dyadic levels, and the 
study of the onset and outcomes of economic sanctions, focusing on how social network 
conceptualizations of world politics can answer the empirical questions of the old material-based power 
theories and improve our understanding of the two phenomena. 
 In Chapter 3, the first section introduces the social network conceptualization of the structure of 
the international system, and the second section introduces its conceptualization of an individual state’s 
national power. The two sections also introduce the data sets for the two dimensions of the international 
system, focusing on the justifications for their use in the project, the substantive importance of each 
measurement concept, and the implications of these measures. The third section introduces the 
operational indicators of each of five different network power measures. The five different centrality 
measures used in this project, which have been developed by social network theorists, emphasize different 
aspects of structural network power (e.g., Boje and Whetten 1981; Lincoln and Miller 1979; Blau and 
Alba 1982; Brass 1984, 1992; Brass and Burkhardt 1992, 1993; Burkhardt and Brass 1990; Knoke and 
Burt 1983; Krackhardt 1990; Sparrowe and Liden 2005). The section also introduces two different sets of 
system-level power measures using the above five state-level structural network power concepts: (1) the 
set of systemic power centralization (measuring the degree of how power is centralized within the whole 
system [Freeman 1978/1979; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991]); and (2) the set of systemic power 
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concentration, change, and movement (measuring different aspects of the power distribution within the 
whole system) by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994). The fourth section compares 
the social network measures of national power to the previous measures of power, focusing on the COW 
material capability index. A comparison of the two sets of measures is performed by two sets of analyses: 
confirmatory factor analyses and correlation analyses (Pearson and Spearman). The fifth section presents 
an example of graphical representation of the two new conceptualizations using the sociograms of 
international arms transfer networks. This graphically shows us how the two new social network 
conceptualizations give a radically different view of the international system than the older scalar 
representations do. The final section introduces four central principles of applying the social network 
perspective to international relations, and explains how the two new conceptualizations are applied to the 
two empirical phenomena of militarized conflicts and economic sanctions, which are examined in the later 
empirical chapters. 
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I provide the results from the empirical analyses, applying the social network 
perspective of international system structure and national power to militarized conflicts and economic 
sanctions. I also identify the theoretical and substantive meanings of the empirical findings. These 
empirical analyses focus on how my social network conceptions of international system structure and 
national power lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models of militarized conflicts and economic 
sanctions than previous ones rooted in attribute logic, and on how my models applying the social network 
perspective perform better than the previous models of these phenomena. In Chapter 4, covering 
militarized conflicts, the first section argues for the importance of graphical representation of dyadic 
conflict (militarized dispute and crisis) onsets from the social network perspective, focusing on describing 
what information each set of figures from the social network perspective provides in the study of 
militarized conflicts. The second section is devoted to the systemic study of international conflict. I present 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative binomial regression (NBREG) analyses of militarized disputes 
and international crises, and empirical analyses test how the structure of the international system—more 
specifically, the structural network power concentration, changes, and movement in the system, derived 
from changes in network relationships among system members—affects the number and proportion of 
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disputes and crises. The third section is devoted to the study of conflict in dyads that are nested in larger 
networks. Using the four different estimation methods of logistic estimation clustered on dyads, Window 
Subsampling Empirical Variances (WSEV) estimation, Rare Events Logistic Regression (ReLogit) 
estimation, and generalized estimating equation (GEE) estimation controlling for the first order 
autoregressive (AR1) process, I focus on testing the power-based dyadic hypotheses in the study of 
interstate disputes; that is, the hypotheses from balance of power theory and power preponderance theory 
using a structural network power conception. In the final section, the performance of conflict models at 
both systemic and dyadic levels using structural network power measures will be compared against those 
using attribution-based power measures, through nonparametric model discrimination statistics and 
information criteria measures. 
 In Chapter 5, the empirical analysis of economic sanctions, the first section presents their 
graphical representations. The next two sections are devoted to empirical analyses of economic sanctions, 
using the sample selection method (censored probit estimation). In the second section, I argue that even 
though there have been many recent efforts to identify the determinants of economic sanctions success, 
we lack empirical analyses of the factors affecting the onset of economic sanctions; when do states initiate 
their use? Although we now know quite a lot about the determinants of the onset of militarized interstate 
disputes, we know far less about the determinants of the onset of economic sanctions. This section 
addresses the gap in empirical analysis of sanction onset. In the third section, regarding the second stage 
of sample selection analyses, I argue that even though many different attributes of the sender or target 
state and of the relationship between the two have been hypothesized to affect the success of economic 
sanctions, two important factors have been neglected or tested inadequately in the previous empirical 
studies: the relative structural network power difference between sanctioning and target states, and the 
target’s structural network power. In the final section, the performance of sanction models on both onset 
and success using structural network power measures will be compared against those using attribution-
based power measures, through nonparametric model discrimination statistics and information criteria 
measures. In Chapter 6, I summarize the major findings from this project and address directions for future 
studies.  
 6
CHAPTER 2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
This review chapter consists of two sections. The first section reviews major theories of 
international system structure, focusing on polarity theories and previous attempts to measure individual 
states’ national power, focusing on the COW material capability index. It discusses what is missing from 
previous conceptualizations of system structure and national power, and how social network 
conceptualizations improve our understanding of the two concepts. The next section reviews the previous 
research on the two international phenomena examined in the later empirical chapters. It considers how 
the new social network conceptualization of world politics can answer the empirical questions of the old 
material-based power theories and improve our understanding of the two phenomena in international 
relations.  
 
2.1. Previous Research on International System Structure and National Power 
2.1.1. On International System Structure 
 In this section I compare and contrast the neorealist conceptualization of system structure, 
focusing on polarity theories, to the social network conceptualization. Table 2.1 summarizes the main 
differences between the two.  
 
            Table 2.1 Neorealist and Social Network Approaches to International System Structure 
  Neorealist Approach Social Network Approach 
 Main aspect  
of system structure 
The number of poles Systemic centralization 
 Focus on the units Focus on a few polar powers Focus on all system 
members 
 System characterization In discrete terms In continuous terms 
 Power concept Material capabilities 
(focusing on what it possesses) 
Social network power 
(focusing on how it interacts 
with other system members) 
 
As the systemic reformulation of political realism, neorealism (or structural realism) has been the 
most influential systemic theory of world politics (Glaser 2003; Maoz et al. 2005). Operating at the system 
level, neorealism identifies the basic structure of the international system in terms of the number of major 
powers and the distribution of power among these states (Waltz 1979). Different aspects of system 
structure have been studied by neorealists: for example, as in Bueno de Mesquita (1975), the number of 
the system’s poles (Deutsch and Singer 1964, Snyder and Diesing 1977, Waltz 1979, Morgenthau and 
Thomson 1985, Gaddis 1986, 1987, Midlarsky 1988, Wohlforth 1999), the tightness or looseness of poles 
(Kaplan 1957; Deutsch and Singer 1964; Singer and Small 1968; Hass 1970; Brody 1963), and the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of power among poles (Gulick 1955; Morgenthau 1962; Organski 
1968; Bueno de Mesquita and Singer 1973; Lucier 1974). The focus of structural aspects in neorealism 
has been on the number of the system’s poles distinguishing the international system as being led by a 
single preponderant state (hegemonic or unipolar), two dominant states (bipolar), or more than two 
dominant states (multipolar). Polarity has been defined in terms of either the number of major alliance 
blocs in the system (Singer and Small 1968; Hass 1970; Wallace 1973; Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Stoll 
and Champion 1985) or the number of preponderant states in the system (Nogee 1975; Rapkin, 
Thompson, and Christopherson 1979; Waltz 1979; Wayman 1984 Levy 1985; Wayman and Morgan 
1990). However, Waltz (1979) and his followers have concentrated on the latter:  
The polarity of the international system is defined by the number of great powers in the 
world. To determine polarity in a particular era, one counts states of great and roughly 
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equivalent capabilities….If there are three or more powerful states, the system is 
multipolar. If there are two such states, it is bipolar. If there is one state with unrivaled 
power, the system is unipolar (Waltz 1979, 92, 194–195). 
Conceptualizing international system structure as a network responds to three criticisms of polarity 
theories (Mansfield 1994; Maoz et al. 2005): its focus on only a few polar powers, its characterization of 
states of the system in strictly discrete terms, and its conception of power in material terms. First, treating 
the structure of the international system as merely defined as the distribution of power between a few 
great powers does not tell us how to distinguish polar powers from other system members. As a result, 
there have been considerable disagreements over the definition, measurement, and operationalization of 
the number of poles in the system (Mansfield 1994). It also arbitrarily assumes that the vast majority of 
international system members are irrelevant. As Maoz et al. (2005) point out, as the world becomes 
increasingly heterogeneous, we lose much by ignoring relations among non-polar powers. Neorealism 
might be parsimonious by using the information on a few major powers and focusing on wars only 
involving those major powers (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Lalman 1988; Mansfield 1994, 1995), but it fails to address the vast majority of 
international relations among non-major powers. For example, non-major powers are 82% of interstate 
war participants (for 1950–1997 COW Interstate War Data), 81% of international crisis participants (for 
1950–2001 ICB Crisis Data), and 80% of interstate dispute participants (for 1950–2001 COW Interstate 
Dispute Data). By using information on all system members, the social network approach discards the 
“zero influence” assumption implicit in the way that polarity theories treat the vast majority of nation-
states. 
Second, polarity theories characterize international system structure in strictly discrete terms. As a 
consequence, in the empirical research of polarity theories, the polarity variable has been defined as a 
dummy variable, taking on a value of one if the system is multipolar and zero if it is bipolar (or vise versa) 
(in Snyder and Diesing 1977, Waltz 1979, and Levy 1985, the international system is considered 
multipolar until 1945, and bipolar thereafter). This categorical and time-invariant treatment of system 
structure by neorealism is partly due to the lack of system transformation theory (i.e., no theoretical 
mechanism to account for the transitions from one structure to another). Instead, it finesses this weakness 
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by treating major wars as ending old configurations and inaugurating new ones. However, as Maoz et al. 
(2005) point out, there are varying degrees of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. Polarity theories’ 
depiction of international system structure in strictly discrete terms precludes a theoretical treatment of 
intermediate or disequilibrium situations. The social network approach allows for a more complicated 
conception of the international system structure than the simple notion of poles such as the bipolar Cold 
War era and the unipolar/multipolar system since the Soviet demise. With the multiple networks approach, 
we can treat system structure as continuous and multidimensional. Finally, polarity theories conceive 
individual states’ national power as an attribute of the state, but not of its relations with other states. This is 
another “zero influence” assumption—this time, about the relevance of day-to-day international 
interaction patterns.  
In this project, the international system structure is conceived as a set of networks. Following 
Maoz (2001a), a network is defined as a system that consists of units (states) and a set of relationships 
among these units—defined as ties on a given relationship. Since states in the international system have 
ties with other system members in many different types of relationships, we observe multiple networks in 
the international system (Maoz et al. 2005). This project uses six types of international networks along two 
dimensions (communication flow networks and resource flow networks) of the international system. 
Network thinking is, however, not new in the field of international relations. There have been several 
studies that treat (or at least consider) multiple networks of international relations as characterizing 
international system structure (Deutsch 1954; Singer and Small 1966; Brams 1966, 1968; Snyder and 
Kick 1979), and that apply the network thinking to specific subject matters in the field of international 
relations (e.g., international conflict in Maoz 2001a, 2006a, 2006b, Maoz et al. 2005, 2006, and Hafner-
Burton and Montgomery 2006; sanctions in Martin 1992). For example, Brams (1966, 1968) identifies 
clusters of nations within the international system, using three different types of international networks (the 
diplomatic exchanges network, the international trade network, and the intergovernmental organizations 
network). Maoz (2006b) develops a democratic networks model embedded in a social network 
perspective to address the democratic peace puzzle. Martin’s (1992) sanctions study approaches a limited 
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form of network thinking in the sense that it considers how a multilateral organization has different effects 
than simple bilateral interventions.  
In contrast to the treatment of international system structure in polarity theories (i.e., its focus on a 
few polar powers, its system characterization in strictly discrete terms, and its power conception in material 
terms), social network approaches use a concept of network centralization1 to depict international system 
structure2 (Freeman 1978/1979; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991). Unlike the polarity conception, this 
conception uses the information on interaction relations among all system members and enables us to 
quantify the characteristics of international system structure in terms of continuous variables. A network 
centralization concept measures the extent to which the whole network has a centralized structure (its 
overall “compactness”) or the extent to which the cohesion of the network is organized around a 
particular focal point3 (Scott 2000; Alderson and Beckfield 2004; Hanneman and Riddle 2001). The 
Freeman system centralization measures also express the degree of variability (or of inequality or 
variation) in our observed network as a percentage of that in a baseline “star” network of the same size. 
When all states hold exactly the same amount of structural network power4 in the whole network (often 
depicted as a “circle” or “wheel” figure), the systemic centralization score equals 0 (corresponding to the 
most extreme case of multipolarity). When one state holds all the network structural power (often depicted 
as a “star” or “hub-and-spokes” figure), the systemic centralization score equals 1 (corresponding to the 
                                                        
1 Social network theorists use the term “network centralization” (or “group centralization”) differently from 
“point centrality” (or “node centrality”) (see Scott 2000, 82). The first term refers to the level of 
centralization of the network as a whole (or the distribution of point/node centralities within the network); 
the second term refers to an individual node’s relative centrality or prominence (compared to other nodes 
in the network). These concepts from the social network perspective can be compared to the 
concentration of powers among states in the international system (for the former) and an individual state’s 
power (for the latter) in the studies of international relations. 
2 In this project, “structure” means more than an ordering of states based on some attributes possessed by 
each state (as in the scalar representations); it refers to elements of the international system that cannot be 
observed merely by observing each state in isolation from others. 
3 The formal definition of the measure is provided in Chapter 3.  
4 I define a state’s “structural network power” as the power of an individual state at its location within the 
networks of international relations—how each state is structurally positioned in different types of social 
networks of international relations. This concept will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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most extreme case of unipolarity). For example, in Figure 2.1, the “star” network depicts the system where 
RUS (Soviet Union/Russia) monopolizes the arms transfers among the remaining system members; the 
“wheel” network depicts the system where the control of arms transfers are equally shared among the 
system members. The actual centralization scores are usually greater than 0 and less than 1. A high 
centralization score is consistent with the network being controlled by a few powerful states (e.g., arms 
transfers are dominated by a few large suppliers). A low centralization score is consistent with the network 
control being shared by many other states (e.g., arms transfers are controlled by relatively many different 
suppliers).  
Another aspect of system structure studied by social network theorists is network density. It 
describes the extent to which states are tied (either directly or indirectly) to each other in the network, and 
is measured by the total number of ties, divided by the total number of possible ties in the network. As in 
Figure 2.1, when the system members have ties to all the other system members, the systemic density 
equals 1 (corresponding to the extreme case of tight system in polarity approaches). When none of the 
system members has ties to the other system members, the systemic density is 0 (corresponding to an 
extremely loose system). Actual density scores are usually greater than 0 and less than 1. A highly dense 
system is one in which every state in the system has some relationship with nearly every other state. A 
low-density system is one in which states have few relationships to other states in the system.  
 
2.1.2. On National Power  
 In this section I compare and contrast the attribute conceptualization of national power (as 
exemplified by the COW material capability index) to the social network conceptualization.5 Table 2.2 
summarizes the main differences between the two.  
 
                                                        
5 In the next chapter, the comparison of the two measures (the COW index and the new social network 
index) is performed by the two sets of analyses: confirmatory factor analyses and correlation analyses 
(Pearson and Spearman). 
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 Table 2.2 Attribute and Social Network Approaches to National Power 
 Attributional power concept 
(focusing on the COW index) 
Social network power concept 
Focus What a state possesses 
(i.e., its attributes) 
How a state interacts with other  
states (i.e., its relations) 
Aspects of power Demographic, industrial, and  
military capabilities 
Five different aspects of  
network power 
Independent of 
other system members 
Yes 
A state’s power is not affected by  
power of the other system members 
No 
A state’s power is affected by  
power of the other system members 
Independent of 
international system 
structure 
Yes 
A state’s power is not affected  
by system structure 
 
No 
A state’s power is affected by system  
structure (how a state is positioned  
in the structure defines its power) 
 
As the most widely used power index in the field, the COW capability index (Composite Index of 
National Capability, CINC) focuses on material attributes to conceptualize national power. The index is 
composed of three aspects of what a state possesses: (1) demographic capabilities (total population and 
urban population), (2) industrial capabilities (energy consumption and iron/steel production), and (3) 
military capabilities (total military expenditures and size of the armed forces). How much total or urban 
population does a state hold? How much energy or iron/steel does a state consume? How much does a 
state spend on its military and how many military personnel does a state possess? Power in the COW 
index is operationalized by treating a state as a “resource container” (Tellis et al. 2000, 32) possessing six 
such capability components.6   
The social network approach to national power is responsive to the criticism that the concept of 
an individual state’s national power such as the COW index is an isolated concept, isolated both from 
other system members and from international system structure. First, because it conceptualizes a state’s 
national power based on what it possesses, it is isolated from other states in the system: what state A 
                                                        
6 Of course, the COW index is not the only measure of national power that has been used to study 
international relations. Details on other efforts of measuring national power are given in Appendix 2.1 (see 
also Stoll and Ward 1989, Tellis et al. 2000, Sweeney 2003a). 
 13
possesses does not take an account of what any of other system members possesses. The perspective that 
power is by definition a relative concept is not new. Many scholars have emphasized that power is 
essentially defined based upon relations, and should be conceptualized as relational. For example, Dahl 
(1961, 1966) defines power as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do; 
Morgenthau’s classical realism posits that power should be understood as “control” over actors 
(Morgenthau, 1948: 29–36, 124–65). Baldwin (1985, 18–24; see also Baldwin 1971a, 1971b, 1980) 
identifies several principles of power analysis and emphasizes that “power is a relational concept” and that 
“it refers to a relationship between two or more people, not to a property of any one of them.” Lasswell 
and Kaplan (1950) define power relationally, not as a simple property. Pruitt (1964) posits that 
international theorists have placed too much emphasis on the resources of nations as the basis of their 
power. As Baldwin (1985) and others correctly point out, international theorists have long been criticized 
for their failure to define power in relational terms (Holsti 1964; Pruitt 1964; McCllelland 1966; Sprout 
and Sprout 1962; Sullivan 1963). For example, during the Cold War era, some viewed power as a zero-
sum concept, so that any power increase by the Soviet Union translated to a power decrease of the United 
States. However, this relative power concept by realists has been treated only as a measurement issue 
rather than a conceptual one (e.g., the power-balance variable in dyadic conflict studies, measured by the 
state A’s power/state B’s power). Even worse, this approach used in dyadic studies ignored information 
from outside the dyad: behavior in a dyad is studied as if it were a closed system, when we all know that 
each dyad is embedded in a network of other international relations. If power is an inherently relational 
concept, we should conceptualize power in relational terms. A social network view of power is closer to 
the relational power concept of “the ability to get people to do what I want” (as in Dahl, Morgenthau, or 
others) than to the previous one that is based on a state’s attributes. 
Second, the previous conception of national power is also disconnected from international system 
structure. Neorealists such as Waltz (1979) posit that the international system is affected by the distribution 
of power among major powers. However, the causal arrows could go in both directions: units (or 
characteristics of units such as their power) affecting international system structure and international 
structure affecting units (and their characteristics). Waltz (1979, 2003) himself emphasizes that causation 
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runs not only from international structure to interacting units, but also from units to structure. However, 
the previous way of conceptualizing national power has been unable to incorporate how international 
system structure and its characteristics affect the power of its member states. A network view of power 
implies that an individual state’s power comes not simply from what it possesses, but rather from how it is 
connected or interacts with other system members in the networks of relations. Cartwright (1965, 4) posits, 
“When an agent, O, performs an act resulting in some change in another agent, P, we say that O 
influences P. If O has the capacity of influencing P, we say that O has power over P.” In other words, he 
argues that power is specific to each dyadic relationship. The main difference between the concepts is in 
how to conceptualize this influencing capacity. In the attribute power concept, the capacity comes from 
the properties of a state’s own resources (i.e., its control over internal, domestic resources). In the network 
power concept, this capacity comes from how a state interacts with other system members (i.e., its control 
over external interactions). Oppenheim (1981) addresses power as property versus power as relation. Hart 
(1976) and Schmidt (2005) discuss power as control over resources versus power as control over actors. 
In other words, the main difference comes from two different ways of looking at the influencing capacity 
and, as a result, the two power measures tap two different aspects of national power. As noted above, this 
understanding of the “relational” aspect of national power, focused on the controls over actors, is not new 
in the field of international relations.  
Adopting the social network concept, this project focuses on two broad dimensions of the 
international system to depict national power (in channels of communication exchanges and of resource 
transfers): (1) how a state is connected or interacts with other states through diplomatic channels (how 
diplomatic missions are exchanged/transferred between states), academic channels (how foreign students 
are exchanged/transferred between states), and telecommunication channels (how international telephone 
messages are exchanged/transferred between states), and (2) how a state is connected or interacts with 
other states in arms channels (how arms are transferred or exchanged between states), trade channels 
(how foreign goods and services are transferred or exchanged between states), and monetary channels 
(how international monetary assistance is transferred or exchanged between states).  
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A state does not have power in isolation from others (without considering its linked interactions to 
others) nor from system structure (without considering its structural positions in the system); rather, it has 
power as a consequence of its interactive relations with other states in the system and its structural 
positions in the networks of relations (Hanneman and Riddle 2001). The proposed power concept from 
the social network perspective is called “structural network power,” defined as the power of an individual 
state arising from its location within the networks of international relations. A structural network power 
concept views an individual state’s power as arising from its positions in different interaction networks of 
international relations: if it is well-positioned, or occupies relatively advantageous positions in networks, 
then it will be influential. This way of conceptualizing a state’s power accords with social network theorists 
who believe that the characteristics of social units arise out of structural or relational processes played out 
among all the units within the network (Hanneman and Riddle 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Freeman 1978/1979; Borgatti and 
Everett 1999; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002; Wellman 1988).   
This project assesses five different aspects of such structural network power of states in the system.  
They are based on five different measures of point centralities from network analyses of interaction data 
(i.e., degree, betweenness, flow-betweenness, coreness, and ego network brokerage).  The details on the 
substantive meanings of each of the power aspects are discussed in Chapter 3. Here, I will illustrate the 
degree and betweenness aspects of structural network power using the hypothetical arms transfers “star” 
network in Figure 2.1, where RUS (Soviet Union/Russia) is the most powerful among the system 
members.  
In the “star” network of Figure 2.1, the structural position of the Soviet Union/Russia enables it to 
hold a more powerful position compared to all other system members. For example, its position in the 
arms transfer network enables it to: (1) be less dependent on other states for its export and import needs 
since it has many alternative ways of arms transfers, (2) have more access to the arms resources available 
within the network since it has more ties to other system members, and (3) benefit from an advantageous 
third-party position (or “deal maker” position) in the exchanges of arms since it has many ties to other 
system members (Hanneman and Riddle 2001). If one of the system members, say BUL (Bulgaria), 
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decides not to import arms from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has many other places to export their 
arms. However, if the Soviet Union decides not to export arms to Bulgaria, Bulgaria (with its limited 
number of arms sources) might be unable to find other alternatives to import their arms. Since the Soviet 
Union has more opportunities and alternatives than Bulgaria, it has more structural network power (in 
terms of degree aspect of network power). It is the most visible actor in the network, and therefore it is 
“where the action is” in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
The Soviet Union is also standing on the geodesic paths (i.e., minimal length paths) connecting 
the pairs of system members (i.e., other states depend on it to make connections to other system 
members) and there is no direct connection between one of the system members, say Bulgaria, and the 
other system members. Thus, if the Soviet Union wants to interact with, say, ALB (Albania), it simply is 
able to do so. However, if Bulgaria wants to interact with Albania, it could do so only by way of the Soviet 
Union.7 Since the Soviet Union holds a more advantageous position (by way of being between the system 
members) than Bulgaria, it has, in the social network perspective, more structural network power (in terms 
of betweenness aspect of network power). This betweenness aspect of network power conceptualizes the 
degree to which a state plays the role of a “broker” or “gatekeeper” with a potential for control over other 
states in the network (Scott 2000). It is also interpreted as the extent to which a state controls the 
communication between other pairs of states in the system (Brandes and Erlebach 2005, 30). 
 
2.2. Previous Research on Militarized Conflicts and Economic Sanctions 
 This section briefly reviews the previous research on two international phenomena examined in 
the later empirical chapters (militarized conflict study at systemic and dyadic levels, and economic sanction 
study regarding outcome and onset) focusing on the major studies that will be compared to my 
applications. This is followed by a discussion of how we can improve our understanding of the two 
phenomena by using social network conceptualizations.   
                                                        
7 In a real situation, this might have worked in two ways: first, Bulgaria and Albania might have had no 
interest in creating a bilateral arms sales agreement; second, the Soviet Union (as a leader of COMECON) 
might have discouraged such a bilateral agreement between Bulgaria and Albania with the purpose of 
dictating their relationship. 
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 2.2.1. On Militarized Conflicts 
 Previous research on militarized conflicts has been conducted at both systemic and dyadic levels 
(the latter much more frequently than the former). At the systemic level, the focus has been on three 
aspects of structural characteristics in the system: (1) the number of poles, (2) the degree of polarization, 
and (3) the concentration of power in the system. At the dyadic level, the focus has been on the two 
widely contested debates: (1) that of the so-called “liberal peace” theory, and (2) that between balance of 
power theory and power preponderance theory.  
At the systemic level, polarity theory posits that how the system is shaped (the number of poles) is 
the main determinant of individual states' behaviors and system stability. Polarization refers to the degree 
of tightness and separation of poles. It has been argued that a high level of polarization (e.g., high levels of 
tightness and discreteness of alliances) is associated with war. At the dyadic level, the so-called liberal 
peace theory posits that democratic states, economically interdependent states, or states that share 
intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships are less likely to have conflicts with each other. The 
theory has its origins in classical literature. Immanuel Kant argued in Perpetual Peace ([1797] 1970) that 
“peace can be built on a tripod of complementary influences: republican constitutions (i.e., representative 
democracy), international law and organization, and ‘cosmopolitan law’ (economic interdependence)” 
(Oneal and Russett 1997, 268).  
However, the focus of my study of militarized conflicts is on the debate between balance of power 
theory (Wright 1965; Kissinger 1964; Ferris 1973; Claude 1962; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) and 
power preponderance theory (or power transition theory) (Blainey 1988; Organski 1958; Organski and 
Kugler 1980). The balance of power theory posits that under a relatively equal power balance 
encompassing two or more states, the states in question will be less likely to go to war (or militarized 
conflict) with one another. In contrast, when one state is substantially more powerful than another, it may 
go to war (or militarized conflict) to enhance its power position further. The power-balance thesis rests on 
the logic that victory becomes problematic under a condition of relative power parity, and that the 
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resulting uncertainty enhances deterrence and discourages aggression. A power imbalance (i.e., power 
preponderance) will tend to support aggression and weaken deterrence by increasing the probability of 
success for the stronger state’s use of force. Mansfield (1994, 75–76) also posits that “the more uniform 
the distribution of power among the leading states, the greater the number of potential blocking coalitions 
that exist. And the more potential blocking coalitions that exist, the greater the expected cost of initiating 
war relative to the expected benefits of doing so, all other things being equal. As the distribution of power 
becomes increasingly skewed, fewer blocking coalitions exist, thus tempting aggression on the part of a 
stronger state” (see also Gulick 1955; Herz 1959; Claude 1962; Wolfers 1962). Wright (1965, 254) also 
posits that “the balance of power is a system designed to maintain a continuous conviction in every state 
that if it attempted aggression it would encounter an invincible combination of the others.”  
On the other hand, the power preponderance theory posits that when power is roughly equal 
among the states involved, they may perceive a reasonable chance of winning (i.e., be overconfident 
about their ability to secure their interests through the use of force). This makes them more willing to take 
firm stances or escalate tensions, leading to an increased probability of disputes and actual war. In 
contrast, when one side enjoys a preponderance of power, the outcomes of potential conflicts are clear, 
and states will settle disputes before they escalate to war. This power-preponderance thesis holds that the 
probability of war (or militarized conflict) increases under a condition of relative parity. The logic is that 
the likelihood of war (or conflict) is greatest when both sides see a prospect for victory and this condition is 
met when parity characterizes the power balance. Under power preponderance, the weaker side cannot 
afford to fight and the stronger side rarely has to go to war in order to achieve its goals (Blainey 1988). 
Mansfield (1994, 75–76) also posits that “a highly skewed distribution of power deters the onset of certain 
types of war. Aggression against preponderant states is likely to be fruitless, and preponderant states can 
achieve political goals vis-à-vis smaller states though means other than war. When inequalities of power 
are less pronounced, states are likely to engage in wars for (among other reasons) the purposes of 
bolstering their positions in the system” (see also Wagner 1986; Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose 1989; Niou 
and Ordeshook 1990). 
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At the systemic level, as noted above, the advocates of balance of power theory posit that a 
highly centralized system is dangerous because states with preponderant power will use it to improve their 
position, and therefore that the balance (or parity) of power in the system will promote stability. On the 
other hand, the advocates of power preponderance theory posit that a highly centralized system is more 
stable because the state with preponderant power will use that power to coordinate the other states’ 
actions, provide leadership, and manage conflict responsibly; and that the system becomes unstable when 
the dissatisfied challenger approaches the power of the dominant state and tries to change the system. The 
research on this debate at the systemic level has been focused on the relationship among the 
concentration, change, and movement of capabilities in the system and the war among major powers (see 
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Mansfield 1994; see also Cannizzo 1978; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; 
Thompson 1983; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988, 1992).   
For example, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994) test the propositions 
from the debate among the advocates of balance of power vs. those of power preponderance theory at 
the systemic level. Using the material capability concentration, change, and movement to measure 
international system structure, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972)’s empirical analysis suggests a weak 
empirical finding in favor of the power preponderance theory at the systemic level (when the data were 
split, the balance of power theory was supported during the nineteenth century, whereas the power 
preponderance theory was supported during the twentieth century); however, Mansfield (1994) finds that 
there is no clear support of either theory, but that there is a strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between capability concentration and wars involving major powers. 
I accept the argument by Mansfield (1994) and Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) that the 
structure of the international system (measured by the power concentration, change, and movement in the 
system) affects the onset of systemic conflicts. However, my study posits that the effect of the international 
systemic structure goes beyond the major power wars they studied. Most international disputes do not 
escalate into crises in which one or both parties threaten or use military force, and, by the same logic, 
most international crises do not escalate into wars in which one or both parties use large military forces to 
resolve the crisis. Therefore, the previous empirical studies that have focused on crises or wars capture 
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only a small subset of the population of international conflicts, and, perhaps more importantly, they do 
not depict a multistep process of conflict escalation or de-escalation (Rousseau 2005). In my study, I 
analyze the effect of international system structure on the number and proportion of disputes and crises in 
the system. 
At the dyadic level, as noted above, balance of power theorists argue that if a state enjoys a 
power advantage over its adversary in a dyad, it will be more likely to use military force because it is more 
likely to succeed, and the cost of using force is likely to be low. Weaker states will view the initiation of 
violence as a very risky strategy that is likely to result in substantial costs. Two states of equal power will be 
deterred from conflict with each other because there will be no guarantee of winning and the conflict will 
be long and hard-fought. On the other hand, power preponderance theorists argue that when the two 
states in a dyad share disproportional power, they are less likely to go to war (on be involved in conflicts) 
with each other. The weaker state will not try to fight with the stronger state because it will certainly lose, 
and therefore the stronger state does not have to initiate conflict to get what it wants.  
 Most empirical studies on testing the two power theories at the dyadic level are basically focused 
on using the COW material capability index. One of the advantages of using the social network power 
concept instead of the COW index used by all the previous dyadic empirical studies is that we utilize the 
information embedded in relations among all other states in the international system. The most widely 
used power-balance variable in dyadic conflict studies is the dyadic capability ratio variable, usually 
measured by state a’s power/state b’s power (with power usually measured by the attributional capability). 
This variable only takes into account two nodes (in a dyad) and one link (connecting the two nodes in a 
dyad). It implicitly assumes that behavior in a dyad can be studied as if it were a closed system (unless it 
aggregates allies’ capabilities onto each side of the dispute), when we all know that each dyad is 
embedded in a network of other international relations. I argue that what happens in a dyad is a function 
not just of attributes of the members of the dyad, but also of the relations with other states that are linked 
to one or both members of the dyad under study. I use six different measures of extra-dyadic interaction 
on the two dimensions of international relations (communication and resource flows) to test dyadic 
hypotheses in conflicts. The testing of hypotheses in the dyadic conflict analyses is focused on whether my 
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newer conceptions of “power” and “system” lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models than 
previous ones rooted in attribute logic.   
 
2.2.2. On Economic Sanctions 
 The previous research on economic sanctions has been conducted focusing on both sanction 
outcomes and sanction onsets (the former much more frequently than the latter). First, regarding the study 
of sanction outcomes, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (hereafter HSE, 1990) find that, among their 18 
hypothesized determinants of sanction success, only 5 were empirically supported based on the results 
from their analysis—which includes variables for World Wars I and II, “international assistance to target,” 
“target conditions,” “time trend” and “pre-sanction relations between sender and target.” Bergeijk (1989) 
reanalyzes their data and finds that three of the HSE variables (“pre-sanction relations between sender 
and target,” “sanction length,” and “target conditions”) and his “sender reputation” variable reached 
statistical significance. Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) argue that the factors affecting the 
success of economic sanctions are dependent on the goals of the sender country. Running different logit 
models with the sender’s different goals, they find the following: that when the sender’s goal is simply 
destabilization, the main determinant of success is the target conditions; and that for all other goals, the 
use of financial sanctions are most effective, and that there is a modest downward trend over time in the 
effectiveness of sanctions in this category.  
Bonetti (1998) finds that third-party assistance to the target and relatively small pre-sanction trade 
between target and sender makes sanctions less successful, but that “modest” objectives and a 
cordial/neutral pre-sanction relationship between sender and target make sanctions more successful. 
Reanalyzing the HSE data using the ordered logit estimation, Drury (1998) finds that most of their 
bivariate variables are insignificant; the exceptions are the positive effect of target gross national product 
(GNP) cost, the negative effect of international cooperation with the sender, and the positive effect of 
institutional cooperation. Using the ordered probit analysis, Hart (2000) finds that sanctions by 
democracies on average are more successful due to the signaling properties of sanctions, and that there is 
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a positive effect of pre-sanction trade level and a negative effect of international cooperation with the 
sender on sanction success. Using only U.S. sanctions in a censored probit analysis, Nooruddin (2002) 
finds that sanctions are less likely to be successful if there was cooperation with the sender, the two had a 
militarized interstate dispute (MID), or the two are aligned; and more likely to be successful if the target is a 
democracy and has a high sanction cost. Martin’s (1992) sanction study approaches a limited form of 
network thinking in the sense that it considers how a multilateral organization sanction has different effects 
than simple bilateral interventions. He argues that “the leading sender has to demonstrate a credible 
commitment to the threats [for the success of its sanction]” and that one of the important mechanisms that 
accompanies the credible commitments is the use of international institutions (413). By making the 
cooperation among other possible sanctioners easier and the free ride among those countries more 
difficult, sanctions by international institutions have the higher probability of success.  
Unlike the rather voluminous empirical research on sanction outcomes, there has been little 
research on sanction initiation. Drezner (1998) rightly points out that “most of the (sanction) literature has 
focused on the outcome of coercive attempts; there has been little research explaining when senders (the 
sanctioning county) will initiate threats or act on economic sanction” (710).  Studying the U.S. use of 
economic sanctions, Drury (2000) finds that a U.S. president considers both domestic factors (such as job 
approval rating, election proximity, inflation rate, and unemployment levels) and the relationship with the 
target county (tension level, increase/decrease of that tension level, and provocative statements/actions by 
target) before making a decision to initiate sanctions. When presidents decide to maintain or alter 
sanctions after they are in place, they only consider the factors relating to the relationship with the target. 
Drury’s later work (2003) finds that democracies more frequently and autocracies less frequently use 
economic sanctions, and that sanctions between democracies are rare (the joint democratic peace in terms 
of economic sanctions). Nooruddin (2002) finds that sanctions are (1) more likely to be imposed on 
targets in the Western hemisphere by a major power with high pre-sanction trade, and (2) less likely on 
those with the MID onset. Lektzian and Souva (2003) argue and find with their statistical analysis that 
democracies (compared to non-democracies) are more likely to initiate economic sanctions since they 
encompass a greater variety of interest groups, and that democracies prefer sanctioning non-democracies 
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rather than democracies. Applying the liberal peace theory, mostly argued in the militarized conflicts 
study, to the economic relations among states, Goenner (forthcoming) finds that democratic states are less 
likely to engage in the onset of economic sanctions compared to non-democratic ones, but that economic 
interdependence between states does not have any effect on the sanction onset.  
I argue that my analyses of economic sanctions will provide a better understanding of sanction 
onsets and outcomes in the following three ways. First, the previous research on the success of economic 
sanctions does not take into account the selection effects that take place; states involved in economic 
sanctions select or are selected into the sanction phase by a strategic process. Ignoring the selection bias 
(in the previous empirical studies of economic sanctions) might yield the erroneous findings regarding the 
sanction outcomes and onset; I use instead the censored probit estimation, controlling for statistical 
linkages of the two dependent variables of sanction outcomes and sanction onset. Second, to test balance 
of power theory and power preponderance theory on sanction outcomes, Hufbauer et al (1999) use the 
measure on the GNP ratio of sender to target. As I pointed out earlier in the above section of dyadic 
conflict studies, the use of material capabilities to test the two theories is limited since they are unable to 
utilize the extra-dyadic information where we all know that each dyad is embedded in a network of other 
international relations.   
Third, my analyses of sanction outcomes also posit that even though many different attributes of 
the sender or target state (as well as the relationship between the two) have been hypothesized to affect 
the success of economic sanctions, one important factor has been neglected or tested inadequately: the 
target’s national power. As Lam (1990) points out, the sender usually is less likely to put much importance 
on foreign policy goals (of economic sanctions) toward a less powerful target (245), and this low resolve or 
low commitment of the sender toward a less powerful target eventually leads to sanction failure. As I will 
present in detail in the next chapter, the structural network power of each state also represents how well it 
is globalized (communication globalization from the first dimension of communication patterns; economic 
globalization from the second dimension of resource flows) in the international system. In other words, 
structural network power also represents each state’s level of globalization in the system; how centrally 
each state is positioned in the network of relations shows how well each state is globalized in the web of 
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network relations. Based on this conceptualization, the additional hypothesis on a target’s power will test 
the argument that a highly globalized target (i.e., a target with relatively high structural network power) will 
be more severely hurt by the economic sanction, and therefore more likely to concede to the sender’s 
demands, because the sender usually makes its best effort to disconnect the target’s globalization web (i.e., 
isolate the target from its interactive relations with other states), especially in the economic arena (e.g., 
target’s access to international trade or investment market). The well-globalized target will be more 
seriously hurt by the sanction, and the high price that is paid by the target ultimately leads to concessions.   
  
2.3. Conclusion 
 I reviewed the theoretical developments on international system structure (focusing on polarity 
theory) and the previous research of national power in the study of international phenomena, focusing on 
the COW material capability index. In previous studies of international system structure, the defining 
structural characteristics are how capabilities are distributed among the system members (often among 
only a few major powers). In the previous studies, each state’s power is operationalized by attributes such 
as economic capability (measured by its GNP or total population), military capability (measured by its 
military expenditures or military personnel), or some combination of the two. However, this study posits 
that: (1) an attribute conception of national power is inadequate because it offers no method for 
investigating influences outside of a dyad, and (2) a depiction of international system structure based 
solely on the distribution of national attributes is too coarse-grained to provide a satisfactory description of 
the international system. It neglects both the regularities in how the components interact with each other 
and how these interaction patterns are shaped or defined by the structure. This study provides social 
network conceptualizations of international system structure and individual states’ national power. Power 
in a social network perspective is focused on individual states’ relational power: unlike the attributional 
power concept in the previous studies, a state’s power in a social network perspective is focused on its 
interactive behaviors with all other states in a network of relations. International system structure in a 
social network perspective is conceived by considering social network powers of all system members 
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focusing on the different types of interaction networks played in among those member states in the 
system, unlike the previous studies where only a handful of the most powerful actors in the system were 
considered.  
The central focus of my study is on this national power concept and its contribution to national 
and systemic attributes in international relations. This study examines the following two traditional 
questions: (1) how do we conceive individual states’ national power, and (2) how does the distribution of 
national power define the structure of international system? This study attempts to show how redefining 
“power” and “system” in this way contributes to a better theoretical understanding of international politics 
and more accurate empirical work. This study applies the social network perspective of world politics and 
the application of this new solution (social network concepts of international system structure and national 
power) to address the old power theories on the subjects. The focus of the two empirical chapters is on 
how social network conceptions of international system structure and national power lead to more 
accurate and powerful empirical models than previous ones, which are (1) mainly rooted in attribute logic, 
and (2) assume behavior in a dyad can be studied as if it were a closed system. The next chapter 
introduces the network perspectives on depicting international system structure focusing on different 
international interaction networks played by all system members, and of conceptualizing national power 
focusing on a state’s structural network power derived from its structural positioning in those different 
social networks of international relations. It also introduces four central principles of applying the social 
network perspective to international relations, and explains how the two new conceptualizations are 
applied to the two empirical phenomena (militarized conflicts and economic sanctions) to be examined in 
the later empirical chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3. NETWORK CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND 
NATIONAL POWER 
 
 This project is focused on two closely related conceptualizations in the study of world politics, 
the first regarding international system structure and the second regarding individual states’ national 
power. First, it introduces an alternative to polarity theories of the structure of the international system, 
based on the different types of interaction networks potentially involving all member states in the system. 
The project is primarily focused on two broad sets of such international interaction networks: first, a set of 
communication flow networks such as diplomatic exchange networks, foreign student exchange networks, 
and international telecommunication networks; second, a set of resource flow networks such as arms 
transfer networks, international trade networks, and international assistance networks. Next, I argue that 
the previous research studying individual states’ national power should be modified by the new power 
concept called “structural network power,” which is based on social network views of international 
relations. Instead of conceptualizing individual states’ power focused on attributional (and material-based) 
aspects such as military capability (using military expenditure or military personnel) or economic capability 
(using GDP or total population), the project asserts that a state’s power should be conceptualized by its 
structural network power, which comes from its interactive relations with all other member states in the 
international system. This project will contribute to the studies of international relations by introducing 
such a social network perspective of world politics and applying this new solution (social network 
conceptualizations of international system structure and national power) to examine old but still 
unresolved empirical phenomena in the field of international relations. 
 This chapter consists of five sections. The first section introduces the social network 
conceptualization of the structure of the international system, and the second section introduces the social 
network conceptualization of individual state’s national power. The two sections also introduce the data 
 sets for the two dimensions of the international system, focusing on the justifications for their use in the 
project, and the operational indicators of each of five different network power measures. Third, I compare 
the social network measures of national power to the previous measures of power (focusing on the COW 
material capability index). A comparison of the two sets of measures is performed by the two sets of 
analyses: confirmatory factor analyses and correlation analyses (Pearson and Spearman). Fourth, I 
present an example of this approach using the sociograms of arms transfer networks. This section shows 
how social network conceptualizations give a radically different view of the international system than the 
older scalar representations do. Finally, I introduce four central principles of applying the social network 
perspective to international relations, and present how the two new conceptualizations are applied to two 
empirical phenomena (militarized conflicts and economic sanctions) that are examined in the later 
empirical chapters. The final section also presents the groundwork for the later two empirical chapters, 
focusing on three questions, two of which are old questions from the power studies of world politics: (1) 
how do we conceive an individual state’s national power (from the social network perspective), (2) how is 
the structure of the international system shaped or defined not only by the distribution of national powers, 
but also interaction patterns among states (from the social network perspective), and (3) how does 
redefining “power” and “system” from the social network perspective contribute to a better understanding 
of international politics?  The project recasts existing theories and tests them using my new network 
conceptions of the international system.  
 
3.1. Depicting International System Structure 
 The international system is indeed composed of many different international networks. How do 
we define the “network” of international relations, and what is the relationship between “network” and 
“(international) system”? I use Maoz’s (2001a) research to answer these two questions (see also Maoz et 
al. 2005). According to Maoz (2001a), a network is defined as a system that consists of units (states) and a 
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 set of relationships among these units—defined as ties8 on a given relationship; since states in the 
international system do have ties with other system members in many different types of relationships, we 
observe multiple networks9 in the international system. Regarding the network-international system 
relationship, Maoz (2001a, 150) correctly notes that there is considerable overlap between the two 
concepts. The key difference between them, adopted from Maoz (2001a), is the nature of the bonds that 
make units members of a network or of a system.10 In this project, states become a part of a network only 
if they have an actual and voluntary contact with other network member(s); this is different from the 
situation where states become a part of a system (here, international system), as long as they are part of a 
common structure that regulates their behaviors. Also, as in Maoz (2001a) and Maoz et al. (2005), the 
project posits that the international system is composed of different types of interaction networks, based 
on different types of connections among states in the system. 
The decision rules that I adopt for choosing international networks to depict the international 
system structure are based on the following three theoretical and empirical considerations. First, 
international networks used in this project are primarily focused on the dynamic behaviors of interactive 
relations among states in the system, and therefore this decision rule excludes the international networks 
that are static, such as a state’s affiliation (Maoz et al. 2005), its attribute(s), its involuntary decision(s)11 
                                                        
8 A difference from Maoz’s research (Maoz 2001a; Maoz et al. 2005) is that this project only focuses on the 
directional ties among states. The definitions of directional and non-directional ties and the reasons for 
only using directional ties are explained in a later section. 
9 The use of multiple networks is not new in the field of international relations. There have been several 
studies that examine (or at least consider) multiple networks of international relations to characterize 
international system structure (Deutsch 1954; Singer and Small 1966, 1973; Brams 1966, 1968; Snyder 
and Kick 1979). 
10 The definition of a “network” and the use of multiple networks can also be found in Knoke and 
Kuklinski (1982): “Relations are the building blocks of network analysis. A network is generally defined as 
a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, or events (see Mitchell 1969). Different 
types of relations identify different networks, even when imposed on the identical set of elements” (12). 
They suggest one such example of using multiple networks: studying the relationship among employees at 
a workplace focusing on the advice-giving network, the friendship network, and the formal authority 
network.  
11 This project uses “discretion networks” rather than “nondiscretion networks” (Maoz 2001a). According 
to Maoz (2001a, 148), the former focuses on the connections by “a result of a choice and a joint activity 
of members” (e.g., the European Union members decide whether to accept Turkey, or the United 
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 (Maoz 2001a), or other static relationships between states (Singer and Small 1966). This decision rule 
excludes, among the possible candidates, the international networks (1) that are primarily based on a 
state’s affiliation or attribute such as ethnic, linguistic, religious, or democratic networks (e.g., international 
networks composed of English-speaking states or of democratic states); and (2) that are primarily based 
on a static relationship between states such as contiguity or distance (e.g., international networks 
composed of contiguous states). The theoretical reasoning behind this decision rule is that (1) this project 
is focused on states’ dynamic interactions with other system members rather than their “natural” or static 
bonds with them, and (2) the power concept derived from the new social network depiction of 
international system structure is focused on the relational aspect rather than attributional aspect of national 
power. States continuously interact with other system members in different international networks, and 
this project focuses on such interactive networks of international relations. This project focuses on the 
international networks where states interact with other system members by continuous choices that are 
updated and revised on a regular basis, rather than on international networks to which states belong 
based on their attribute or affiliation in isolation from other states, or where states hold static relationships 
with other system members. One cannot say much about network effects unless the network varies. 
The international networks used in this project are solely constructed from the directional 
behaviors of interactive relations among states in the system, and thus this decision rule excludes 
international networks that are not focused on the directional characteristics of relationships among states. 
Here, following the consensus among social network theorists, I distinguish directed (or asymmetric) 
international networks from nondirected (or symmetric) international networks based on whether we can 
differentiate between “choices made” and “choices received” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 198). For 
example, the arms transfer network used in this project is a directed (or asymmetric) international network, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Kingdom can decide whether to join the Euro regime), and the latter focuses on connections by “an 
involuntary association formed by some external authority or by circumstances and structural conditions 
not under the discretion of units” (e.g., a neighborhood of states makes up a network, a so-called 
politically relevant international environment or PRIE, Maoz 1996). In other words, the discretionary 
networks are formed as a result of states’ choices; members in the discretionary network can opt into the 
network. The nondiscretionary networks are formed by factors that are not under the control of a state; 
membership in the nondiscretionary network is defined by factors that are outside the realm of states’ 
choices. 
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 because we can distinguish “choices made” (state a transfers arms to state b) and “choices received” (state 
b receives arms from state a). By contrast, the IGO joint membership network, used in some network 
studies of international relations but not here, is a nondirected (symmetric) network because we cannot 
define direction within it.12 The theoretical reasoning behind this decision rule of excluding the 
nondirected international network is that without the true directional characteristics of interaction 
relationships, it is difficult to depict who is influencing or influenced by whom when we consider the social 
network power derived from the international system structure. Compare, for example, the arms transfer 
network (a directional network) used in this project and the IGO membership network (a nondirectional 
network) not used. If we see the direction of arms transfers from state a (e.g., the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War era) to state b (e.g., East Germany), we can argue that the sender exerts influence on the 
receiver by way of transferring arms (by the same logic, if we see the direction of international assistance 
from state a, say the United States, toward state b, say the Philippines, we should be able to differentiate 
the “influencing” and  “influenced” parties in this relationship). However, suppose the two states shared 
the IGO membership (say, the Soviet Union and the United States in the UN during the Cold War era); 
can we pinpoint who influences and influenced whom by way of the joint membership within this 
nondirected network, or can we operationalize a social network power from this international network? 
The answer is probably no in this case, and that is why I focus on directional (or asymmetric) networks of 
international relations in this project (by the same logic, from the nondirectional tie of state a and state b 
being territorially contiguous, we should be unable to distinguish the parties of “influencing” and of “being 
influenced”). Third, some of the international networks identified in previous research are not used in this 
project for practical reasons (e.g., insufficient data). Some of the international networks that satisfy the 
above two theoretical decision rules had to be excluded due to the lack of consistent data available for the 
time period of this project, for all the system member states, or for the directional ties identifying the 
origins and destinations of relationships. They include international networks of mail correspondence, 
                                                        
12 Define X as the matrix of social network data. If the ith row of the sociomatrix is identical to the ith 
column, we call it a nondirectional (symmetric) network. If the two are non-identical, we refer to it as a 
directional (asymmetric) network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 177, 199).  
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 migration, Internet correspondence, and tourism.13 Following the three theoretical and empirical decision 
rules outlined above, six types of international networks14 along two dimensions (communication flow 
networks and resource flow networks) of international systems are used in this project.   
 
3.1.1. Dimension of Communication Flows 
The first dimension used to define the international system structure15 is that of communication 
flows among states in the system (the communication aspect of interactions in international relations). This 
dimension is focused on the exchanges or flows of people among states, or the communication exchanges 
among people across states. This project argues that states in the system are connected with each other in 
many different social networks of international relations, and one of the dimensions we should focus on 
when we define international system structure is how states interact with each other in international 
communication networks. As Barnett (1999) correctly points out, the communication networks of 
international relations have always been one important part of global interactions as the exchanges of and 
among “people” have expanded in response to the globalization process (see also Robinson 1991). 
                                                        
13 I have personally contacted the relevant international institute or agency for the availability of such data 
(e.g., Universal Postal Union [UPU] for international mail correspondence; International Organization for 
Migration [IOM] for international migration; International Telecommunication Union [ITU] for 
international Internet correspondence; World Tourism Organization [WTO] for international tourism; and 
some other international and research institutes). According to the representatives of each institute or 
agency, their data are only available either for a short time period, or for limited numbers of states, or for 
an aggregation of states (rather than for the countries of origins and destinations used in this project). 
14 I have decided to use this set of six international networks not only because they satisfy the three 
decision rules outlined above, but also because they have been used in previous research in international 
relations consistent with the two new conceptualizations of this project (i.e., to identify the international 
system structure and an individual state’s national power). For example, diplomatic, academic, and 
telecommunication exchanges or flows have all been used to identify the international system structure; 
arms, international trade, and monetary flows or exchanges have all been used to identify the relational 
power among states in the system. Of course, we can surely identify and use more than two dimensions of 
international system structure and, by the same logic, find more than three networks for each of the two 
dimensions. My project, however, will focus on six such international networks along the two broad 
dimensions of international system structure, based on the theoretical/empirical decision rules outlined 
above. 
15 In this project, “structure” means more than an ordering of states based on some attributes possessed by 
each state (as in the scalar representations noted by Chapter 2); it refers to elements of the international 
system that cannot be observed merely by observing each state in isolation from others. 
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 Deutsch (1954) also argues that, in the mapping and measuring political community at the international 
level, the most important aspect of international transaction is international communication and the level 
of mutual communication among different groups and regions. Communication flows are operationalized 
by three measures: diplomatic exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and international telephone 
exchanges. In this first set of communication networks, interactive relational ties (linkages) between 
sovereign but interdependent states are channels of communication exchanges that show how states are 
connected or interact with each other in diplomatic channels (how diplomatic missions are 
exchanged/transferred between states), in academic channels (how foreign students are 
exchanged/transferred between states), and in telecommunication channels (how international telephone 
messages are exchanged/transferred between states).  
 The first international communication network used here is diplomatic exchanges. These 
exchange networks have been examined to classify international system members based on their 
attributed status (e.g., Singer and Small 1966, Small and Singer 1973), or to identify clusters of nations 
within the international system (e.g., Brams 1966, 1968; Snyder and Kick 1979). Small and Singer (1973) 
claim that the decision to locate, maintain, and abolish a diplomatic mission reflects a wide variety of 
considerations between states, and that the sum total of such diplomatic missions to a given capital 
represents some consensus as to how important the recipient state is to all other states in the system (also 
in Singer and Small 1966). Snyder and Kick (1979) use the network of diplomatic exchanges as one of 
their four types of international networks to define international system structure. They all argue that 
diplomatic exchanges are an important part of how states are connected with each other in the web of 
relationships.  
Two widely used data sets of diplomatic exchanges among states are used in this project to 
identify this aspect of international communication flows (the diplomatic channels of international 
communication exchanges): Singer and Small’s (1991) “Diplomatic Missions Received by Each 
International System Member (ICPSR 5025)” and “Diplomatic Exchange Data (ICPSR 5026).” The two 
data sets record the presence or absence of a diplomatic mission and, if present, the number and rank of 
missions sent or received (at five-year intervals) among states in the international system. I will use states’ 
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 interaction with other system members in terms of their diplomatic exchanges (i.e., in the diplomatic 
channels of international relations) as one of the communication flows to depict the international system 
structure. States interact with other states in different networks of international relations, and this 
diplomatic exchange network identifies one aspect of international system structure focused on the 
importance of diplomatic channels in such international communication interactions.  
The second international communication network used here is based on foreign student 
enrollments. As Chen and Barnett (2000) correctly point out, as scientific and technological knowledge 
and information are being regarded as vital in the process of globalization, higher education has become a 
key international linkage among states in the international system. Chen and Barnett (2000) also argue 
that foreign student enrollments have become another important form of communication, determining 
how states interact and communicate with each other. Much recent research in the field of 
communications studies has argued that foreign student exchanges are one of the key communication 
linkages connecting states in the system, and that this exchange of overseas students among states is also 
related to other aspects of international relations such as political or economic relations. The flow of 
knowledge resources among states (in the form of overseas study) is closely interconnected with the global 
political, economic, and cultural relationships among states in the system (McMahon 1992). Global 
expansion in overseas study is sensitive to changes in the world economy (Sutton 1993). Cummings 
(1993) argues that the increase in overseas education is related to the emergence of a new international 
economic order. Arguing that the exchange of students is an important part of how states are connected 
with each other in the web of relationships, Barnett and Wu (1995) study international student exchange 
networks in 1970 and 1989; Chen and Barnett (2000) study international student exchange networks in 
1986, 1989, and 1996.  
This project uses data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO)’s Statistical Yearbook (various years) to identify this aspect of international communication 
flows. The source recodes the yearly number of foreign students exchanged by their countries of origin. I 
use this information about how states interact with other system members in terms of their foreign student 
exchanges (i.e., in the academic channels of international relations) as one of the communication flows to 
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 depict international system structure. States interact with other states in different networks of international 
relations, and this foreign student exchange network identifies one aspect of international system structure 
focused on the importance of academic channels of such international communication interactions. 
Finally, the third international communication network used here is international 
telecommunication exchanges. These networks have been examined mainly in the discipline of 
communications studies. The use of telecommunication networks is important because, as Barnett et al. 
(1996) correctly point out, telephones until very recently provided the basic connection for social 
interactions and the linkages within or among states, producing what Deutsch (1953) called “a web of 
nations.” For example, Barnett and his colleagues have examined the structure of telecommunications 
networks, arguing that it provides one of the important linkages connecting states in the system: Barnett 
and Choi (1995) for 1986 telecommunication networks; Barnett et al. (1996) for 1982, 1986, and 1989 
networks; and Barnett and Salisbury (1996) for 1992 networks. This project uses two widely-used data 
sets of telecommunication exchanges to identify this aspect of international communication flows: the 
international telecommunication data from ITU’s Yearbook of Statistics (various years) and Direction of 
Traffic (various years). These sources recode the yearly incoming/outgoing international telephone traffic 
in minutes by country of origin. I use state interaction with other system members in terms of their 
international telephone exchanges (i.e., in the telecommunication channels of international relations) as 
one of the communication flows to depict international system structure. States interact with other states in 
different networks of international relations, and this international telephone exchange network identifies 
one aspect of international system structure focused on the importance of telecommunication channels of 
such international communication interactions. 
All the data for each type of communication dimension are first transformed from the typical 
dyadic interaction data (state A, state B, year, dyadic data variable) to the n*n (n=number of states in the 
international system) square matrices of each year.16 These valued directional square matrices are then 
                                                        
16 The example for international trade (bilateral export) data set is below.  
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 transformed to the binary directional17 square matrices to be used in the social network analyses (using 
the procedures in Ucinet Version 6.87 by Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Appendix 1.1 is included 
to illustrate these procedures, the original and binary matrices of diplomatic exchanges and foreign student 
exchanges in 1960 (for the European continent only, to save space). So for example, for the diplomatic 
exchanges matrix in 1960, UKG (United Kingdom) received diplomatic missions from all other 23 states in 
Europe except ALB (Albania) and BUL (Bulgaria); but it sent diplomatic missions to all other 23 states in 
Europe except ALB (Albania) (thus the directional square matrix where the raw and column of the data 
entries can be different). For the foreign student exchange matrix, we can see how many foreign students 
from each state in Europe were received by the United Kingdom in 1960 by taking a look at the raw 
entries for UKG in Appendix 1.1. How many students the United Kingdom sent to other states in Europe 
can be revealed by taking a look at the column for UKG in Appendix 1.1. These valued matrices of 
foreign student exchange are then binalized to be used in the social network analyses by using the average 
value of cells in the whole matrix as a cutoff point (e.g., the cutoff point in a foreign student exchange 
matrix in 1960 is 14.492; if the cell is greater than or equal to 14.492, it is coded as 1, otherwise it is 
coded as 0).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
State A State B Year Dyadic       
Data 
United 
Kingdom 
France 1990 $155mil  1990 United 
Kingdom 
France U.S. ... 
United 
Kingdom 
U.S. 1990 $357mil  United . $155mil $357mil  
Kingdom 
France United 
Kingdom 
1990 $282mil ==> France $282mil . $126mil  
France U.S. 1990 $126mil  U.S. $536mil $465mil .  
U.S. United 
Kingdom 
1990 $536mil  ...     
U.S. France 1990 $465mil       
...          
 
17 Define X as the matrix of social network data. If the ith row of the sociomatrix is identical to the ith 
column, we call it a nondirectional (symmetric) network. If the two are non-identical to each other, we 
refer it as a directional (asymmetric) network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 177 and 199). Or, let’s refer xij 
to the matrix entities that recode the value vk associated with the line or arc lk between ni and nj. If the 
matrix entity of xij is identical to that of xji, we refer to the matrix as a nondirectional matrix. If the matrix 
entity of xij is different from that of xji, we refer to the matrix as a directional matrix. Furthermore, if the 
value vk associated with xij is restricted to zeros and ones, we refer to the matrix as a binary matrix. On the 
other hands, if the value vk associated with xij is not restricted to zeros and ones (i.e., it carries a value), we 
refer to the matrix as a valued matrix.  
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 3.1.2. Dimension of Resource Flows  
 The second dimension used to define international system structure is that of resource flows 
among states in the system (the resource aspect of interactions in the international relations). This 
dimension is focused on the transfers or flows of goods and services among states in the system. States in 
the system are connected with each other in many different social networks of international relations, and 
one of the dimensions that we should consider when we define international system structure is how states 
interact with each other in the international resource flow networks. Resource flows are operationalized by 
three measures: arms transfers, international trade (exports), and international economic assistance. In this 
second set of resource networks, interactive relational ties (linkages) between sovereign and 
interdependent states are channels of resource transfers that show how states are connected or interact 
with each other in the arms channels (how arms are transferred or exchanged between states), in the trade 
channels (how foreign goods and services are transferred or exchanged between states), and in the 
monetary channels (how international monetary assistance is transferred or exchanged between states).  
The arms transfer networks have been examined in many studies of international relations, such 
as arms transfer relationships used as a tool of statecraft, especially during the Cold War era (Krause 1991; 
Sanjian 1989; Blanton 2000; Maniruzzaman 1992; Cutler, Despres, and Karp 1987). Recently, Kinsella 
(2003, 2004, 2006) examined the structure of arms transfer networks using the social network perspective. 
Kinsella (2003, 1) argues that “the global arms trade should be understood not as a market but as a 
network, one that shares some important properties with networked forms of organization studied by 
sociologists.” I use data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to identify this 
aspect of international resource flows.18 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all 
transfers of seven categories of major conventional weapons. The source covers both the sales of weapons 
(including manufacturing licenses) and other forms of weapon supplies such as gifts and aid.  
                                                        
18 For providing arms transfer data used in this project, my thanks go to Nicholas Chipperfield and 
Natasza Nazet of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project. 
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 The second international resource network used here is the flows of goods and services. The 
international trade (of goods and services) networks have been examined, for example, in the empirical 
analyses of world-system theory to depict the structure of the world economy (Snyder and Kick 1979, 
Nemith and Smith 1985, Smith and Nemith 1988, Smith and White 1992). As Smith and White (1992) 
correctly point out, world-system theorists have long argued the importance of commodity trade 
(“unprocessed raw materials” for periphery trade and “highly processed exports” for core trade) in 
determining stratum membership and in promoting unequal exchange in the world economy (also in 
Emmanuel 1972, Frank 1969, Galtung 1971, Firebaugh and Bullock 1987, and Steiber 1979). For 
example, Nemith and Smith (1985), exclusively focusing on flows of international commodity trade to 
formulate international system structure, emphasize that the world-system theory stresses the world 
economy as the basic unit of analysis, and therefore international trade should be subjected to analysis in 
its own right. I use data from Gleditsch (2002, 2004) to identify this aspect of international resource flows. 
The Expanded Trade and GDP Data version 4.1 by Gleditsch (2002, 2004) covers total exports and 
imports among states in the system in millions of current U.S. dollars.  
The third international resource network used here is the flows of monetary assistance. The 
international assistance networks have been suggested by Singer and Small (1966, 1973) as one of the 
possible candidates to characterize international system structure. The use of economic assistance 
networks also has been studied to examine the consequences of the recipient’s aid dependence on the 
sender and, as a result, the sender’s power over the recipient in such areas as human rights (e.g., Roeder 
1985, Regan 1995, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, Carleton and Stohl 1987). The international 
assistance data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s 
International Development Statistics: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 
provides the volume, origin, and types of aid and other resource flows for more than 180 countries in the 
system.  The same procedures used to derive the binary directional matrix for the data sets of 
communication dimension are also applied to derive the matrix for the resource dimension data sets 
(Appendix 3.1 illustrates the procedures, using the examples of arms transfer and international trade data 
sets).  
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3.2. Conceptualizing National Power 
 I define a state’s “structural network power” as the power of an individual state at its location 
within the networks of international relations—how each state is structurally positioned in different types of 
social networks of international relations. In this project, I focus on several different dimensions of 
structural network power that arise from a state’s structural positioning in different types of interaction 
networks of the international system. These dimensions are based on five different conceptualizations of 
point centralities19 from network analyses of different types of interaction data (i.e., degree, betweenness, 
flow-betweenness, coreness, and ego network brokerage) (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Freeman 1978/1979; Borgatti and 
Everett 1999; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). The substantive 
meanings of each of the network power measures are provided in this section; the technical details of how 
to derive each measure (or formal definitions of each measure) are presented in the next section.   
As most social network theorists emphasize, there is a consensus among social network analysts 
that there is a positive relationship between an actor’s centrality and its power within a network. Actors 
occupying central positions are essentially viewed as powerful due to their greater access to and possible 
control over the relevant resources (Boje and Whetten 1981; Lincoln and Miller 1979; Blau and Alba 
1982; Brass 1984, 1992; Brass and Burkhardt 1992, 1993; Burkhardt and Brass 1990; Knoke and Burt 
1983; Krackhardt 1990; Sparrowe and Liden 2005). Each of the five different centralities that have been 
developed by social network theorists emphasizes different aspects of structural network power, and I 
argue that we should consider all five when we conceptualize a state’s national power. The five centrality 
concepts can be divided into two groups based on the emphasis of each centrality concept. We can place 
                                                        
19 Social network theorists use the term “point centrality” (or “node centrality”) differently from that of 
“network centralization” (or “graph centralization”) (see Scott 2000, 82). The first term refers to an 
individual node’s relative centrality or prominence (compared to other nodes in the network); the second 
term refers to the level of centralization of the network as a whole (or the distribution of point/node 
centralities within the network). These concepts from the social network perspective can be compared to 
an individual state’s power (for the former), and the concentration of powers among states in the 
international system (for the latter) in the studies of international relations. 
 40
 degree and ego network centralities in one group, and betweenness, flow-betweenness, and core 
centralities in the other. The first group focuses on the nodes to which a particular node is adjacent (called 
“local centrality” [Scott 2000, 82–89]), and the second group focuses on the distances among the various 
nodes (called “global centrality”). We might also categorize the five power measures as follows: first, 
degree centrality focuses on the node’s direct involvement with other network members; second, 
betweenness, flow-betweenness, and ego network centralities focus on the node’s third-party broker 
opportunities within the network; and finally, core centrality focuses on the node’s overall core-peripheral 
structural positioning within the network. Grouping some of the power measures together or choosing one 
or a few of the measures over the others all depends on which aspect of structural network power 
concepts we are interested in (or which aspect of the power concept is more or less appropriate for 
examining the research question at hand). For example, in the field of international relations, if we are 
interested in examining the interdependence-conflict relationship, we might want to focus on the degree 
aspect of structural network power. If we are interested in studying the third-party involvement-conflict 
relationship, we might want to focus on the betweenness and flow-betweenness aspects of network power 
(or the ego network brokerage aspect if the focus is more regional). If we are interested in testing the 
arguments of the world-system theory, we might want to focus on the coreness aspect of structural 
network power. Better yet, we might want to use all five different aspects of structural network power to 
examine the empirical phenomenon at hand and see how each aspect of structural network power (in 
isolation from other aspects) is related, or how structural network power as a whole (considering all five 
aspects of power) is related. 
 
3.2.1. Structural Network Power Based on Degree Centrality 
 Viewing a state’s structural network power as arising from its degree centrality treats each node’s 
(state’s) structural power based on its total number of direct connections to other nodes (states) in the 
network. A state with a high degree centrality (i.e., many direct ties to other states) holds a powerful 
(influential), prestigious (prominent), or advantaged position in the network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne 
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 and Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Freeman 
1978/1979; Borgatti and Everett 1999; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti, Everett, and 
Freeman 2002). It is the most visible actor in the network, and therefore it is “where the action is“ in the 
network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Compared to the state that holds a less powerful or prestigious 
position in the network (with its limited number of direct ties to other network members), a highly degree-
central state: (1) is less dependent on other states because it has many alternative ways to get what it 
needs, (2) has more access to the resources of the network since it has more ties to other states, and (3) 
usually holds and benefits from a third-party position (or a deal-maker position) in exchanges among 
other states in the network because it has many ties to other states20 (Hanneman 2001). For example, the 
Cold War matrices of arms transfers show that the Soviet Union had a higher degree centrality in the arms 
transfer network than Bulgaria. The structural position of the Soviet Union enabled it to: (1) be less 
dependent on other states for its export and imports needs, (2) have more access to the arms resources 
available within the network, and (3) benefit from advantageous third-party positions in the exchanges of 
arms. For example, if Bulgaria decided not to import arms from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had 
many other places (especially in Eastern Europe) to export their arms. However, if the Soviet Union 
decided not to export arms to Bulgaria, Bulgaria (with its limited number of arms sources) might be 
unable to find other alternatives places to import their arms to. Since the Soviet Union had more 
opportunities and alternatives than Bulgaria, it had more structural social network power (in terms of 
degree centrality) in the arms networks. The Soviet Union could also influence the behavior of other 
suppliers such as East Germany. 
 
                                                        
20 The long-debated relationship between economic interdependence and national power in the field of 
international relations has some merit here (especially in terms of “sensitivity interdependence” and the 
vulnerability interdependence regarding the “mutual effects” or “the opportunity costs of disrupting the 
relationship;” refer to the summary of the debate in Baldwin 1980). 
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 3.2.2. Structural Network Power Based on Betweenness Centrality 
 An approach to structural network power focused on betweenness centrality treats each node’s 
structural power as arising from its position on the geodesics (minimal length paths) that connect two other 
nodes in the network. A state with a high betweenness centrality (standing on many geodesics) holds a 
powerful or prestigious (prominent) position in the network (Bavelas 1948, Shaw 1954, Shimbel 1953, 
Cohn and Marriott 1958; see also Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 
1994; Scott 2000; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Freeman 1978/1979; Borgatti and Everett 1999; Freeman, 
Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Many other states depend on it to make 
connections to other states in the system. The betweenness centrality conceptualizes the degree to which a 
state plays the role of a “broker” or “gatekeeper,” with a potential for control over other states in the 
network (Scott 2000). This centrality is also interpreted as the extent to which a state controls the 
communication between other pairs of states in the system (Brandes and Erlebach 2005, 30). This broker 
or gatekeeper role played by a state with high betweenness centrality is more clearly understood by 
viewing Figure 3.6, which maps international arms transfers among states in 1950. In this situation, Italy 
(ITA) played an important intermediary role among the three sets (or blocs) of states centered around the 
Soviet Union, the U.S., and the United Kingdom.; the same role was played by Indonesia (INS) in the 
international arms transfer network of 1960. During the Cold War, the data show that the Soviet Union 
had a higher betweenness centrality in the arms transfer network than Bulgaria. The Soviet Union was 
standing on the geodesic paths connecting many pairs of communist states (as a leader of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON]), while there were no direct connections between Bulgaria and 
many other communist states. Thus, if the Soviet Union wanted to interact with, say, Albania, it was able 
to do so. However, if Bulgaria wanted to interact with Albania, it could do so only by way of the Soviet 
Union.21 Since the Soviet Union held a more advantageous position (by way of being between the states 
of COMECON) than Bulgaria, it had, in the social network perspective, more structural social network 
power (in terms of betweenness centrality). 
                                                        
21 This works in two ways: first, Bulgaria and Albania might have had no interest in creating a bilateral 
arms sales agreement; second, the Soviet Union (as a leader of COMECON) might have discouraged such 
a bilateral agreement between Bulgaria and Albania with the purpose of dictating their relationship. 
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3.2.3. Structural Network Power Based on Flow-Betweenness Centrality 
 Treating structural network power as arising from flow-betweenness centrality implies measuring 
each node’s structural power based on its position on both the direct and indirect paths that connect two 
other nodes (states) in the network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 
1994; Scott 2000; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Freeman 1978/1979; Borgatti and Everett 1999; Freeman, 
Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). As a modification of Freeman’s original 
conceptualization of betweenness, flow-betweenness is focused on the notion that the actors will use all 
paths to be connected to other actors (not only the shortest geodesic paths); as Stephenson and Zelen 
(1989) point out, there is no reason to believe that interactions between a pair of states occur only on the 
shortest path. This approach assumes that states use each pathway that connects them in proportion to 
the length of that pathway, and that states that are “between” other states are able to translate their broker 
roles to power (Hanneman 2001). A state with high flow-betweenness centrality (standing on many direct 
and indirect paths) holds a powerful or prestigious position in the network because it can affect so many 
interaction channels.  
Flow-betweenness centrality enriches the conceptualization of betweenness centrality. Suppose, 
for example, that two states, South Korea and North Korea, want to exchange arms transfers, and that the 
direct geodesic path between them is blocked by China (say, to maximize its arms transfers by its separate 
connections to South Korea and to North Korea by blocking the direct connection between the two 
Koreas). If there is another pathway to connect them, such as Russia, they will be likely to use it, in spite of 
the fact that it is longer and also subject to disruption. States interact with other network members using 
both direct and indirect pathways, and, from a social network perspective, a state that holds a more 
advantageous position (standing on many direct and indirect paths among network members) holds more 
structural social network power (in terms of flow-betweenness centrality).  
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 3.2.4. Structural Network Power Based on Core Centrality 
 Viewing a state’s structural network power as arising from its core centrality treats each node’s 
(state’s) structural power based on its degree of coreness compared to the other nodes (states) in the 
network (Borgatti and Everett 1999; see also Mintz and Schwartz 1981, Mullins et al. 1977, Doreian 1985, 
and Corradino 1990). Based on the concepts of a core/periphery structure (i.e., a dense and cohesive core 
and a sparse and unconnected periphery), and of a core/periphery relationship (the former exploiting the 
latter), this conceptualization of core centrality is an extension of Wallerstein’s (1974, 1979) dichotomous 
(core-periphery) or trichotomous (core-semiperiphery-periphery) typology that has been used in many 
studies of world-system theory. It measures “coreness” as a continuous variable (a high score on coreness 
represents a highly core state; a low score on coreness represents a highly peripheral state). World-system 
theorists claim that a state’s degree of coreness is highly related to its power. With this approach, we can 
now not only partition states into different groups (core, semiperiphery, and periphery), but also 
differentiate the within-group members (who is the mostly/least powerful within each group).  
 
3.2.5. Structural Network Power Based on Ego Network Brokerage Centrality 
 Defining structural network power in terms of ego network (or egonet) brokerage centrality 
involves measuring each node’s (state’s) structural power based on its possibilities for brokerage among 
the nodes (states) within its own ego network. This treatment involves two separate network concepts. 
First, the concept of brokerage has been defined as a process “by which intermediary actors facilitate 
transactions between other actors lacking access to or trust in one another” (Marsden 1982, 202). Burt 
(1976) and Galaskiewicz and Krohn (1984) define brokers as “actors who simultaneously send and 
receive resources from different parts of the network in which they are embedded” (Gould and Fernandez 
1989, 18). This concept of brokerage has been studied in both theoretical and empirical social network 
research (Blok 1974, Boissevain 1974, Knoke and Laumann 1982; Pruitt 1964); this research emphasizes 
linking the ability to broker negotiation or resource flows to perceived power or influence (see also 
Galaskiewicz 1979, Galaskiewicz and Krohn 1984, Gould 1989, Gould and Fernandez 1989). Gould and 
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 Fernandez (1989) identify five qualitatively different roles of the broker: (1) as a local broker or 
coordinator (e.g., the Federal Reserve Bank as a clearinghouse for all the private banks in a major city), 
(2) as a cosmopolitan or itinerant broker (e.g., a stockbroker as a mediator among clients, buyers and 
sellers), (3) as a gatekeeper or representative (e.g., the broker as a gatekeeper for his or her political party 
can decide whether to grant other party members access to an outsider in a rival party, (4) as a 
representative for other party members who can decide whether to establish contact with an outsider in a 
rival party [Rogers and Rogers 1976]), and (5) as a liaison to link distinct groups (e.g., agents in the 
publishing or entertainment industries). Second, the ego network (or egonet) consists of a focal node 
(called “ego”), the nodes to which ego is directly connected (called “alters”), and the ties among the alters. 
The ego network (also called the neighborhood network or the first order neighborhoods of ego) is a set of 
states to which a given state is directly connected, and therefore focuses on a limited set of interactive 
relationships compared to the other structural network power conceptualizations previously outlined. 
 To illustrate the brokerage concept, suppose that South Korea has a tie to the U.S., and that the 
U.S. has a tie to Afghanistan, but that South Korea has no direct tie to Afghanistan. In this triad of 
relationships (the U.S., South Korea, and Afghanistan), the U.S. (as a local broker or coordinator, as a 
cosmopolitan or itinerant broker, as a gatekeeper, as a representative, or as a liaison in the relationship 
between South Korea and Afghanistan) can play a brokerage role in case South Korea needs to reach 
Afghanistan. If we extend this brokerage role of the U.S. to all the member states within the U.S. ego 
network, we can depict U.S. structural network power in terms of egonet brokerage centrality. The data 
matrices of arms transfers, for example, show that the size of the U.S. ego network increased from 29 in 
1950 to 35 in 2000. Assume that, during the Cold War era, there were two large ego networks (one led by 
the United States and the other by the Soviet Union) and a small number of groups whose members did 
not belong to either. The ego in each of the two ego networks might have played a number of roles as a 
broker: coordinating and mediating transactions among states within the egonet (e.g., the U.S. 
coordinating or mediating the foreign policies among the Organization of American States [OAS] 
members); deciding, as a gatekeeper, whom to invite as its egonet member(s) or whether to grant its 
member state(s) access to an outsider (e.g., during the Cold War era, the U.S. deciding who can belong to 
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 OAS or granting its egonet member(s) permission, in an implicit or explicit way, to interact with the Soviet 
egonet member[s]); establishing, as a representative, relationship with an outsider (e.g., the U.S. 
establishing, as a representative of its egonet members, a relationship with outside states such as China); 
working as an agent to mediate transactions between two outside groups (e.g., the U.S. mediating among 
the members of different non-aligned groups, such as Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] groups during the 
Cold War era). We measure it by first constructing the ego network for each node within the whole 
network, and then by computing each node’s brokerage centrality within its own ego network. From the 
social network perspective, this egonet brokerage represents a more localized structural network power 
compared to other types of structure network power that use all the interactions within the whole network.  
 
3.3. Measuring Structural Network Power 
3.3.1. State-Level Measures of Structural Network Power 
 Each of the five measures of structural network power is constructed using yearly n*n binary 
directional matrices of interaction data (diplomatic exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and 
international telecommunications for the communication dimension; arms transfers, international exports, 
and international assistance for the resource dimension) using the procedures stated below. 
 
1. The degree aspect of structural network power 
 The degree aspect of structural network power, measured by degree centrality, calculates each 
node’s structural network power according to its total number of connections to other nodes in the 
network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman 2002). For directed graphs, it measures both indegree centrality (the number of ties 
received by the node) and outdegree centrality (the number of ties initiated by the node). The indegree 
and outdegree CD of each state ni are: 
∑== +
j
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Since the measures depend on the actual network size g (i.e., the number of states in the system), I use the 
normalized version of these measures, independent of the network size g,  to facilitate comparisons across 
networks of different sizes (i.e., to accommodate changes in the number of international system members 
over time). The normalized indegree and outdegree centralities C’D of each state ni are  
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If g is the number of nodes in the network, then (g – 1) is the maximum possible number of connections 
linking j to i (indegree) or i to j (outdegree). Dividing by (g – 1) allows us to compare each state’s centrality 
to that of the most central state in an ideal star network.22 The normalized degree centralities range from 0 
(when a given node ni has connections to none of the nodes in the network) to 1 (when a given node ni 
has connections to all the nodes in the network).  
To illustrate how countries fare when evaluated by the degree aspect of structural network power, 
Appendix 1.3 displays the degree centralities of foreign student exchanges for the dimension of 
communication patterns and arms transfers for the dimension of resources flows.23 Those figures are 
accompanied by the table ranking each state’s raw degree centrality scores in Appendix 1.2. The figures in 
the Appendix portray the extent to which each state is degree-centralized compared to all other states in 
the network. For example, from the foreign student exchange network of 1960, we see the U.S. is the 
most centralized state, followed closely by France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, in that order. 
We also see that there is another set of about 13 states that are less central than the first set of states but 
far more central than a third set of states; and that the other remaining states (the majority of system 
members, 90 out of 107 in the system) have relatively minimal centrality scores (i.e., minimally powerful 
                                                        
22 Appendix 3.2 describes in detail how to calculate an individual state’s degree centrality by using one of 
the resource flow data sets (arms transfer data sets in 1960 and 2000) and one of the communication flow 
data sets (foreign student data sets in 1960 and 2000).  
23 The figures in the appendix use the Concentric Layout Algorithm, with the options of threshold value 
and grid of 10 in Netminer 2.5.0a.  
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 in the degree aspect) compared to the first two groups of states. In 2000, however, we see that the first set 
of states (the U.S., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) still hold strongly central positions in the 
network; but the second set of states, which is less central than the first set of states but far more central 
than the remaining states in the network, has expanded to approximately 25 states. The top destinations 
of overseas study have not changed much in fifty years, but more countries now host a sizable number of 
foreign students. We might describe this change of pattern as a rough graphical representation of the 
systemic changes argued by world-system theorists (no change of the major powers or of the core 
grouping, and the expansion of middle powers or of the semi-periphery grouping).  
 
2. The betweenness aspect of structural network power 
 The betweenness aspect of structural network power is measured by a betweenness centrality that 
calculates each node’s structural network power according to its capacity of standing on the geodesic 
paths that connect two other nodes in the network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). The betweenness CB of 
each state ni is 
jki
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jkiB gngnC /)()( ∑
<
= , i ≠ j ≠ k 
Since the measure depends on the actual network size g (i.e., the number of states in the system), I use the 
normalized version of the measure, independent of the network size g, to facilitate the comparisons across 
networks of different sizes (i.e., to accommodate changes in the number of international system members 
over time). The normalized betweenness centrality C’B of each state ni is 
[ ])2)(1(/)()(' −−= ggnCnC iBiB  
where (g – 1)( g – 2) is the maximum possible betweenness score. This enables us to compare each state’s 
centrality to that of the most central state in an ideal star network. The normalized betweenness centrality 
ranges from 0 (when a given node ni falls on no geodesic paths in the network) to 1 (when a given node ni 
falls on all geodesic paths in the network).  
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  To illustrate how countries fare in the betweenness aspect of structural network power, Appendix 
1.3 depicts the betweenness centralities of foreign student exchanges for the dimension of communication 
patterns, and arms transfers for the dimension of resource flows. The figures in the Appendix portray the 
extent to which each state is betweenness-centralized compared to other states in the network. Those 
figures are accompanied by the table ranking each state’s betweenness centrality scores in Appendix 1.2. 
In the 1950 network of arms transfers, the U.S. held the most centralized position, closely followed by the 
USSR and Italy, and the United Kingdom, in that order. The 2000 network of arms transfers shows the 
U.S. in the strongest position, with four other suppliers becoming a distant secondary supply group. 
Comparing these two networks shows that the arms transfer network has become more centralized. This 
graphical representation is also confirmed by the systemic centralization index change from 0.007 (in 
1950) to 0.015 (in 2000). Briefly, what the centralization index measures is how centralized each system is 
compared to the star system, where one state holds all the powers obtainable in the network (the 
centralization index of star network equals 1).  
 
3. The flow-betweenness aspect of structural network power 
 The flow-betweenness aspect of structural network power is measured by a flow-between 
centrality. It calculates each node’s structural network power according to its capacity for standing on both 
the direct and indirect paths that connect two other nodes in the network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and 
Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Flow-
betweenness centrality CFB of each state ni is 
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where is the amount of flow-between node j and node k that must pass through i for any 
maximum flow. This normalization enables us to compare each state’s centrality to that of the most central 
state in an ideal star network. Therefore, the flow-betweenness of node i is the sum of all where i, j, 
and k are distinct, and j < k. Since the measure depends on the actual network size g (i.e., the number of 
)(if jk
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 states in the system), I use the normalized version of the measure, independent of the network size g, to 
ensure the accuracy of comparisons across networks of different sizes (i.e., to accommodate changes in 
the number of international system members over time). The normalized flow-betweenness centrality C’FB 
of each state ni is 
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The normalized flow-betweenness centrality of state i is the flow-betweenness of i divided by the total flow 
through all pairs of points where i is not a source or sink and ranges from 0 (minimum flow-betweenness 
centrality) to 1 (maximum flow-betweenness centrality). 
To illustrate how countries fare in the flow-betweenness aspect of structural network power, 
Appendix 1.3 depicts the flow-betweenness centralities of foreign student exchanges for the dimension of 
communication patterns, and arms transfers for the dimension of resource flows. These figures in the 
Appendix portray the extent to which each state is flow-betweenness centralized compared to other states 
in the network. These figures are then accompanied by a table ranking each state’s flow-betweenness 
centrality scores in Appendix 1.2. In the 1950 network of arms transfers, the U.S. held the most centralized 
position, closely followed by Italy, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, in that order. The 
2000 network of arms transfers still shows a strong position for the U.S. with other suppliers (around nine 
states) becoming a distant second supply group. Comparing these two networks show that the foreign 
student exchange network has become more centralized. 
 
 4. The coreness aspect of structural network power  
 The coreness aspect of structural network power is measured by a core centrality that indicates 
each node’s structural network power according to its degree of coreness to the other nodes in the 
network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman 2002). Based on the concept of a core/periphery structure (i.e., a dense and 
cohesive core and a sparse and unconnected periphery), the index of core centrality is a development of 
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 Wallerstein’s (1974) dichotomous (core-periphery) or trichotomous (core-semiperiphery-periphery) 
conception that is used in many studies of world-system theory. The strength of this continuous measure 
(over its previous categorical measure) can be easily understood with the notion of the differentiation 
among states within the core and within periphery groups in the old study of world-system theory.  
The procedure for core centrality fits a core/periphery model to the data network by finding a 
vector C such that the product of C and C transposed is as close as possible to the original data matrix; “In 
a Euclidean representation, this would correspond to distance from the centroid of a single point cloud” 
(Borgatti and Everett 1999, 387). More specifically, the algorithm to derive the core centrality starts with 
the nodes with the highest coreness score and places them in the core; all other actors are placed in the 
periphery. The core is then successively increased by moving the node with the highest coreness score 
from the periphery into the core. This is continued until the periphery consists of a single node (Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman 2002). The coreness of each node is normalized so that the total sum of squares is 
1; the normalized coreness measure ranges from 0 (minimum core centrality) to 1 (maximum core 
centrality). More details on each state’s coreness centrality scores can be found in the Appendix 1.2. For 
example, in 1950, the U.S. held the most centralized position (i.e., the most powerful in the core aspect of 
structural network power) with a coreness score of 0.502; United Kingdom was a distant second at 0.262; 
Canada was 0.205; and France was 0.205. The scores for all the other states in the system were below 
0.200. In 2000, the U.S. still held the highest coreness position, but with a much lower score of 0.347; 
several other states (such as the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Switzerland) had scores around 
0.200; and many other states had scores between 0.100 and 0.200. The pattern is rather clear in the 
terms of coreness centrality: the network has become less centralized. 
 
5. The ego network brokerage aspect of structural network power 
The ego network brokerage aspect of structural network power is measured by an ego network 
brokerage centrality that indicates each node’s structural network power according to its level of brokerage 
among the nodes within its own ego network (Hanneman 2001; Degenne and Frosé 1999; Wasserman 
and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). This measure involves two different 
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 measures in social network analysis: ego network and brokerage. To measure ego network brokerage 
centrality, we first construct the ego network for each node within the whole network (consisting of a focal 
node, called “ego,” the nodes to which ego is directly connected, called “alters,” and the ties among the 
alters); and then we compute each node’s brokerage centrality within its own ego network (by calculating 
the number of ordered actor pairs not directly connected to each other divided by the total number of 
ordered pairs in each ego network). From a social network perspective, this measure of ego network 
brokerage represents a more localized network power index compared to other measures that use the 
interactions in the whole network. Since the measure depends on the actual network size g (i.e., the 
number of states in the system), I use the normalized version of the measure, independent of the network 
size g, to facilitate the comparisons across networks of different sizes. This measure ranges from 0 
(minimum ego network brokerage centrality) to 1 (maximum ego network brokerage centrality). More 
details on each state’s ego network brokerage centrality scores can be found in Appendix 1.2. For 
example, in 1950, the U.S. held the most centralized position (i.e., the most powerful in the ego network 
brokerage aspect of structural network power) with an ego network brokerage score of 0.892, with many 
states closely following. The 2000 figures do not differ much. But the U.S., the most powerful, became 
slightly less powerful and many other states held more powerful positions (compared to the 1950 figures) 
in terms of ego network brokerage. In other words, the system is less centralized in 2000 than in 1950.  
 
3.3.2. System-Level Measures of Structural Network Power 
Two different sets of systemic measures of structural network power are used in this project; first, 
the set of system-level measures developed by Freeman (1978/1979) and Freeman, Borgatti, and White 
(1991) that accompanies their state-level centrality measures of degree, betweenness, and flow-
betweenness; second, the set of system-level measures using the formulas developed by Singer, Bremer, 
and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994). 
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 1. System-level measures from Freeman (1978/1979); structural network power centralizations 
The following three sets of system-level structural network power measures are based on Freeman 
(1978/1979) and Freeman, Borgatti, and White (1991). Each of the three system characteristics is 
measured based upon different aspects of social network power (i.e., degree, betweenness, and flow-
betweenness). Each type of systemic centralization measures the level of centralization in the whole 
network, compared to the ideal “star” network, where a node is connected to all the other N-1 nodes. 
They measure the extent to which the whole network has a centralized structure (or an overall 
“compactness” of a network), or the extent to which the cohesion of the network is organized around a 
particular focal point (Scott 2000). Freeman network centralization scores range from 0 to 1. When all 
states hold exactly the same amount of structural network power in the whole network (which looks similar 
to the “circle” or “wheel” figure), the systemic centralization score equals 0. When one state holds all the 
network structural power in the whole network (which looks similar to the “star” figure), the systemic 
centralization score equals 1. When the centralization score is high, the network is controlled by a few 
powerful states. When the centralization score is low, the control of network is shared by many other 
states. The actual centralization scores are usually greater than 0 and less than 1. Following Freeman 
(1978/1979), this general formula for network centralization is used:  
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2. System-level measures from Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994); structural 
network power concentration, change, and movement 
 
The following sets of system-level structural network power measures are based on Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994) in their study of systemic power concentration and 
systemic war. Each of the three different system characteristics is measured based upon five different 
aspects of structural network power (degree, betweenness, flow-betweenness, coreness, ego network 
brokerage, and their composite index); they will measure different aspects of structural network power 
distribution among states in the international system, using the formula from Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 
(1972) and Mansfield (1994).  
1) Systemic Network Power Concentration  
2) Systemic Network Power Chance (five-year Moving Average) 
3) Systemic Network Power Movement (five-year Moving Average) 
The formulas for each of the measures are as follows: 
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where Nt is the total number of states in the system in year t and Sit is the proportion of state i’s control of 
the aggregated structural network power possessed by all states in year t. The variable  varies 
from 0, where each state possesses the equal proportion of aggregated structural network power possessed 
by all states, to 1, where one state possesses all aggregated structural network power possessed by all 
states in the system. 
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where m is the state that possesses the smallest proportion of structural network power in the system.  
 
3.4. Comparing Measures of National Power 
This section compares and contrasts our new measure of national power (SNPI) to the previous 
measures of national power (focusing on the COW material capability index, CINC). A comparison of the 
two measures is performed by two sets of analyses: confirmatory factor analyses and correlation analyses 
(Pearson and Spearman). The first part of this section provides the results and discussion on the 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the measurement models of CINC and SNPI. The CFA evaluates the 
performance of a particular factor structure through a measurement model that assesses the fit of the 
structure with the data. In other words, the analysis is used to examine the structure of each national 
power index (CINC and SNPI) by comparing its models to the data, allowing for measurement errors in 
the indicator variables. The analysis provides insight into which index of national power provides the 
better fit in its measurement model. The second part of this section provides the results and discussion on 
the Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses for the two power measures. The analyses indicate the 
strength and direction of a relationship between the two measures over time. 
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 3.4.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Measurement Models  
Figure 3.1 represents the CFA measurement model24 of the Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC), the most widely used measure of national power in the field of international relations. 
The index utilizes the following six variables along three dimensions (demographic, industrial, and 
military): (1) total population (TPOP), (2) urban population (UPOP), (3) energy consumption (ENERGY), 
(4) iron and steel consumption (IRST), (5) military expenditure (MILEX), and (6) military personnel 
(MILPER). The single-headed arrow from the construct toward each of the six indicators represents the 
direct causal effect (also called factor loading or pattern coefficient) of the latent variable on the observed 
measures; the single-headed arrow from the indicator to its measurement error term represents all 
variance not explained by the indictor’s underlying factor (such as random or systemic error). Figure 3.2 
represents the CFA measurement model of the Structural Network Power Index (SNPI), the newly 
proposed measure of national power. The index utilizes the following six variables along two dimensions 
(communication and resource flows): (1) diplomatic exchange (DEX), (2) foreign student exchange 
(FSEX), (3) international telecommunication (TELE), (4) arms transfers (ARMS), (5) international trade 
(TRADE), and (6) international assistance (ASSIST). Table 3.1 presents the estimates of coefficients and 
model fit indices for the CFA measurement model for CINC. Table 3.2 presents the estimates of 
coefficients and model fit indices for the CFA measurement model25 for SNPI. 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 Following the conventions of standard CFA models (see Kline 2005, 165-169), two assumptions are 
held. First, each indicator (Xi, per notation conventions of Jöreskog 1978, or Yi, per conventions of Bollen 
1980) is a continuous variable represented as having two causes: a single underlying factor (ξi or ηi) that 
the indicator is supposed to measure, and all other unique sources of causation that are represented by 
the error term (δi or εi). Second, the measurement errors are independent of each other and of the factor.   
 
25 All of the CFA measurement models examined in this section pass the two necessary conditions (the 
number of free parameters less than or equal to the number of observations and every latent variable with 
a scale) and one sufficient condition (at least three indicators for a single-factor model) for model 
identification (Kline 2005, 169-175). 
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 1. Comparing the standardized coefficients of indicators 
The standardized estimates for the six indicators for the CINC measurement model range from 
.453 to .943 (all statistically significant at p=.001), with the expected positive signs; the estimates 
represent how much each indicator changes per one-unit change of the construct. For example, the 
coefficient of .453 for TPOP indicates that for a one-unit change in the factor POWER (CINC), TPOP 
changes .453 units. The results show that in general, the set of indicators representing a state’s population, 
such as TPOP, UPOP, and MILPER, show the relatively low factor loadings of .453, .728, and .775 
(respectively) on CNIC (i.e., relatively low direct causal effects of CNIC on the indicators), compared to 
the remaining indicators representing a state’s consumption or spending (ENERGY, IRST, and MILEX), 
which have relatively high factor loadings of .970, .935, and .943 (respectively) on CINC. The 
standardized estimates for the six indicators in the SNPI measurement model range from .490 to .851 (all 
statistically significant at p=.001), with the expected positive signs; one of the indicators (DEX) shows low 
factor loading (.490), whereas the other five indicators show relatively high and comparable factor 
loadings (FSEX with .839, TELE with .753, ARMS with .794, TRADE with .851, and ASSIST with .832).  
 
2. Comparing the reliability coefficients of indicators 
The reliability coefficient of each indicator shows how well the construct explains the variance in 
the indicator. The reliability coefficients of the six indicators for the CINC measurement model range from 
.205 to .940, showing that the indicator TPOP is the least reliable (only 20.5% of its variance is explained 
by the latent variable) and the indicator ENERGE is the most reliable (94.0% of its variance is explained 
by the latent variable). The reliability coefficients of the six indicators for the SNPI measurement model 
range from .240 to .724, showing that the indicator DEX is the least reliable (only 24.0% of its variance is 
explained by the latent variable) and that the other five indicators show comparable reliability coefficients 
(ranging from .567 to .724). The correlations among the six indicators in each measurement model also 
show a similar pattern. For the indicators of the CINC model, the correlations of TPOP (the least reliable 
indicator) with the other five indicators are quite low (ranging from .329 to .439) and the remaining 
correlations between indicators all exceed .564. For the indicators of the SNPI model, the correlations of 
 58
 DEX (the least reliable indicator in the model) with the other five indicators are quite low (ranging from 
.369 to .417) and the remaining correlations between indicators all exceed .598.  
 
3. Comparing the model fits 
Researchers have used different model fit indices to examine how well the implied model (set by 
the researchers) portrays the data. Following suggestions by Kline (1998, 2005), Hoyle and Panter (1995), 
and Hu and Bentler (1999), I use five standard indices to evaluate the overall fit of proposed 
measurement models (of CINC and SNPI): (1) Bentler’s (1990) Comparative Fit Index (CFI), (2) Bentler 
and Bonett’s (1980) Normed Fit Index (NFI), (3) Bollen’s (1989) Incremental Fit Index (IFI), (4) the 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and (5) the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and its 
parsimony-adjusted index (ECVI, Browne and Cudeck, 1992).26 The first three indices (CFI, NFI, and IFI) 
are called comparative or incremental fit indices, which are the most widely used indices in the structural 
equation model literature (Kline 2005, 140). The indices assess the relative fit improvement of the implied 
model (set by the researchers) compared to the null model (or so-called baseline model or independence 
model), which assumes zero variance among the observed variables. Values for the CFI, NFI, and IFI 
range from 0 to 1, and any fit of .95 or better is considered to be excellent, while .90 or better is deemed 
acceptable (Kline 1998, 2005; Hu and Bentler 1999). The fourth index (SRMR) is based on covariance 
residuals – the differences between observed and predicted covariances. It has been suggested that a 
value greater than .10 indicates that the model does not explain the associated correlations very well; 
                                                        
26 The formal definitions of each of the fit indices used are as follows: (1) CFI = 1 – d (Proposed Model) / 
d (Null Model) where d = X2 – df where df indicates the degrees of freedom of the model, (2) NFI = 1 – 
X2 (Proposed Model) / X2 (Null Model), (3) IFI = (1 – X2 (Proposed Model) / X2 (Null Model)) – (df / (N – 
1)), (4) SRMR is the standardized difference between the observed covariance and predicted covariance, 
and (5) AIC = X2 (Proposed Model) + k(k – 1) – 2df where k is the number of variables in the model and 
ECVI = (X2 (Proposed Model) + k(k – 1) – 2df ) / (N – 1) where N is the sample size in the model. I have 
also examined other overall model fit indices and the results are in line with those presented in the section. 
However, I decided not to use one of the other most widely used fit indices, the X2 index, because, as 
Kline (1998, 128) correctly points out, the index is very sensitive to sample size; if the sample size is large 
(as is the case for all the models examined in this section), the statistic is usually significant even though 
differences between observed and model-implied covariances are slight. Bollen and Long (1993) and 
Tanaka (1993) also show that large sample size can supply sufficient statistical power to reject the null 
hypothesis (indicating the model is significantly different from the data), regardless of the adequacy of 
model fit. 
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 conversely, a value less than .10 is considered to indicate a “good” model (Kline 2005, 131; Browne and 
Cudeck 1992, 239). The last two indices (AIC and ECVI) are called predictive fit indices, which assess the 
model fit in hypothetical replication samples of the same size and randomly drawn from the same 
population as the researcher’s original sample (Kline 2005, 142). The model with the smallest AIC and 
ECVI is preferred since it represents the best fit (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
 Table 3.1 shows the different fit indices of the CINC measurement model. Overall, the model 
fits are far from acceptable range. The first three incremental fit indices are .629 (far from the conventional 
threshold of .90) and the SRMR is .593 (far from the conventional threshold of .10). Sub-sampling the 
whole population into five decades (the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s) reveals that the overall model fits 
get worse over time (e.g., CFI of .659 for the 1950s to .559 for the 1990s; SRMR of .624 for the 1950s to 
.641 for the 1990s). Table 3.2 shows the different fit indices of the SNPI measurement model. Overall, the 
model fits are far better than those of the CINC measurement model and are acceptable. The first three 
incremental fit indices are .974 (better than the conventional threshold of .90) and the SRMR is .099 
(better than the conventional threshold of .10). In contrast to the results from the CNIC measurement 
model, sub-sampling the whole population into five decades reveals that the model fits improve over time 
(e.g., CFI of .935 for the 1950s to .972 for the 1990s, SRMR of .181 for the 1950s to .100 for the 1990s). 
Finally, the predictive fit index (ECVI) for the CINC measurement models is 3.175 for the whole period, 
worsening over time (3.556 for the 1950s to 3.717 for the 1990s). The SNPI measurement model shows a 
much better model fit than the CNIC measurement model; the fit index is .094 for the whole period, 
improving over time (.350 for the 1950s to .112 for the 1990s). Three overall patterns are clearly revealed 
from the comparison of the fit indices of the CINC and SNPI measurement models. First, the fit indices 
from the CINC measurement model are far from the acceptable range of a “good” model. In contrast, all 
the fit indices from the SNPI measurement model are within the range of a “good” model. Second, all the 
fit indices from SNPI model are far better than those from CINC model, providing the rationale to prefer 
the SNPI model over the CINC model. Finally, the gap of fit indices between the two models widens over 
time (i.e., the SNPI model gets better and the CINC model gets worse); in other words, the performance 
difference between the SNPI model and the CINC model is more apparent over time. Figure 3.3, 
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 comparing the overall model fit indices between the CINC and SNPI measurement models based on 
yearly statistics (instead of the decade statistics in Tables 3.1–3.2) for 1950–2000, also confirms the above 
three patterns.  
 
4. Sensitivity analyses 
I have conducted two sensitivity checks on the CFA measurement models of CINC and SNPI.27 
First, I ran a two-factor measurement model of SNPI (for the two dimensions of the SNPI index) and 
compared the results with those from the proposed single-factor model of SNPI. The overall results 
indicate that a two-factor model poorly fits the data and that a single-factor model is superior.28 The 
various overall fit indices show little difference between the two; for example, the CFI, NFI, IFI, SRMR, 
and ECVI for the two-factor model are .975, .975, .975, .101, and .088 (respectively), whereas for the 
single-factor model they are .974, .973, .974, .099, and .094 (respectively). However, the X2difference statistic 
(45.791 with one degree of freedom, which is significant at the 0.001 level) of the two hierarchical 
(nested) models29 indicates that the fit of the single-factor model is significantly better than that of the two-
factor model. Second, I performed the CFA measurement models for CINC and SNPI, putting all twelve 
indicators together. The results show that the six indicators for CINC load on one factor (with the factor 
loadings ranging from .683 to .921), whereas the six indicators for SNPI load on the other factor (with the 
factor loadings ranging from .851 to .943).  
 
                                                        
27 In addition to the two main sets, several additional sets of sensitivity checks on the CFA measurement 
models were performed, and support the main findings. 
28 Similar results were found with a three-factor measurement model of CINC (for the three dimensions of 
the CINC index) compared to the results with those from the proposed single-factor model of CINC. 
29 As Kline (1998, 215) points out, the two models are nested because the single-factor model is a 
constrained version of the two-factor model. If the correlation between the two factors in the two-factor 
model is fixed at 1.0, then the two factors are identical, which is the same as replacing the two factors with 
just one factor (as in a single-factor model). 
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 3.4.2. Pearson and Spearman Correlation Analyses  
Table 3.3 shows the correlations of CINC with SNPI (different aspects of SNPI and GDP are also 
compared). Pearson correlations between measures are below the main diagonal and Spearman 
correlations between measures are above the diagonal. I also split the whole sample into two groups: one 
of developed states and one of less-developed states, using the yearly medians of GDP.30 The purpose of 
the sub-sample correlations is to examine the argument that “the commonly used power capability indices 
do not adequately tap the underlying concept because they work well only among more developed 
countries (MDCs) but fail among the less developed countries (LDCs)” (Taber 1989, 29; see also Tellis et 
al. 2000 and Organski and Kugler 1980).31 Several overall patterns are clear from the correlation tables. 
First, the correlation of CINC with SNPI is modest (.551). Second, the Spearman correlation of CINC with 
SNPI is higher (.718) than the Pearson correlations. This indicates that even though the face validity 
among the measures is acceptable (as evidenced from the Spearman correlations), the two measures do 
not completely overlap (as evidenced from the Pearson correlations). Third, providing indirect evidence 
for the findings by Taber (1989), Tellis et al. (2000), and Organski and Kugler (1980), the Pearson 
correlations are higher among developed states (.512) than less-developed states (.304), whereas the 
Spearman correlations are compatible for the two groups (.508 for developed states and .503 for less-
developed states). The yearly correlation graphs of Figure 3.4 also confirm the above findings and reveal 
that the yearly correlations of CINC with SNPI show a similar pattern to that of CINC with GDP.32
                                                        
30 Using the yearly medians of GDPs as the cutoff points (e.g., 3.724 million dollars in 1950 and 23.309 
million dollars in 2000), the countries of the sample in each year were split into two groups. The countries 
above the yearly median point were categorized as developed and those below as less-developed. 
 
31 Tellis et al. (2000, 3) argues that most power measures such as GNP and the COW index adequately 
measure national power for the developed world but fail to do so for developing world, largely due to 
“analysts’ greater interest in and familiarity with the great power as opposed to the underdeveloped 
countries.” Organski and Kugler (1980) argue that “although [power measures such as GNP and the 
COW index] in the case of developed countries can generate some fairly reliable estimates of national 
capabilities, the same measures, applied to other systems, lead to substantial errors” (66) and, as a result, 
“such measures fail mainly in cases in which a developing and a developed nation, or two developing 
nations, go to war with each other” (68). 
 
32 The congruence between the two measures is also assessed by OLS. Regressing CINC on SNPI, the 
results show that (1) the SNPI only accounts for 30.3% of the variance in CINC, (2) the variance in CINC 
explained by SNPI is larger for developed states (26.2%) than for less-developed states (9.2%) and 
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3.5. Social Network Visualizations of International System Structure and National Power 
 
3.5.1. Social Network Visualization of International System Structure 
The sociograms in Figure 3.5 represent one of the international interaction networks used in this 
project, an arms transfer network of the post-World War II period (1950–2000). These sociograms show 
how each nation-state node interacts with other nodes in each of the networks in different time periods; 
they provide a picture of a specific international network and its evolution (for 1950–2000). These 
sociograms provide the following information: (1) the direction of ties/linkages between nodes represented 
by the arrowhead of the tie (an arrowhead shows the origin and destination of exchange/transfer), (2) the 
absolute/relative structural network power of each node represented by the size of the node (a bigger node 
size means larger raw structural network power score), (3) the major power status, defined by the COW 
project, represented by the shape of the node (diamond for a major power; a circle for all other states), 
and (4) the regions of each node represented by the color of the node (the five regions in the international 
system defined by the COW project) 
 If I borrow the conception of blocs or poles from polarity theory, in the networks of arms transfers, 
the sociograms in Figure 3.5 show that: (1) the United Kingdom bloc or pole (in addition to the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union/Russia blocs) clearly existed until 1960, (2) the bloc led by France emerged in 1960 and 
persisted through 2000, (3) the Soviet Union/Russia bloc grew beginning in 1970 and persisted through 
2000, (4) the size of the U.S. bloc was far larger than the other existing blocs, and (5) a considerable 
amount of interactions among the bloc-followers occurred, especially since 1970, and the blocs led by 
each bloc leader33 were much more intertwined, especially since 1960 (several states in each bloc received 
arms transfers from members of other blocs). This is quite different from polarity theory’s depiction of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
declines over time (43.1% for the 1950s to 29.8% for the 1990s), and (3) similar patterns are also found 
for the regressions of CINC on GDP. 
 
33 The term bloc leader (or pole leader) refers to the most powerful state within the bloc (or pole). The 
term bloc follower (or pole follower) refers to all the other states within the bloc (or pole) that are 
constrained by the regular rules of interactions established and maintained by the bloc leader (or pole 
leader). 
 63
 international system structure, which depicted the system during the Cold War era as a bipolar system (the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union blocs), and, after the demise of the Soviet Union, as a unipolar system (with 
the U.S. the only bloc). The sociograms also highlight the differences between polarity theory and my 
social network perspective of international system structure. In polarity theory: (1) the pole leader and pole 
followers are connected mainly by their alliance formation (or some other foreign policy similarity), (2) the 
interactions among the pole followers are assumed to be nonexistent or unimportant, (3) the interactions 
between the members of different poles are assumed to be nonexistent (or minimal), and (4) the pole 
leaders are the only powerful members in the system. On the other hand, my social network perspective of 
international system structure during the post-World War II period shows that: (1) the pole leaders and 
pole followers are connected by different types of interactions (different communication interactions, 
different resource interactions), (2) the interactions among the followers of one pole and with the members 
of different poles are significant, and (3) almost all system members (not just the pole leaders) play roles to 
depict  international system structure. One other advantage of my social network approach over polarity 
theory is that it allows us to express several different characteristics of international system structure as a 
continuous variable; this permits us to observe transitions much more easily. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
polarity theory treats polarity as a categorical, and provides no way to characterize mixed or transitional 
systems.  
Arms transfer networks provide another view of how social network representations differ from 
the scalar representations of polarity theory. The sociogram in Figure 3.5 of the 1950 arms transfer 
network shows that the international system is composed of three subnetworks led by the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The three subnetworks in 1950 show several distinctive 
structural characteristics that are not revealed by polarity theory. First, each is composed of the 
subnetwork leader, its exclusive members, and some joint members of different subnetworks (belonging to 
two or three different subnetworks). Polarity theory has never provided for the possibility of these joint-
bloc members.  Second, the size of the three subnetworks is quite different; the U.S. subnetwork is the 
largest with around 30 members, followed by the United Kingdom subnetwork with around 20 members, 
and the Soviet subnetwork with around 10 members; polarity theory does not describe the relative size of 
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 such blocs. Third, the U.S. and the United Kingdom subnetworks are closely linked with each other by the 
interaction between their subnetwork leaders (the U.S. and the United Kingdom) and the interactions 
between many of their joint subnetwork members (e.g., ITA, EGY, NTH, BEL, PAK, ISR, NOR, GRC, and 
DEN). Polarity theory cannot assume such a configuration of connected subnetworks (it can be either a 
bipolar system with the U.S. bloc vs. the Soviet Union bloc, or a multipolar system with the U.S., the 
United Kingdom [the connection with the two is ignored], and the Soviet Union blocs). Fourth, polarity 
theory does not directly capture the interactions among the bloc members other than those interactions 
from bloc leader toward bloc followers (it only implicitly argues for within-bloc and between-bloc 
interaction patterns with the claims of “tight” or “loose” blocs), but the sociogram of the 1950 arms 
network clearly shows several noticeable interaction patterns among the subnetwork followers (e.g., those 
of CAN, NTH, and ITA in the U.S. bloc; those of SWD, EGY, and ITA in the U.K. bloc; and, those of CZE 
in the Soviet bloc). Fifth, we also see the important intermediary roles of ITA and CZE (polarity theory 
does not consider such an intermediary role). ITA plays a role in connecting the U.S./United Kingdom 
subnetworks to the Soviet Union subnetwork by its direct connection to the Soviet Union; CZE plays a 
role in connecting the Soviet subnetwork to the United Kingdom subnetwork by its direct connection to 
SWZ, which is a United Kingdom subnetwork member. These five distinctive characteristics that are 
revealed by the sociograms of arms transfer networks clearly show that the social network approach of 
depicting international system structure provides a richer picture of how the system components are 
connected or interact with each other than the simple poles conception from polarity theory. In addition, 
the changes of the structure of each type of network and across different types of networks (say, the arms 
network in 1950 and foreign student network in 1950) clearly reveal that the structure of the international 
system is more accurately depicted when we consider all the different interaction networks present in the 
international system.34
                                                        
34 One other advantage of using the social network approach to depict international system structure is 
that it can also show the subsystem (or regional) structure on which many previous studies of international 
relations (also in the regional studies of comparative politics field) have focused (e.g., Lemke 2002). The 
arms transfer networks in Appendix 3.3 show that the network approach of international system structure 
can also provide a means of analyzing such regional subsystems (sociograms in Appendices 3.3 and 3.4 
are based on states’ affiliation in their relevant regions, defined by Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 95–98 and 
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3.5.2. Social Network Visualization of National Power 
In this project, a state’s power is based on its structural network power that is derived from its 
position in different types of international interaction networks. As described above in detail, an individual 
state’s structural power is different depending on the type of network (communication or resource) and on 
the specific structural network power characteristics (degree-based, betweenness-based, flow-betweenness-
based, coreness-based, and ego network brokerage-based structural power). Some states, for example, 
will be powerful in communication networks but not in resource flows networks; other states will be 
powerful in the degree-based structural dimension but not in the betweenness-based structural dimension. 
By considering all these different characteristics of an individual state’s structural network power, a social 
network approach of conceptualizing the state’s national power will provide a more sophisticated and 
richer conception of a state’s national power in the international system, compared to the simple material-
capability based dominance/submission, the top dogs/underdogs, the core/periphery, the strong/weak, and 
the top/bottom power arguments in the previous theories in the field. 
 Figure 3.6 (the arms transfer network in 1950) shows how each state’s structural relational power 
can vary, depending on its different structural dimensions of network power. The main focus of the 
sociograms in Figure 3.6 is the absolute or relative size of a node within the network, which represents the 
raw scores of different dimensions of structural network power. For example, the analysis of the arms 
transfer network in 1950 shows that the structural network power of each state differs, depending on the 
different conceptualizations of structural network power adopted. In the degree aspect of structural 
                                                                                                                                                                            
adapted by the COW project). From the sociograms, we can see how each subsystem is configured (i.e., 
how regional members are connected with each other in their regional settings) and how the structural 
characteristics of subsystems are similar to or different from those of the whole international system. 
Several distinctive structural features in the Asian arms transfer networks from Appendix 3.3. stand out (as 
compared to the whole system structure). First, the region is mainly divided into two subregions during the 
Cold War era (one led by the U.S. and the other led by the Soviet Union), comprising multiple subregions 
during the post Cold War era. Second, the U.S.-led subregion outnumbers by a great deal the Russian-led 
subregion; third, the United Kingdom and France play less active roles (the former less than the latter) in 
the U.S.-led subregion, while China plays an important role in the Russian-led subregion since 1980. 
Finally, the network becomes much more intertwined over time (in terms of interactions among members 
within and across the two subregions). 
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 network power that focuses on each node’s (state’s) centrality according to its total number of connections 
to other nodes (states) in the network, the U.S. and the United Kingdom held the two most powerful 
positions in the network, and the Soviet Union held a comparable but less powerful one. The U.S. and the 
United Kingdom are the most visible actors in the network, and therefore they are “where the action is” in 
the network of the 1950 arms transfer network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Regarding the betweenness aspect of structural network power that focuses on each node’s 
(state’s) centrality according to its capacity of standing on the paths or geodesics (i.e., minimal length 
paths) that connect two other nodes (states) in the network, we see the following in 1950: (1) the United 
Kingdom held a relatively less powerful position, (2) the Soviet Union held a powerful position compared 
to the most powerful state, the U.S., and (3) Italy, due to its structural position, connecting the three blocs 
of the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, held a powerful position that is comparable to the 
two most powerful states, the U.S. and Soviet Union. Those states that held positions in the between 
aspect of structural network power played the role of a “broker” or “gatekeeper” with a potential for 
control over other states in the network (Scott 2000). In the flow-betweenness aspect of structural network 
power that focuses on each node’s (state’s) centrality according to its capacity of standing on both the 
direct and indirect paths that connect two other nodes (states) in the network, Canada became one of the 
two most powerful states in the network because it transferred arms to the state (the U.S.) that held the 
other most powerful position within the network by transferring arms to some 30 states. In the coreness 
aspect of structural network power that focuses on each node’s (state’s) centrality according to its degree 
of coreness to the other nodes (states) in the network, the U.S. is shown to hold the most powerful 
position in the network. In the egonet brokerage aspect of structural network power that focuses on each 
state’s centrality based on its level of brokerage within its own ego network, the U.S., the United Kingdom, 
Soviet Union, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia all show levels of brokerage that are the 
highest within their own ego networks.35  
                                                        
35 As in Appendix 3.3, the social network approach can be used to analyze national powers among 
regional subsystem members. For example, Appendix 3.4 (of the Asian arms transfer network in 1950) 
shows that: (1) overall, the U.S. held the most powerful position in the Asian arms transfer network, (2) 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands held quite powerful structural positions due to their roles of 
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3.6. Central Principles and Hypotheses: A Social Network Perspective 
 
3.6.1. Four Central Principles 
Wasserman and Faust (1994, 4) provide the four central principles underlying the network 
perspective in general. First, actors and their actions are regarded as interdependent rather than 
autonomous, independent units. Second, relational linkages (ties) between actors are channels for the 
transfer or “flow” of resources (either material or nonmaterial). Third, network models focusing on an 
individual actor view the network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on 
individual action. Fourth, network models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and so 
forth) as relatively persistent multilink patterns of relations among actors. 
This set of four central principles will be applied to the study of international relations in the 
following ways. First, sovereign states in the international system and their behaviors are viewed as 
interdependent rather than independent. Sovereign states conduct their foreign policies in multiple social 
networks of international relations. I primarily focus on two broad sets of such social networks: the set of 
communication networks (composed of diplomatic exchange, foreign student exchange, and international 
telecommunication networks) and the set of resource networks (composed of arms transfer, international 
trade, and international assistance networks). The assumption of interdependent units (rather than 
autonomous and independent units) argues that the main interests of the social network perspective on 
international relations are the interdependence of states (1) within each type of social network (say, arms 
transfer networks) and (2) across different types of social networks (say, three different resource networks) 
and how states’ behaviors in a particular network are affected by their behaviors in other interaction 
networks. For example, South Korea’s actions in one social network (for example, arms transfers) are 
being affected by and affecting another state’s (for example, the United States’) actions in the same 
                                                                                                                                                                            
connecting the two most viable blocs (the U.S. and the United Kingdom blocs) in the network, and the 
Soviet Union did so with their arms transfers to China and North Korea, and (3) the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Netherlands all showed that their levels of brokerage were the highest 
within their own ego networks of the 1950 Asian arms transfer network. 
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 network and in a different network (such as the international trade network). The first assumption posits 
that we will not be able to conceive the units in our social networks of international relations as truly 
isolated from other units (unless they are actually isolated) in the system. 
Relational ties (linkages) between states in the international system are channels for the transfer or 
“flow” of resources (either material or nonmaterial). Relational linkages (ties) between states in the system 
are focused on two sets of social networks in the international system. In the first set of communication 
networks, relational ties between sovereign but interdependent states are channels of communication 
exchanges that show how states are connected or interact with each other through diplomatic channels 
(how diplomatic missions are exchanged/transferred between states), academic channels (how foreign 
students are exchanged/transferred between states), and telecommunication channels (how international 
telephone messages are exchanged/transferred between states). In the second set of resource networks, 
relational ties (linkages) between sovereign but interdependent states are channels of resource transfers 
that show how states are connected or interact with each other through arms channels (how arms are 
transferred/exchanged between states), trade channels (how foreign goods and services are 
transferred/exchanged between states), and monetary channels (how international monetary assistance is 
transferred/exchanged between states).  
The network perspective presumes that the social networks of international relations provide the 
structural environment that constrains the foreign policy behaviors of their member states. The two-way 
processes of (1) interdependent states and their relational linkages creating the social networks and (2) the 
created social networks constraining each state’s behaviors enable us to perceive (3) the structure of the 
international system and (4) the processes that create it. This third principle gives us a rationale for (1) the 
two-way processes of interdependent states and their relational linkages that define the main 
characteristics of the resultant social networks (e.g., using such measures as network centralization and 
network density) and (2) the created social networks defining the structural network power of individual 
states from their positions in the networks. 
Finally, the network perspective of international relations conceptualizes the structure of the 
international system based on observed patterns of interaction among individual states in the system. 
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 Even though interaction patterns are never perfectly stable (i.e., there is always some change from one 
time period to the next), the network perspective posits that interaction patterns persist long enough for 
there to be significant constraints on the structure of the international system. As the first principle above 
implies, not only are the social networks of international relations intertwined across different sets (e.g., 
across the three different communication/resource networks and across the two different types/sets of 
communication and resource networks), but each type of social network is evolving, and in such a way 
that is constrained by past and present interaction patterns.36 For example, the structural characteristics of 
the arms transfer network in 1952 depend on those of the arms transfer network in 1951; the structural 
characteristics of the international assistance network in 1951 depend on those of the arms transfer 
networks in 1951 Based on this principle, I will use time-series analyses (1950–2000) based on the time-
series data of different types of interaction networks in the international system. This persisting but co-
evolving sense of system structure provides us with a better conception than previous approaches such as 
hegemonic stability and polarity theories. The latter are only able to provide us with a rough 
categorization of different system structures and rather time-invariant views of them.  
 
3.6.2. Hypotheses To Be Tested in the Two Empirical Chapters 
The social network conception of national power is applied to two empirical phenomena focused 
on their power explanations. This project is the application of the relatively new (at least in the field of 
international relations) network power concept to examine the old but still unresolved empirical 
phenomena in world politics. The contributions of this project are not only the introduction of this new 
social network power concept (focused on relational rather than attributional power) but also how this 
new power concept is applied to the two old power theories in the field (balance of power and power 
preponderance theories). In other words, the key concept of a social network power, conceptualized as 
acting within and derived from its position within a network of international relations, is a solution or a 
                                                        
36 This, of course, is also at tension with the idea of a stable pattern of interactions that reproduces itself. 
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 tool to attack the existing theories in the field; a social network power in this project intends to 
address/examine the puzzles that are raised by other previous research and theories.  
The two empirical phenomena examined with the new social network conceptions of 
international system structure and national power are international militarized conflicts and economic 
sanctions. In the chapter on international conflicts, the new social network power concept is applied to 
balance of power and power preponderance theories at both systemic and dyadic levels. My main 
questions are the following: (1) does the increased level of systemic structural network power 
concentration, change, and movement lead to an increased or decreased level of systemic conflict onset, 
and (2) does the structural network power balance between the two states in a dyad increase or decrease 
the probability of dyad conflict onset? In the following chapter on international sanctions, the network 
power concept is applied to the power explanations. My main questions here are: (1) does the structural 
network power balance between sanctioning and target states in a dyad increase or decrease the 
probability of sanction success, and (2) does the structural network power of the target in a dyad increase 
or decrease the probability of sanction success?37 The focus of hypothesis testing in the two empirical 
chapters is on how my new social network conceptions of international system structure and national 
power lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models than previous ones mainly rooted in attribute 
logic. In other words, I take existing theories and models as the starting point, and ask how they perform 
when they are modified by my newer social network conceptions of international system structure and 
national power. In both chapters, the focus will be on how the new social network power concept answers 
the empirical questions of the old material-based power theories regarding the power-balance between 
states in a dyad. The performance of empirical models using structural network power measures will be 
compared against those using attribution-based power measures, through nonparametric model 
discrimination statistics and information measures (AIC and BIC). 
 
                                                        
37 To measure the structural network power balance between sanctioning and the target states, one would 
first have to measure the target’s power, so these two hypotheses are not really two distinct ones—the 
second is contained within the first hypothesis. 
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 1. Hypotheses on Militarized Conflict Onset  
At the Systemic Level 
Three hypotheses are tested in the section on systemic study of militarized conflicts. The first part 
of the military conflict empirical chapter focuses on testing the propositions from the debate among the 
advocates of balance of power vs. those of power preponderance theory at the systemic level, modified by 
my new social network conceptions of international system structure and national power. The three 
hypotheses on structural characteristics of the system and systemic conflicts are based on Singer, Bremer, 
and Stuckey (1972); Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Thomson (1983); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
(1988); and Mansfield (1994). The details on the two power explanations on systemic conflicts can be 
found in Chapter 2, and the following three hypotheses are tested based on the balance of power theory 
at the systemic level (the hypotheses based on the power preponderance theory will have the opposite 
relationships).  
Hypothesis 1. The greater the level of systemic structural network power concentration, the greater the 
level of systemic conflicts. However, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between systemic 
power concentration and conflicts.  
Hypothesis 2. The greater the rate of systemic structural network power change, the greater the level 
of systemic conflicts.  
Hypothesis 3. The greater the rate of systemic structural network power movement, the lesser the level 
of systemic conflicts. 
 
At the Dyadic Level 
Two hypotheses are tested in the section on dyadic study of militarized conflicts. The second part 
of the military conflict empirical chapter focuses on testing the propositions from the debate among the 
advocates of balance of power vs. power preponderance theory at the dyadic level, modified by my new 
social network conceptions of international system structure and national power. The two hypotheses 
below test the effect of structural network power balance, using the network power analyzed at the dyadic 
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 level. This use of a new power concept is based on the core argument that a state’s power should be 
conceptualized focusing on the social network perspective of international system structure (on different 
types of communication and resource networks) and measured by taking account of its interactions with 
all other states in those different types of social networks in international relations. The details on the two 
power explanations of dyadic conflicts can be found in Chapter 2. Basically “balance of force” theorists 
argue that if a state enjoys a power advantage over its adversary, it is more likely to be involved in a 
dispute because it is more likely to succeed, and the cost of dispute involvement is likely to be low. On the 
other hand, “power preponderance” theorists argue that a power preponderance between states will 
preserve peace, because it reduces the uncertainties of winners and losers in a dispute.  
     Hypothesis 1. The parity of structural network power decreases the probability of the onset of dispute.  
     Hypothesis 1’. The preponderance of structural network power decreases the probability of the onset of   
 dispute. 
 
2. Hypotheses on Economic Sanctions Success 
The two hypotheses that are tested in the economic sanctions empirical chapter are on the power 
relationship between sanctioning and target states, modified by my new social network conceptions of 
international system structure and national power. The two main hypotheses in this study are based on (1) 
the results from those of previous empirical research (generally, the negative effect of sender/target power 
balance and, as a consequence, the positive effect of target power on sanction success. As I noted earlier, 
the two hypotheses are closely related to each other, as the second hypothesis is contained within the 
first), and (2) the use of the structural network power concept (based on the social network concept of 
international system structure) to measure the power balance between sender and target, and the target’s 
power. Based on the previous empirical research regarding the powers of sender and target and the 
structural network power concept derived from this project, it will be hypothesized: (1) that the relative 
structural network power difference will have the expected negative effect (from Hypothesis 1, the lower 
structural network power balance of sender/target leads to the higher sanction success), and (2) that the 
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 structural network power of the target will have the opposite positive effect on sanction success 
(Hypothesis 2, the higher structural network power of the target leads to higher sanction success). As Lam 
(1990) points out, the sender usually is less likely to put much importance on foreign policy goals (of 
economic sanctions) toward a less powerful target (245), and this low resolve or low commitment of the 
sender toward a less powerful target eventually leads to sanction failure (Hypothesis 2). As Elliott and 
Uimonen (1993) point out, the larger the sender’s power relative to the target’s, the lower the stakes 
involved, and therefore the weaker the commitment of the sender (408–409). The low stakes of the 
sanction or the low commitment of the sender ultimately leads to the sanction failure (Hypothesis 1). Since 
the two hypotheses are complementary (in the sense that when the target’s power is large, the relative 
power balance of sender/target is relatively small, and vise versa), the argument for either one of the 
hypotheses will be applied to support the other hypothesis. 
As I pointed out in the measurement section, the structural network power of each state also 
represents how well it is globalized (communication globalization from the first dimension of 
communication patterns; economic globalization from the second dimension of resource flows) in the 
international system. Structural network power also represents each state’s level of globalization in the 
system; how centrally each state is positioned in the network of relations shows how well each state is 
globalized in the web of network relations. Based on this conceptualization, Hypothesis 2 will also test the 
argument that a highly globalized target (i.e., a target with relatively high structural network power) will be 
more severely hurt by the economic sanction, and therefore more likely to concede to the sender’s 
demands, because the sender usually makes its best effort to disconnect the target’s globalization web (i.e., 
isolate the target from its interactive relations with other states) especially in the economic arena (e.g., 
target’s access to international trade or investment market). The well-globalized target will be more 
seriously hurt by the sanction, and the high price that is paid by the target ultimately leads to concessions. 
The use of the structural network power concept (based on the social network concept of international 
system structure) in this study is based on the core argument of this project, positing that a state’s power 
should be: (1) conceptualized focusing on the social network perspective of international system structure 
(on different types of communication and resource networks), and (2) measured by taking an account of 
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 its interactions with all other states in the system in those different types of social networks in international 
relations. Accordingly, the measures of these structural network powers (for the sender-target balance and 
for the target) are derived from using six types of international interaction data (on the dimensions of 
communication patterns and resource flows) using the social network analysis. In the sanction empirical 
chapter, I argue that the two hypotheses regarding the sender/target power balance and the target’s power 
are more accurately examined with this new power concept, called “structural network power;” this 
concept captures more accurately the powers of two states in a sanction than all of the previous measures 
(in HSE 1990; Lam 1990; Elliottt and Uimonen 1993; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drezner 1998, 
1999; Hart 2000; and Nooruddin 2002). The two hypotheses tested are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. The lower the difference in the levels of structural network power between sender and 
the target, the higher the probability of success.  
Hypothesis 2. The higher the structural network power for the target, the higher the probability of 
success. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
A state in the international system always interacts with other states in different issue areas. This 
project posits that each state’s structural network power comes from its interactions with other states in 
different networks of the international system, and that the structure of the international system is shaped 
or defined by the interactions of the system members in those different social networks in the international 
system. This project argues that when we conceptualize the international system structure, we should focus 
on those different interaction networks and how states are structured in those different networks of the 
system (i.e., conceptualize international system structure and states’ national power from the social 
network approach). This project is the application of social network perspective to the study of 
international relations. One of its main focuses is that the international system is composed of different 
social networks (e.g., networks of arms transfers, international trade, international assistance, diplomatic 
exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and international telecommunication) among sovereign but 
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 interdependent states in the system. This project argues that when we  consider all those different social 
networks in the system,  we will more correctly depict how the structures of the international system affect 
each state’s behaviors, and how each state’s structural position in the system affects its behaviors with 
other members of the system.38 This project takes existing theories and tests them using my newer 
network conceptions of the international system; this project also focuses on the conception of the 
international system as networks, and is primarily interested in how this newer conception leads us to 
recast a great deal of existing empirical work. Does a structurally centralized or concentrated international 
system induce a more peaceful world, or just the opposite; and how is the structural network power 
balance between states related to their conflict behaviors? How are the structural network powers of the 
sanction sender and its target, and the structural power balance between the two related to the onset and 
success of economic sanctions? What are some distinctive characteristics of militarized disputes networks 
and economic sanctions networks? These are some of the research questions to be examined in this 
project of social network application to international relations. This project also emphasizes the graphical 
representations (in a global map) of states’ interaction with other members of the international system 
(Gleditsch and Ward 2005); it also emphasizes how useful the sociograms (produced by the social 
network analysis) of different international networks are in depicting and highlighting the distinctive 
characteristics of international system structure and the different interaction relations among system 
members in the international system. 
In this project, I apply the social network analysis to different types of interaction relations among 
international system members. It posits that the interactions of states are played out within the web of 
different social networks, and that the structure of different networks and the structural power of each state 
measured by their interactions with other states in the networks play important parts in their behaviors in 
the international system. This new conception of international system structure and of each state’s network 
power based on the network perspective is different from other previous studies in the field of 
                                                        
38 Social network theorists emphasize the same arguments. For example, Scott (2000, 14) argues that 
“The structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have 
important behavioral, perceptual, and attributional consequences both for the individual units and for the 
system as a whole” (see also Mitchell 1969).  
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 international relations, where system structure is focused on one of or a few of the most powerful (in the 
material-capability sense) states in the system and a state’s power in the system has been defined solely 
focused on its attributional power (especially, material-based capability). This project argues that 
international system structure is more accurately depicted by considering different types of interaction 
networks participated in by all the member states in the international system, and that the power of each 
state is more accurately conceptualized by considering how it interacts with all other states in the 
international system of different networks. This project develops a more accurate way of depicting the 
international system structure and of conceptualizing each state’s national power in the international 
system using a social network perspective. By focusing on the network characteristics of interaction 
patterns between states in the system, we can depict a more complete picture of the structure of the 
international system, each state’s structural power in the system, the distribution of structural power in the 
system, and the changes of both a state’s structural power and its distribution. Based on these two new 
conceptualizations of international system structure and of a state’s structural national power, the next two 
chapters focus on: (1) the empirical analyses of the onset of international militarized disputes; and (2) the 
empirical analyses of the onset and success of economic sanctions.
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 Table 3.1 Evaluation of a Measurement Model of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
 
 Correlations  
TPOP UPOP ENERGY IRST MILEX MILPER 
R2 Standardized 
Coefficient 
 
 TPOP 1.000           0.205 0.453  
 UPOP 0.329 1.000         0.529 0.728  
 ENERGY 0.439 0.706 1.000       0.940 0.970  
 IRST 0.423 0.680 0.906 1.000     0.874 0.935  
 MILEX 0.427 0.686 0.914 0.881 1.000   0.889 0.943  
 MILPER 0.351 0.564 0.752 0.725 0.731 1.000 0.601 0.775  
           
 Goodness of Fit Summary          
  X2 df X2/df CFI NFI IFI AIC ECVI SRMR 
 1950–2000 22626.208 9 2514.023 .629 .629 .629 22662.208 3.175 .593 
 1950s 2905.042 9 322.782 .659 .659 .659 2941.042 3.556 .624 
 1960s 4520.527 9 502.281 .642 .642 .642 4556.527 3.720 .640 
 1970s 5718.195 9 635.355 .575 .575 .575 5754.195 3.944 .659 
 1980s 5900.541 9 655.616 .570 .570 .570 5936.541 3.713 .640 
 1990s 7487.214 9 831.913 .559 .559 .559 7523.214 3.717 .641 
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 Table 3.2 Evaluation of a Measurement Model of Structural Network Power Index (SNPI) 
 
 Correlations  
DEX FSEX TELE ARMS TRADE ASSIST 
R2 Standardized 
Coefficient 
 
 DEX 1.000           0.240 0.490  
 FSEX 0.411 1.000     0.704 0.839  
 TELE 0.369 0.632 1.000    0.567 0.753  
 ARMS 0.389 0.667 0.598 1.000   0.631 0.794  
 TRADE 0.417 0.714 0.640 0.676 1.000  0.724 0.851  
 ASSIST 0.407 0.698 0.626 0.661 0.708 1.000 0.692 0.832  
           
 Goodness of Fit Summary          
  X2 df X2/df CFI NFI IFI AIC ECVI SRMR 
 1950–2000 634.204 9 70.467 .974 .973 .974 670.204 .094 .099 
 1950s 253.162 9 28.129 .935 .932 .935 289.162 .350 .181 
 1960s 271.224 9 30.136 .947 .945 .947 307.224 .251 .154 
 1970s  100.784 9 11.198 .981 .980 .981 136.784 .094 .084 
 1980s 147.882 9 16.431 .975 .974 .975 183.882 .115 .098 
 1990s 190.560 9 21.173 .972 .970 .972 226.560 .112 .100 
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 Table 3.3 Pearson and Spearman Correlations of CINC and GDP with SNPI  
 
All CINC GDP Degree Betweenness Flow-Betweenness Coreness 
Egonet 
Brokerage SNPI 
 CINC  0.823 0.692 0.805 0.774 0.717 0.669 0.718 
 GDP 0.550  0.715 0.731 0.700 0.692 0.669 0.712 
 Degree 0.501 0.481  0.824 0.840 0.961 0.854 0.989 
 Betweenness 0.703 0.534 0.776  0.925 0.837 0.816 0.844 
 Flow-Betweenness 0.717 0.494 0.808 0.982  0.833 0.830 0.850 
 Coreness 0.537 0.492 0.960 0.809 0.827  0.829 0.990 
 Egonet Brokerage 0.464 0.422 0.896 0.656 0.706 0.874  0.852 
 SNPI 0.551 0.502 0.986 0.831 0.854 0.991 0.888  
 
Underdeveloped CINC GDP Degree Betweenness Flow-Betweenness Coreness 
Egonet 
Brokerage SNPI 
 CINC  0.535 0.484 0.525 0.536 0.489 0.379 0.503 
 GDP 0.200  0.439 0.270 0.341 0.359 0.320 0.401 
 Degree 0.285 0.347  0.694 0.798 0.930 0.828 0.971 
 Betweenness 0.795 0.043 0.334  0.858 0.672 0.657 0.694 
 Flow-Betweenness 0.658 0.129 0.490 0.768  0.749 0.732 0.784 
 Coreness 0.262 0.269 0.932 0.335 0.456  0.759 0.986 
 Egonet Brokerage 0.219 0.214 0.690 0.298 0.460 0.643  0.802 
 SNPI 0.304 0.316 0.985 0.369 0.509 0.979 0.684  
 
Developed CINC GDP Degree Betweenness Flow-Betweenness Coreness 
Egonet 
Brokerage SNPI 
 CINC  0.603 0.487 0.646 0.640 0.477 0.530 0.508 
 GDP 0.523  0.550 0.535 0.503 0.453 0.552 0.518 
 Degree 0.459 0.466  0.793 0.765 0.937 0.802 0.984 
 Betweenness 0.681 0.506 0.816  0.901 0.788 0.804 0.819 
 Flow-Betweenness 0.693 0.461 0.827 0.986  0.734 0.802 0.778 
 Coreness 0.493 0.467 0.954 0.832 0.832  0.780 0.981 
 Egonet Brokerage 0.407 0.387 0.882 0.655 0.687 0.850  0.811 
 SNPI 0.512 0.481 0.984 0.864 0.868 0.989 0.867  
80
              NOTE: The upper, right sided quadrant represents Spearman correlations among measures. The lower, left-sided quadrant represents  
Pearson correlations.  
 
 Figure 3.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Six Components of National Power (CINC) 
 
 
 
NOTE: NT=not tested, the parameter is constrained to 1 for the scaling. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Six Components of National Power (SNPI) 
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 Figure 3.3 Fit Indices of CINC with SNPI 
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 Figure 3.3 Fit Indices of CINC with SNPI (Continued) 
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 Figure 3.4 Pearson and Spearman Correlations of CINC and GDP with SNPI 
Pearson (All) 
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 Figure 3.4 Pearson and Spearman Correlations of CINC and GDP with SNPI (Continued) 
Pearson (Underdeveloped) 
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 Figure 3.4 Pearson and Spearman Correlations of CINC and GDP with SNPI (Continued) 
Pearson (Developed) 
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Figure 3.5 Arms Transfer Networks, 1950–2000: Social Network Perspective of International System 
Structure 
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 Figure 3.5 Arms Transfer Networks, 1950–2000: Social Network Perspective of International System 
Structure (Continued) 
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 Figure 3.5 Arms Transfer Networks, 1950–2000: Social Network Perspective of International System 
Structure (Continued) 
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 Figure 3.6 Arms Transfer Networks in 1950: Social Network Perspective of National Power 
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 Figure 3.6 Arms Transfer Networks in 1950: Social Network Perspective of National Power (Continued) 
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 Figure 3.6 Arms Transfer Networks in 1950: Social Network Perspective of National Power (Continued) 
Egonet Brokerage 
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CHAPTER 4. DETERMINANTS OF THE ONSET OF MILITARIZED CONFLICTS 
 
This study, which is an application of social network perspective to international conflicts, focuses 
on several important contributions to the study of militarized conflicts, using the measures of each state’s 
structural network power (derived from using six types of international communication and resource 
interaction data with the social network analysis) and their distribution (especially concentration, 
movement, and change) in the international system. The first third of the chapter focuses on the graphical 
representations of international conflicts. This part argues for the importance of graphical representation of 
dyadic conflict (militarized dispute and crisis) onsets from the social network perspective; it uses figures to 
describe how the social network perspective represents the study of militarized conflicts. 
The second third of the chapter is devoted to the systemic study of international conflict. Here, 
using both the OLS and NBREG analyses for both militarized disputes and international crises, this set of 
empirical analyses is conducted to test how the structure of the international system (more specifically, the 
structural network power concentration, change, and movement in the system, derived from the network 
relationships among system members) affects the number and proportion of disputes and crises in the 
system. The final third of the chapter is devoted to the dyadic study of international conflicts, focusing on 
hypotheses arising from balance of power and power preponderance theories (using a structural network 
power conception from the social network perspective). Using several different estimation methods such 
as: (1) logistic regression with errors clustered on dyads, (2) logistic regression with clustering on periods 
(sometimes called the WSEV estimation), (3) ReLogit estimation (the logistic regression of rare events), 
and (4) the pooled estimation of GEE controlling for the AR1 process, the main hypotheses are tested for 
dyadic militarized interstate disputes for the period of 1950–1992.  
The use of the structural network power concept (based on the social network concept of 
international system structure) both at the systemic and dyadic levels in the last two subchapters is based 
 on the core argument of this project, positing that a state’s power should be conceptualized based on the 
social network perspective of international system structure (on different types of international 
communication and resource networks) and measured by taking an account of its interactions with all 
other states in the system in those different types of social networks in international relations. Accordingly, 
the measures of those structural network powers at both systemic and dyadic levels are derived by using 
six types of international interaction data sets (on the dimensions of communication patterns and of 
resource flows) using the social network analysis. In other words, the focus of hypothesis testing in the 
latter two parts of this empirical chapter is on how my new social network concepts (of international 
system structure and national power) lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models of militarized 
conflicts than previous ones mainly rooted in attribute logic. The performance of conflict models at both 
systemic and dyadic levels using structural network power measures is compared against those using 
attribution-based power measures, through nonparametric model discrimination statistics and information 
criteria measures. 
 
4.1. Graphical Representations of Dyadic Militarized Dispute and Crisis Onsets 
Figures 4.1–4.3 display the graphical representations of dyadic militarized conflict (dispute and 
crisis) onsets (please see Appendix 4.1 for (1) a discussion on graphical network data representation 
(especially sociograms) versus tables and (2) an exercise to compare the two methods). In each of the 
sociograms, the two states involved in the onset of conflicts are connected by two-way arrows representing 
the dyad’s involvement of conflict onset. To account for the major power-conflict onset relationship, the 
five major powers as defined by the COW project (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet 
Union/Russia, and China) are represented by the circle-in-box shape rather than by the circle shape used 
for all other states. To account for the pattern of regional conflicts,39 the region of each state as defined by 
the COW project is represented by a different color: yellow for the Middle East; pink for North and South 
                                                        
39 The regional conflict is identified as a conflict where both states in a conflict belong to the same region. 
For example, the dispute between Iran and Iraq in the 1950s disputes network is identified as a regional 
dispute because both states belong to the same region, the Middle East. 
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 America; green for Africa; blue for Asia; and red for Europe. To represent the pattern of recurrent 
conflicts40, the frequency of conflict onset in a dyad is represented by the thickness of lines connecting the 
dyad. Figure 4.1 displays the networks of dyadic disputes in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
throughout 1950–2000. The sociograms for five separate decades display all pairs of states that had more 
than one dispute in the respective decade; the sociogram for the whole study period (of 1950–2000) 
displays all pairs of states that had more than five disputes in the period (i.e., identifying the recurrent 
militarized dispute patterns in the system). Figure 4.2 displays the networks of dyadic crises in five 
separate decades and throughout 1950–2000. The sociograms for the five separate decades display all 
pairs of states that had at least one crisis in the respective decade; the sociogram for the whole study 
period (1950–2000) displays all pairs of states that had more than two crises in the period (i.e., identifying 
the recurrent militarized crisis patterns in the system).  
We see several distinctive characteristics revealed from each set of sociograms in Figures 4.1–4.2. 
First, the sociograms of dispute onsets (of each decade from 1950–2000) in Figure 4.1 reveal the 
following: (1) the predominance of dispute onsets by major powers (e.g., the Soviet Union and China in 
1950s; the U.S., the United Kingdom, USSR, and China in 1960s; the U.S. and USSR in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s), (2) the high connectedness41 of regional dispute onsets (e.g., in Asia, Europe, and the 
Middle East in the 1950s; in Asia in the 1960s; in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the 1970s and 
1980s; in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s), (3) the high connectedness of dyadic 
dispute involvement especially in the later decades, and (4) the predominance of a few large-scale dispute 
onsets in a few decades (e.g., the dispute onset of the Korean War involving 25 states; the dispute onset of 
the Gulf War involving 27 states; the dispute onset of the NATO-Yugoslavia War involving 20 states). The 
                                                        
40 The recurrent conflict identifies a situation where the same dyad experiences more than one dispute 
case. For example, the dispute between France and Tunisia in the 1950s disputes network is identified as 
a recurrent dispute because both states experienced more than one dispute during the decade. Grieco 
(2001) identifies that a significant majority of conflicts are such recurrent conflicts (72% of dyadic-level 
disputes of 1816-1992, 49% of dyadic-level crises of 1918-1994, and 26% of dyadic-level wars of 1816-
1992). 
41 The conflict onset case is defined as “connected” in the network if it has a connection to any other 
conflict onset cases in the network. The conflict onset case is defined as “isolated” or “disconnected” in 
the network if it does not have any connection with other conflict onset cases in the network.  
 95
 sociograms of crisis onsets in Figure 4.2 show quite similar patterns to those of dispute onsets in Figure 
4.1; however, because the definition of crisis is narrower than that of dispute (see below for the definitions 
of dispute and crisis used in this study), the sociograms of crisis onsets reveal rather intensified conflict 
patterns (i.e., fewer states are involved, but more conflict cases are connected to each other in the crisis 
networks) than those of dispute onsets.  
Figure 4.3 shows us how the sociograms of militarized disputes reveal the general graphical 
patterns of monadic or dyadic factors affecting the onset of disputes (of regime type42, economic 
development, major power status, alliance, contiguity, distance, economic interdependence, past conflict 
interaction levels, and alliance agreements). For each of the sociograms in Figure 4.3, the two nodes 
(states) involved in a dispute are connected by a two-way arrow. Each state’s regime type is represented 
by the color of the node (blue for a democratic regime; red for a non-democratic regime); each state’s 
economic development level, measured by its total trade size, is represented by the size of the node 
(bigger for more economically developed; smaller for less economically developed); and each state’s 
major power status is represented by the shape of the node (circle-in-box shape for major, circle for all 
others). We can see that, among 27 total dyadic disputes in 1960, there were only 3 (or 11%) democratic-
democratic disputes (United Kingdom-Iceland, United States-Austria, and Austria-Italy), supporting the 
argument that democratic states are less likely to be involved in conflict with other democracies, and that 
major powers were involved as much as non-major powers (14 dispute dyads or 52%). The remaining 
sociograms reveal that allied states were far less involved than non-allied states. Contiguous states were far 
less involved than non-distant states. Economically interdependent states, measured by bilateral trade, 
were somewhat less involved than economically non-interdependent states. Hostile states, measured by 
past conflict interaction level, were somewhat more involved than non-hostile states. States with alliance 
agreements, measured by Tau-b, were far less involved than states without alliance agreements.  
Gleditsch and Ward (2005) emphasize the importance of global maps when displaying, 
identifying, or highlighting international relations data. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 provide such global maps of 
                                                        
42 The measurements and data sources for all the variables in this section will be discussed later in detail.  
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 international conflicts utilizing each state’s monadic conflict43 (dispute or crisis) onset distribution in the 
system.44 Figure 4.4 displays the global map of monadic dispute onset distribution in 1950–2000; Figure 
4.5 displays the global map of monadic crisis onset distribution in 1950–2000. From these maps we can 
see the zone of conflict or peace (groups of states that have relatively more or less amounts of conflicts). 
States are grouped into three sets: (1) those most actively involved in dyadic conflicts (involved in the top 
third of total dyadic conflicts in the period), (2) those least actively involved in dyadic conflicts (involved in 
the bottom third of total dyadic conflicts in the period), and (3) those between the two groups (involved in 
the middle third of total dyadic conflicts in the period). For example, the global map of militarized disputes 
for 1950–2000 (from Figure 4.4) reveals that 10 states (in the order of dispute involvement: the Soviet 
Union/Russia, the U.S., China, Iraq, Yugoslavia, United Kingdom, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and North Korea), 
which were colored black in the map, were involved in the top third (1,066 dyadic disputes, or 33.04%) of 
total dyadic disputes for the period (3,326 dyadic disputes, for 1950–2000); 29 states (including Thailand, 
Egypt, India, Japan, France, and others), which were colored as gray in the map, were involved in the 
next third (1,065 dyadic disputes, 33.02%) of total dyadic disputes; and the remaining 159 states 
(including Philippines, Venezuela, Canada, Somalia, Spain, and others), which were colored white in the 
map, were involved in the bottom third (1,095 dyadic disputes, or 33.94%) of total dyadic disputes 
(please also see Appendix 4.2 for the raw scores on the distribution of each state’s dispute/crisis onsets for 
1950–2000). The global map of militarized crisis for 1950–2000 (from Figure 4.5) reveals that only 7 
                                                        
43 The monadic conflict onset represents a dispute onset of each state, in contrast to the dyadic conflict 
onset, which represents a dispute onset of each dyad. This distinction is from the level-of-analysis 
discussions in international relations where monadic analysis focuses on the state, dyadic analysis focuses 
on the dyad, and system analysis focuses on the system. This chapter tries to reveal the patterns of 
militarized conflicts at all three levels (monadic, dyadic, and systemic). The global maps in Figures 4.4–4.5 
show monadic patterns of international conflicts (which state is more or less likely to be involved in 
international conflicts). The two following empirical sections focus on finding dyadic and systemic patterns 
of international conflict (the determinants of dyadic and systemic conflicts). 
44 There have been other efforts to identify global maps of international conflicts (i.e., the monadic 
patterns of international conflict). For example, the Nobel Foundation provides global maps of 20th wars 
(1899-2001, interstate, colonial and civil wars) and their casualties 
(http://nobelprize.org/educational_games/peace/conflictmap/). ViewConflicts (Software for Visualizing 
Spatiotemporal Data on Armed Conflicts) provides global maps of arms conflicts (1946-2004, internal and 
internationalized conflicts) (http://www.svt.ntnu.no/geo/forskning/konflikt/viewConflicts/). 
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 states were involved in the top third (320 dyadic crises, or 32.13%) of total dyadic crises for the period 
(996 dyadic crises for 1950–2000); 24 states were involved in the next third (352 dyadic crises, or 
35.34%) of total dyadic crises; and the remaining 167 states were involved in the bottom third (324 
dyadic crises, or 32.53%) of total dyadic crises. The zone of crisis in the world for 1950–2000 was 
composed of a much smaller number of states compared to that of dispute (i.e., a smaller number of states 
was more actively involved in crises than in disputes), but the composition of each zone is mostly in line 
with each other (i.e., states actively involved in the crises were also actively involved in the disputes).  
 
4.2. Systemic Analysis of Militarized Conflicts 
4.2.1. General Approach 
The third section of this chapter is devoted to the systemic study of international conflicts. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, there have been only a handful of empirical analyses on systemic conflicts (see 
also Maoz et al. 2005; Sacko 2004).45 The model setup of systemic analyses performed in this section is 
based on exemplary works by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) and Mansfield (1994) that have been 
regarded as the benchmark for the systemic empirical study of international conflicts. I base my analysis 
on their systemic conflict model setups to facilitate comparison with previous research. However, I 
performed a set of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of the results found in the chapter (e.g., 
varying the models by adding some of other control variables used in the literature46); the overall pattern 
from this sensitivity test confirms my findings. Equation (4-1) summarizes the set of hypotheses that will be 
tested for the systemic analysis of international conflict:  
                                                        
45 Maoz et al. (2005, 35) notes that “in the last two decades, most students of international politics have 
abandoned the systemic level of analysis in favor of the dyadic level, which seemed to have been more 
promising in terms of meaningful findings.” Sacko (2004, 116) notes that “although systemic studies of 
international politics were once the focus of the field, they no longer hold the attention of researchers. 
Advanced data collection and more properly specified theories have primarily led researchers to analyze 
dyadic levels of conflicts. Thus, there is little recent work on the analysis of system-level conflict.” 
46 For example, see Rousseau and Kim (2005) for the systemic conflict analysis comparing explanations 
from the systemic, regional, dyadic, and monadic levels. 
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 Systemic Conflicts,
t 
= ß0 + ß1*Systemic Structural Network Power Concentration,
t
 + ß2*Systemic 
Structural Network Power Concentration Squared,
t 
+ ß3*Systemic Structural Network Power 
Change,
t 
+ ß4*Systemic Structural Network Power Movement,
t 
+ e                    (Equation 4-1) 
The hypotheses to be tested in this section of systemic conflict analysis (hypotheses 1–3) are presented in 
detail in Chapter 3. These hypotheses are tested mainly in regard to the power explanations that use the 
new power measures in the systemic conflict models. 
 
1. Data 
I test the three hypotheses on balance of power theory versus power preponderance theory at the 
systemic level, using the onset of militarized interstate dispute data (“Militarized Interstate Dispute Data 
Set, Version 3.0”) for 1950–2000 from the COW project modified by Maoz (2001b, DYMID1.1)47 and the 
onset of international crisis data (“ICB Version 5.0”) for 1950–2000 from the International Crisis Behavior 
(ICB) project. The COW data set is a collection of interstate disputes where a case of dispute is defined as 
“a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military 
force, or actual uses of force” (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 586). To be included in this dispute data set, 
acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government-sanctioned (587). The ICB data set contains a 
population of international crises, with international crisis defined as “a situation change characterized by 
an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries, with a high 
probability of military hostilities” (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and James 1989, 5). A militarized interstate dispute 
(e.g., the COW data case) evolves into an international crisis (e.g., the ICB data case) when a system 
member on each side of the dispute indicates by its actions its willingness to go to war to defend its 
interests or to attain its objectives (i.e., a dangerously high probability of war, see also Brecher 1977; 
                                                        
47 The use of Maoz’s modified version instead of the COW original data is based on the finding (Maoz 
2001b) that the COW data set contains dispute cases where states on one side of a multilateral contest 
may never have threatened, displayed, or used force against states on the opposing side (e.g., Bulgaria 
and Japan on the opposite sides in World War I). Maoz corrects this and other problems to produce more 
accurate militarized interstate dispute data (see also Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum, 2003, 376). 
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 Snyder and Diesing 1977; Buchan 1964; Bell 1971). Maoz and Russett (1993) find that, due to different 
definitions and criteria, the two data sets are not strongly related (628).48
 
2. Measurements 
I use four different dependent variables on the onset of systemic conflicts (Maoz et al. 2005): 
Proportion of Dyads in Disputes. This is measured by dividing the total number of militarized dispute 
dyads by all possible dyads in the system in a given year.  
Proportion of Dyads in Crises. This is measured by dividing the total number of crisis dyads by all 
possible dyads in the system in a given year. 
Number of Dyadic Disputes in the System. This is measured by the total number of dyads engaged in 
interstate militarized disputes in a given year.  
Number of Dyadic Crises in the System. This is measured by the total number of dyads engaged in 
international crises in a given year. 
The measurements of the independent variables used (systemic structural network power measures) are 
presented in detail in Chapter 3. The first set of systemic measures is based on Freeman (1978/1979) and 
Freeman, Borgatti, and White (1991), and measures the level of systemic power centralization in the 
whole network, compared to the ideal “star” network, where a node is connected to all the other N-1 
nodes, or the extent to which the whole network has a centralized structure (or an overall “compactness” 
of a network), or the extent to which the cohesion of the network is organized around a particular focal 
point (Scott 2000). The second set of systemic measures is based on Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) 
and Mansfield (1994), and measures the level of systemic power concentration and its dynamic features 
(change and movement). The two sets of systemic power measures identify how concentrated or 
                                                        
48 Of course, the two data sets used in this chapter are not the only international conflict data available. 
There are other data sets that have been used to examine the causes of international conflicts (see Leng 
and Singer [1988] for a general discussion on the different types of interstate conflicts such as interstate 
dispute, militarized interstate dispute, militarized interstate crisis, and interstate war, as well as the 
relationships among them). For the descriptions and discussions on those other data collections, see the 
SIPRI website at http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/conflictdatasets.html and Rousseau (2005, esp., 
100-105). The SIPRI website provides brief descriptions of 16 different data collection projects on 
international conflicts. Rousseau (2005) discusses some other data collection efforts on international 
conflicts such as Huth (1996) and Huth and Allee (2002) on territorial conflicts and Sherrman (1994, 
SHERFACS).  
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 centralized each system is, based on the power distribution among the system members (see Ray and 
Singer 1973 for the summary review and discussion on different types of power concentration or unequal 
distribution measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirshman index and the Gini index; see Wasserman and 
Faust 1994 for a discussion on other social network measures of power concentration, such as the 
dispersion/heterogeneity index [Snijders 1981] and the hierarchization index [Coleman 1964]). 
 
4.2.2. Estimation Methods 
I use two different estimation methods for this part of study. For the two dependent variables of 
proportions of dyadic conflicts (disputes and crises) in the system, I use the OLS estimation, controlling the 
Year variable to capture the passage of time. Mansfield (1994) finds evidence of a secular trend in the 
onset of international conflicts and recommends the control of the Year variable to ensure that an 
observed relationship between the power distributions and conflicts is not due to the secular trends on 
both variables (85). For the two dependent variables of total numbers of dyadic conflicts (disputes and 
crises) in the system, I use the NBREG estimation, again controlling by year. Overdispersion (i.e., the 
variance is greater than the mean of the distribution) as revealed by the results of alpha (which is an 
estimate of the degree of overdispersion) in my analyses (see Table 4.6) recommend the use of NBREG 
over poisson regression. As Long and Freese (2005) point out, in the presence of overdispersion, the 
poisson regression model underfits the amount of dispersion in the outcome, and the NBREG model 
corrects this failure of the poisson model by adding ancillary parameter alpha that reflects unobserved 
heterogeneity among observations (372).  
 
4.2.3. Results and Discussion 
Here I present two analyses of the relationship between systemic structural network power and 
militarized conflicts: first, the correlation analysis, and second, the OLS and NBREG analyses.  
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 Correlations Results 
Tables 4.1–4.4 display the Pearson correlations between the sets of dependent variables (systemic 
conflicts) and independent variables (systemic structural network power). As noted earlier, I use four 
different types of dependent variables on systemic conflicts (proportions and numbers of dyadic disputes, 
and crises in the system), and two different sets of independent variables on systemic structural network 
power (Freeman’s [1978/1979] systemic network power centralizations and Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey’s 
[1972] systemic network power concentrations49). The results (Tables 4.1–4.4) reveal that there are clear 
positive relationships between the systemic structural network power measures and the proportions of 
dyadic disputes and crises, and between power measure and the number of dyadic crises in the system; 
they also show that there are negative relationship between the systemic structural network power 
measures and the number of dyadic disputes in the system. This set of results, in general, supports the 
hypothesis that the greater the level of systemic structural network power concentration, the greater the 
level of systemic conflicts, suggesting support for balance of power theory over power preponderance 
theory at the systemic level. Regarding the other two structural aspects, there is no clear evidence of either 
systemic structural network power change or systemic structural network power movement’s relationships 
with the proportions and numbers of dyadic disputes or crises (some weak evidence of a negative 
relationship of systemic structural network power change and of a positive relationship of systemic 
structural network power movement are apparent, however). In general, the results from the correlation 
analysis in Tables 4.3–4.4 reject the hypotheses that: (1) the greater the level of systemic structural 
network power change, the greater the level of systemic conflicts; and (2) the greater the level of systemic 
structural network power movement, the lower the level of systemic conflicts. However, this set of null 
findings from the correlation analysis is in line with those from Mansfield (1994).  
 
 
                                                        
49 For sensitivity purposes, I have also tried the structural network power concentration measures using 
only major powers instead of using all of the members and the power change and movement measures 
using a one-year instead of five-year interval (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Mansfield 1994). The 
overall pattern with this sensitivity test confirms my findings. 
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 Regression Results 
Table 4.5–4.6 display the OLS results of the systemic structural network power characteristics-
conflicts (for the proportions of dyadic dispute and crisis dependent variables) and the NBREG results of 
the systemic structural network power characteristics-conflicts (for the number of dyadic disputes and crisis 
dependent variables). Regarding the ratio-level dependent variables (the proportions of dyadic conflicts in 
the system), the results differ depending on the type of conflict data used in the analyses. For the dispute 
dependent variable, there is clear evidence of a U-shaped relationship between systemic power 
concentration and systemic disputes (the support of power preponderance theory over balance of power 
theory at the system level). The coefficient on SCON is negative and statistically significant, and that on 
SCON2 is positive and statistically significant. However, for the crisis dependent variable, no clear pattern 
is revealed. The results from this set of OLS regression analyses show that, in general, the greater the level 
of systemic network power concentration, the lower the level of dyadic disputes in the system. After the 
systemic concentration of structural network power reaches a certain level, the system is likely to have 
more dyadic disputes. Both the highest and lowest levels of systemic power concentrations give rise to the 
highest level of systemic conflicts, while the intermediate levels of systemic power concentration do so at 
the lowest level of systemic conflicts. However, this empirical pattern is not found when analyzing the 
dyadic crisis dependent variables. Regarding the other two systemic characteristics (the change and 
movement of structural network power concentration), there seems to be only weak evidence of the 
negative effects of the change and movement of structural network power concentration on dyadic 
disputes. All in all, from the OLS results on the systemic structural network power characteristics-conflicts, 
we do see the general support of power preponderance theory over balance of power theory at the system 
level.  
Regarding the count dependent variables (the numbers of dyadic conflicts in the system), the 
results also differ depending on the type of conflict data used in the analyses. For the dispute dependent 
variable, there is evidence (rather weak compared to the results from its ratio-level dependent variable) of 
a U-shaped relationship between systemic power concentration and systemic disputes (and thus the 
support of power preponderance theory over balance of power theory at the system level). The coefficient 
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 on SCON is negative and statistically significant, and that on SCON2 is positive and statistically significant. 
However, for the crisis dependent variable, there is clear evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between systemic power concentration and systemic crises as in Mansfield (1992) (the support of balance 
of power theory over power preponderance theory at the system level). The coefficient on SCON is 
positive and statistically significant, and that on SCON2 is negative and statistically significant. The results 
show that the greater the level of systemic network power concentration, the greater the level of dyadic 
crises in the system. After the systemic concentration of structural network power reaches a certain level, 
the system is likely to have fewer dyadic crises. Both the highest and lowest levels of systemic power 
concentrations give rise to the lowest level of systemic conflicts, while the intermediate levels of systemic 
power concentration give rise to the highest level of systemic conflicts. Regarding the other two systemic 
characteristics (the change and movement of structural network power concentration), there seems to be 
no clear evidence for either a positive or negative relationship. All in all, from the NBREG results for the 
systemic structural network power characteristics-conflicts, we do see mixed support for power 
preponderance theory and balance of power theory at the system level (for the former with systemic 
disputes, and for the latter with systemic crises).  
This section addresses the systemic study of militarized conflicts, and examines the hypotheses on 
balance of power theory and power preponderance theory at the system level. The overall results do not 
reveal any clear support for either theory. The balance of power theory, in general, does have support for 
the hypotheses on the systemic crises, and the power preponderance theory, in general, does have 
support for the hypotheses on the systemic disputes. These seemingly contradictory findings should be 
examined in future studies, but one possible explanation might be the omitted variable bias for the crisis 
models. The OLS results show that there are relatively high adjusted R2 for the dispute models (ranging 
from .571 to .777), but relatively low adjusted R2 for the crisis models (ranging from .215 to .489), 
suggesting that the results from the dispute models (and as a consequence, the support for the power 
preponderance theory at the system level) seem to be stronger than the support for the balance of power 
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 theory at the system level coming from the crisis models.50 Perhaps the system-level crisis study should be 
distinguished from the system-level dispute studies (i.e., the process of getting involved in the dispute stage 
is different from that of escalating into the crisis stage). It can be argued that, in the lower level of systemic 
conflicts (militarized dispute), the higher level of systemic power concentration leads to the lower level of 
systemic conflicts; in the higher level of systemic conflicts (militarized crisis), the opposite is true (the higher 
level of systemic power concentration leads to the higher level of systemic conflicts). However, in both 
cases, we do find clear support for Mansfield’s argument that the relationship between the systemic power 
concentration and systemic conflicts (or major power wars in the system) is (inverted) U-shaped rather 
than monotonic.  
 
4.3. Dyadic Analysis of Militarized Conflicts 
4.3.1. General Approach 
 The second section of this chapter is devoted to the dyadic study of international conflicts.51 As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, there have been many empirical analyses on dyadic conflicts and Oneal, 
Russett, and their colleagues have been leading proponents of the dyadic study of international conflicts 
(e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Their model setup has been regarded as fully 
specified for dyadic interstate conflict. It has been adopted extensively and includes the views of (1) realists 
– that power (power balance and major-power status) and alliance are crucial determinants of conflict, (2) 
liberals – that the factors on state interests such as regime type (democracy) and trade ties (economic 
                                                        
50 Another reason for my preference of accepting the results from the dispute models over those from the 
crisis models is that the sample of disputes captures a much larger subset of international conflicts than 
that of crises. As Rousseau (2005) point out, most international disputes do not escalate into crises in 
which one or both parties threaten or use military force and, by the same logic, most international crises 
do not escalate into wars in which one or both parties use large military forces to resolve the crisis. 
Therefore, the empirical studies that have focused on crises or wars (Mansfield 1994; Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey 1972) capture only a small subset of the population of international conflicts.  
51 The analyses in this section are focused on the causes of dyadic conflicts (i.e., what causes a state’s 
conflict involvement with other states). This focus is different from the causes of monadic conflicts (i.e., 
what causes a state’s conflict involvement in general). See Bennett and Stam (2004, 44-46) and Croco 
and Teo (2005) for general discussion on the dyadic analysis of militarized conflicts. 
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 interdependence) influence a state’s conflict behavior, and (3) political geographers (e.g., Mahan 1893; 
Mackinder 1919; Spykman 1944; Richardson 1960; Sprout and Sprout 1965; Most and Starr 1989) – that 
a county’s region and proximity to other states (contiguity and distance) affect conflict.52 My analysis is 
based on their dyadic conflict model setup, to facilitate comparisons with previous research. However, to 
check the robustness of the results found in the chapter, I performed a set of sensitivity analyses (e.g., 
varying the models by adding or dropping some of the control variables and using sub-samples such as 
politically relevant or politically active dyads); the overall pattern with this sensitivity test confirms my 
findings. Equation (4-2) will be tested for the dyadic analysis of international conflicts: 
Onset of Dyadic Dispute,
t 
= ß0 + ß1*Balance of Structural Network Power,
t
 + ß2*Level of 
Economic Interdependence,
t 
+ ß3*Level of Democracy,
t 
+ ß4*Shared Alliance Ties,
t 
+  
ß5*Contiguity,
t 
+ ß6*Distance,
t 
+ ß7*Major Power,
t 
+ ß8*Peace Year,
t 
+ ß9*Spline1,
t 
+ 
ß10*Spline2,
t 
+ ß11*Spline3,
t 
+ e                  (Equation 4-2)  
 
1. Hypotheses 
The main hypotheses to be tested (hypotheses 1 and 1’, on balance of power and power 
preponderance theory at the dyadic level) are presented in detail in Chapter 3. All the other hypotheses to 
be tested in this section of dyadic conflict analysis (hypotheses 2–7) are in Appendix 4.3. The main 
purpose of testing the hypotheses in this section is to determine how the two main hypotheses on power 
explanations using the new power measures behave in the dyadic conflict models. 
 
 
 
                                                        
52 For more detailed discussion on dyadic conflict model setups, see Vasquez (1993), Bremer (1992, 
1993), and Gartzke, Nordstrom, Boehmer, and Hewitt (2006). Also see the following research for each of 
the factors in the conflict model setups: (1) for democracy and interdependence, Kant (1970[1797]), 
Russett and Oneal (2001), McMillan (1997), and Mansfield and Pollins (2001); (2) for alliance, Levy 
(1981), Singer and Small (1966), Faber and Weaver (1984), Moul (1988), Schroeder (1976), and Ostrom 
and Hoole (1978); (3) for contiguity and distance, Wallensteen (1981), Diehl (1985), Diehl and Goertz 
(1988), and Starr and Most (1976); (4) for the major power status, Singer and Small (1966), and 
Gochman (1980). 
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 2. Data 
The data to be used in this dyadic study are based on two dispute data sets. As noted above, 
Oneal and Russett have been leading proponents of the dyadic study of international conflicts, and I use 
their latest data set (from Oneal 2003 and Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003)53 as the baseline for this 
study. This data set is merged with the data set of each state’s structural network power measures that I 
have created using six types of interaction network data among all states in the international system. Using 
the data on diplomatic exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and international telecommunications for 
one dimension (called “the dimension of communication patterns”), and arms transfers, international 
exports, and international assistance for the other dimension (called “the dimension of resource flows”) of 
international system structure, I have derived each state’s scores on different aspects of structural network 
power based on the social network perspective of international relations (more details on the measures 
can be found in Chapter 3).  
 
 
 
                                                        
53 Some use so-called “politically relevant dyads” (dyads containing continuous states and dyads 
containing at least one major power, Maoz and Russett 1993) instead of all the dyads used in this project 
(see Bennett and Stam 2004 for a general discussion on the advantages/disadvantages of focusing on 
politically relevant dyads, esp., 61-62). I have decided to use all available dyads in the system instead of 
sub-samples such as politically relevant dyads, following (1) Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s argument 
that “the effects captured by taking only a subset of states (power projection capabilities, distance between 
dyads) are already included in” the model of using all dyads (2006, 12, footnote 10) and (2) the argument 
by Bennett (2005) and Lemke and Reed (2001a) that the use of relevant dyads introduces measurable 
selection bias. For example, Lemke and Reed (2001a) demonstrate that employing the set of politically 
relevant dyads introduces a measurable selection bias in analysis, although the size of the bias appears to 
be small. They also argue that the specific threats of selection bias from relevant dyad usage could arise in 
two ways: first, some control variables such as wealth, alliance, or democracy could be correlated to major 
power status; second, contiguity increases the likelihood of interactions, specifically concerning territory. 
Bennett (2005, 5-6) notes that “the bias emerges because a variety of the factors theorized to cause 
conflict (such as capabilities, wealth, and possibly democracy) correlate quite strongly with the selection 
criteria for political relevance. Major powers by definition have greater capabilities and wealth than the 
average state, and they tend to be disproportionately democratic. States with many contiguous neighbors 
may also have higher levels of capabilities than states facing few potential threats, and recent work 
suggests that regime type tends to cluster geographically” (for general discussion on politically relevant 
dyads, see also Bennett and Stam 2000b, 2004; for other sub-sample usage in conflict studies, see 
Quackenbush 2006, which addresses “politically active dyads” using contiguity, power status, and 
alliances as defining characteristics). 
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3. Measurements 
The dichotomous Onset of Dispute dependent variable is coded as 1 if any kind of militarized 
dispute is ongoing between two states in a particular year; if there was no dispute, it is coded as 0.54 Some 
use only the initial year of a dispute, arguing that events over time are not statistically independent. I count 
ongoing disputes following Russett and Oneal’s argument that “rational leaders frequently reevaluate their 
positions, whether to escalate, deescalate, halt, or maintain the existing strategy” (Russett and Oneal 
2001, 95, footnote 2).55 The decision to include the ongoing conflict instead of using only the initial year 
of conflict has been also rationalized in Maoz and Russett (1993). They posit (631) that states’ political 
systems and other variables typically change frequently during ongoing conflicts, and we have to take 
those changes into account when explaining states’ conflict behaviors.56  
The measurements on the main independent variables used (balance of structural network power 
measures) are presented in detail in Chapter 3. These variables measure the balance of structural network 
power between the two states in a dyad. They are based on five different measures of point centralities 
from network analyses of interaction data (i.e., degree, betweenness, flow-betweenness, coreness, ego 
network brokerage, and their composite index). Briefly, degree aspect of network power measures each 
node’s (state’s) centrality according to its total number of connections to other nodes (states) in the 
network (system). Betweenness aspect of network power measures each node’s (state’s) centrality 
according to its capacity in standing on the paths or geodesics (i.e., minimal length paths) that connect 
two other nodes (states) in the network (system). Flow-betweenness aspect of network power measures 
                                                        
54 See Pevehouse (2004) for a general discussion on the measurement of the dependent variable, 
international conflict. He argues that widely used conflict data sets such as MID code all hostilities, but 
only report the highest level of hostility in the dispute and ignore the cooperative behavior among states. 
See Kadera (2001) for the discussion on the cooperation-conflict continuum (treating cooperation and 
conflict as separate dimensions versus as opposite sides of one dimension) (36-40). Also see the similar 
discussion in Barbieri 2002, esp., 50-53 (conceptualizing peace as the absence of militarized conflict, 
rather than the presence of cooperation, see also Domke 1988). 
 
55 Oneal and Russett also argued that more than half of all disputes involve change of level force over the 
course of the dispute or a new dispute that arises before the first has concluded (2001, 95, footnote 2).  
56 Please also see Bennett and Stam (2000b, 2004) for general discussion on including versus excluding 
ongoing disputes.  
 108
 each node’s (state’s) centrality according to its capacity in standing on both the direct and indirect paths 
that connect two other nodes (states) in the network (system). Core aspect of network power measures 
each node’s (state’s) centrality according to its degree of coreness to the other nodes (states) in the 
network (system). Based on the concept of a core/periphery structure (a dense and cohesive core and a 
sparse and unconnected periphery), it measures how central each state is in terms of its network coreness 
in the continuous sense (with a high score representing a highly core state, and a low score representing a 
highly periphery state).  Ego network brokerage aspect of network power measures each node’s (state’s) 
centrality according to its level of brokerage among the nodes (states) in its own ego network. To measure 
the egonet brokerage centrality, we first construct the ego network for every actor within the whole 
network and then compute each actor’s brokerage centrality within its own ego network. The ego 
brokerage centrality is the number of (ordered, because I use only directed data) actor pairs, within its ego 
network, that are not directed connected. Based on the five different measures of point centralities, the 
final product is the log-transformed ratio of the stronger state’s structural network power index to that of 
the weaker state, which has been the conventional measure of power balance variable used in the conflict 
models. The reasoning for this is that having greater power brings only declining marginal gains (i.e., a 
decreasing marginal advantage of increasing power difference, Russett and Oneal 2001, 103; Barbieri 
2002, 66).57 The measurements on all other independent variables used in this section of dyadic conflict 
analysis are presented in detail in Appendix 4.3.  
  
4.3.2. Estimation Methods 
The main estimation method in this dyadic study is the logistic regression assuming clustering on 
dyads. To check the robustness of results from the empirical tests, I employ three additional estimation 
methods: (1) logistic regression analysis clustered on periods, (2) ReLogit estimation, and (3) pooled GEE 
estimation. First, logistic analysis clustered on periods is based on the WSEV one-step approach, 
                                                        
57 Whether a state has 100 or 1,000 times more power than its opponent makes little difference, because 
varying the power preponderance has little effect when power differences are great (Barbieri 2002, 63). 
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 accounting for the dependences (temporal, spatial, and dyadic) on the covariance structures in my panel 
data (Heagerty, Ward, and Gleditsch 2002; Heagerty and Lumley 2000). Second, ReLogit analysis is 
based on the corrections of the biases in the logit estimations of rare events (King and Zeng 2001a, 
2001b). Finally, I use the pooled GEE estimation, adjusting the AR1 process (Liang and Zeger 1986). The 
findings from these three different additional sensitivity analyses are generally with my main analysis, and 
therefore the discussions on the results in the following section are based on the results from my main 
method of analysis (logistic regression analysis clustered on dyads) in Table 4.7 (Appendix 4.4 displays 
the results from the three sensitivity analyses). To add the substantive meanings from the logistic results in 
Table 4.7, Table 4.8 displays the results from the marginal effects analysis for the main independent 
variables of the study, the balance of structural network power, using the Clarify program by King, Tomz, 
and Wittenberg (2000, 2003). This program, using stochastic simulation techniques, first “draws 
simulations of the main and ancillary parameters from their asymptotic sampling distribution,” and second 
“converts the simulated parameters into substantively interesting quantities, such as predicted values, 
expected values, or first differences.” I choose to simulate 1,000 sets of parameters (from my models) to 
produce the predicted values for each of my 18 models to be tested below.  
 
4.3.3. Results and Discussion  
Hypotheses 1 and 1’ test the arguments advanced by “balance of power” theorists (that the 
power parity of states in a dyad leads to a decreased probability of dispute onset) and by “power 
preponderance” theorists (that power preponderance leads to a decreased probability of dispute onset), 
using the new concept of structural network power.58 Table 4.7 displays the results from the logistic 
                                                        
58 This section only discusses the results on the main hypotheses (balance of power versus power 
preponderance). The discussion on the remaining hypotheses is presented in Appendix 4.3. 
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 regression of the onset of dyadic dispute: the logistic results for six models (five different aspects and their 
composite index).59  
The results from the logistic regressions clustered by dyads (Tables 4.7) strongly support the 
arguments of power preponderance theorists at the dyadic level. In all but one model specification, the 
coefficient on the Balance of Structural Network Power is negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that the more skewed the distribution of structural network power in a dyad, the less likely a militarized 
interstate dispute. In the other model specification, the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. The results from all other sensitivity analyses (logistic regression analysis clustered on periods, 
ReLogit analysis, and pooled GEE analysis) all support the power preponderance theory. It is clear from 
all the analyses that when two states in a dyad share disproportional structural network power (i.e., one 
state’s power is disproportionate to the other state’s power), they are less likely to be involved in conflicts 
with each other, supporting the power preponderance-leads-to-peace argument. As power preponderance 
theorists argue, the weaker state will not try to fight with the stronger state because it will certainly lose, 
and therefore the stronger state does not have to get into the fight to get what it wants.  In other words, 
the power preponderance between states will preserve peace since it reduces the uncertainties of winners 
and losers in a dispute. As there is a highly asymmetric power distribution, a weaker state will more likely 
concede to a stronger state’s demand since it knows it is less likely to prevail in a crisis bargaining 
situation. All in all, the results from all sets of dyadic analyses in this project provide the empirical evidence 
toward supporting the “power preponderance leads to peace” (or “power balance leads to conflict”) 
theoretical argument from Organski (1968), Organski and Kugler (1980), Blainey (1988), Kugler and 
Lemke (1996), and Lemke (2002), and are in line with the empirical findings of Garnham (1976a), 
Garnham (1976b), Weede (1976), Organski and Kugler (1980), Bremer (1992), Maoz and Russett (1993), 
Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999, 2001), Oneal, Russett, and Davis (1998), Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), 
and Gartzke (1998).  
                                                        
59 As I noted in Chapter 3, the structural network power measures were derived in this project using the 
international interaction data based on communication patterns and resource flows among international 
system members (the two dimensions of international system structure).  
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 To add the substantive meanings from the logistic results in Tables 4.7, Table 4.8 displays the 
marginal effects analysis for the main independent variables of the study—the balance of structural 
network power—using the Clarify program of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000, 2003). The results show 
that, for example, using the degree aspect of balance of structural network power, the baseline probability 
of the onset of a dispute, holding all other included variables at their means, is .00077 (this baseline rate 
represents the chance of a dispute for some “typical” dyad in the samples). Raising the level of structural 
network power balance from its minimum to the mean, while holding all other variables at their means, 
reduces the probability of onset by 22.9%. Increasing the change to its maximum triggers an additional 
decrease of 49.2%. Increasing the level of the variable from its minimum to its maximum reduces the 
probability of onset by 58.7% (a drop of more than half from the baseline rate in the likelihood that the 
two states in a dyad will have a dispute). As seen in Table 4.8, the reduction of predicted probabilities 
(changing the values for the balance of structural network power variable from the minimum to the 
maximum, holding all other independent variables at their means) ranges from 54.1% to 83.2% for the 
models. The results of the marginal impact analyses show that, in addition to the statistical results from 
Table 4.7, there are quite sizable effects of the balance of structural network power on the onset of 
militarized disputes. This finding supports power preponderance theory over balance of power theory.  
All in all, three sets of findings stand out. First, regarding the debate on balance of power and 
power preponderance theory at the dyadic level, my empirical findings strongly support the argument by 
power preponderance theorists. Using different aspects of structural network power (e.g., degree, 
betweenness, flow-betweenness, coreness, egonet brokerage, and their composite index) and different 
estimation methods (logistic regression analysis clustered on dyads or on periods, ReLogit analysis, and 
pooled GEE analysis), the results consistently support the power preponderance theory—that 
preponderance of structural network power decreases the probability of dispute onset (or the more skewed 
the distribution of structural network power in a dyad, the less likely a militarized interstate dispute). 
Second, regarding the liberal peace theory, the economic interdependence pillar is weakly supported 
(mostly, at the .10 significance level) compared to that of the democratic pillar (mostly at better than the 
.001 level). However, the weak support of the “economic interdependence leads to peace” argument is 
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 not surprising on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Many realists (e.g., Waltz 1979; Gaddis 1986) 
theorize that economic interdependence rather increases conflict among states (i.e., interdependence is a 
source of friction that can lead to military conflict) or that economic interdependence and conflict among 
states are irrelevant (i.e., the interdependence is subordinate to other considerations in determining the 
incidence of international conflict). Recent empirical work using more advanced econometric methods 
have consistently found no relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict 
(e.g., Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Goenner 2004; Kim and Rousseau 2005). Finally, the marginal 
effects analysis using Clarify shows that all the variables of the three main hypotheses in this study have 
quite sizable and compatible effects; the reductions of the probability of dyadic onset (against the baseline 
rate in the likelihood that the two states in a dyad will have a dispute) for the Balance of Structural 
Network Power variable range from 54.1 % to 83.2% for six of my models; those for the Interdependence 
Low from 74.4% to 77.8%; and those for the Democracy Low from 76.0% to 85.8%. Not only are 
democratic states or economically interdependent states less likely to be involved in a dispute, but also 
states with sizable power differences (the weaker state in a dyad knowing it will certainly lose and, as a 
consequence, the stronger state getting what it wants without getting involved in a dispute). This set of 
results is consistently supported in all different estimation methods used and with different measures of 
structural network power utilized.  
 
4.4. Model Comparisons for the Conflict Studies  
 
4.4.1. Using Nonparametric Model Discrimination Test 
To compare the conflict models using SNPI (Structural Network Power Index) variables against 
those using CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) or GNP variables, I first use Clarke’s (2001a, 
2001b, 2003) pair-signed test of nonnested model discrimination60 (see also Conover 1980). Clarke 
                                                        
60 The two sets of conflict models tested in this chapter are nonnested because one model cannot be 
reduced to the other model by imposing a set of linear restrictions on the parameter vector (see Clarke 
2001a and 2001b for the definition of nonnested model). 
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 (2001a, 2001b) posits that traditional methods of model discrimination such as likelihood ratio tests, F-
test, and artificial nesting fail when applied to nonnested models. Clarke (2001a, 2003) also argues that a 
nonparametric approach for model discrimination such as the pair-signed test is more robust and performs 
better than other approaches of nonnested model comparison (e.g., the Vuong test). His model 
discrimination test compares two nonnested models by examining the predictions of each model. If both 
models produce similar predictions, they cannot be distinguished. If one model produces better 
predictions (statistically significant) than the other, we can conclude that the former model performs better 
(or has the greater explanatory power) than the latter. So, for example, in applying his tests to conflicts 
models examined in this chapter, if we find that the conflict models using SNPI variables produce the 
better predictions than the models using CINC variables, we can conclude that the former models 
performs better than the latter models. If we find that the opposite is true, we can argue that the latter 
models have greater explanatory power than the former models. 
 Clarke’s model comparison tests proceed in two steps (Clarke 2001a, 2003). First, each model’s 
predictions are generated for all available data points (calculating individual log-likelihood ratio for each 
case). Second, the predictions of each model are compared based on the median log-likelihood ratio to 
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the two models.61 This 
nonparametric nonnested model discrimination approach has been applied to international relations 
research. For example, Clarke (2003) applies this approach to compare a political norms explanation 
against a political structure explanation on foreign policy decision-making (Huth and Allee, 2002) and 
                                                        
61 Clarke (2003, 77–78) details the algorithm for applying his pair-signed test as follows: 
a. Run model f, saving the individual log-likelihoods. For a binary choice model, the individual log-
likelihoods are calculated by yilog(^pi) + (1 – yi)log(1 - ^pi). For a linear dependent variable model, 
they are calculated by –log(2 * pi * sum((residuals(x))^2)/N)/ 2- (1/2) * ((residuals(x)) / 
sqrt(sum((residuals(x)) ^2)/N)^2). The former is in Clarke (2003, 77) and the latter is in Souva (2005, 
159), and also has been confirmed by personal communication with Clarke. 
b. Run model g, saving the individual log-likelihoods. 
c. Compute the differences and count the number of positive and negative values. 
d. The number of positive differences is distributed binomial (n, p = .5). 
The test determines whether the median log-likelihood ratio is statistically different from zero. If the models 
are equally close to the true specification, half the log-likelihood ratios should be greater than zero and 
half should be less than zero. If model f is “better” than model g, more than half the log-likelihood ratios 
should be greater than zero. Conversely, if model g is “better” than model f, more than half the log-
likelihood ratios should be less than zero.  
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 finds that the former has greater explanatory power than the latter. He also finds that the two systemic 
long-cycle explanations of great power wars (research focused on global economic activities, such as 
Goldstein (1991), and those on global political order, such as Wallerstein (1983), Modelski and Thompson 
(1987), and Gilpin (1981)) cannot be discriminated from each other. Souva (2005) applies the test to 
compare the systemic realist explanation to the domestic-politics explanation of foreign policy decision-
making and finds that the former model is statistically better than the latter. 
Tables 4.9–4.10 present the results of pair-signed tests for both systemic and dyadic conflict 
models (comparing the models with the attribute-based power variables against those with the structural 
network power variables). For the systemic conflict study (systemic dispute and crisis onset models), Table 
4.9 shows that ten of twelve models with SNPI variables have greater explanatory power than those with 
CINC variables (in the remaining two models, the model with SNPI performs equally well compared to the 
model with CINC). In other words, the model comparison test confirms that the models with SNPI 
generally account for more variation in systemic conflict (both dispute and crisis) onsets and are 
statistically better than the models with CINC. For example, in 59.5–69.0% of all the systemic dispute 
cases (depending on the models), the model with SNPI outperforms the model with CINC (if the two 
models perform equally, each should account for 50%). For all of the systemic crisis cases, four of six 
models with SNPI outperform the model with CINC in 54.8–69.0% of the cases. In all the models where 
the SNPI conflict models outperform the CNIC model, the null hypothesis of equality between the two 
models is rejected at the 0.001 level.  
For the dyadic conflict study, Table 4.10 shows that for all six models, those with SNPI variables 
have greater explanatory power than those with either the CINC or GNP variable. This means that the 
model comparison test confirms that the models with structural network power variables account for more 
variation in dyadic conflict onsets and are statistically better than the models with the attribute-based 
power variables. For example, in 53.9–62.9% of all dyadic dispute cases, the model with SNPI 
outperforms the model with CINC. The same results are found when the SNPI conflict models are 
compared with the GNP model; all six models with SNPI outperform the model with GNP in 53.3–61.6% 
of the cases. In all of the conflict models, the null hypothesis of equality (between the two sets of models, 
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 with SNPI versus CINC and with SNPI versus GNP) is rejected at the 0.001 level. After comparing the 
conflict models, we conclude that the models with SNPI variables have greater explanatory power than (or 
statistically outperform) those with CINC (or GNP) variables in both systemic and dyadic conflict onsets. 
 
4.4.2. Using Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria 
The second set of statistics used to compare the two sets of nonnested models in conflict studies 
are information criteria measures such as Akaike’s (1973) information criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC) proposed by Raftery (1996). The basic idea behind both statistical model fit 
measures is to examine the complexity of the model together with the goodness of its fit to the sample 
data and to produce a measure that balances between the two (i.e., selection measures that balance 
model fit with some adjustment of parsimony).62 The Bayesian information criteria (BIC) is proposed by 
Raftery (1996) and, compared to Akaike’s measures, favors the models with fewer parameters and 
penalizes the complex models more heavily than AIC. The two measures permit the comparison of both 
nested and nonnested models and have been used to assess the relative performance of models (e.g., 
Fordham and McKeown 2003 for the study of constituency economic interests on foreign trade 
registration; Goenner 2004 for the study of economic interdependence on international conflicts; Gordon, 
Kim, and McKeown forthcoming for the study of U.S. federal research and development funding). The 
differences in the AICs or BICs from two models indicate which model is more likely to have generated the 
observed data, and the model with the smallest AIC or BIC is considered the better fitting model (Long 
1997; Long and Freese 2001). Raftery (1996), adopting Jeffrey’s (1961) conventions, suggests guidelines 
for the strength of evidence favoring one model against the other model based on the BIC difference (if 
BIC1 – BIC2 < 0 then the first model is preferred and if BIC1 – BIC2 > 0 then the second model is 
preferred): absolute difference of 0–2 as weak support of lower scoring model, 2–6 as positive support, of 
6–10 as strong support, and of greater than 10 as very strong support. 
                                                        
62 See Judge et al. (1985, 870-875) for a general discussion of information-based measures.  
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 Tables 4.9-4.10 contain the AIC and BIC measures for both systemic and dyadic conflict models 
(comparing the models having the attribute-based power variables against those having the structural 
network power variables). For the systemic conflict study (systemic dispute and crisis onset models), Table 
4.9 shows that in all twelve models, the conflict models with SNPI variables are favored against those with 
CINC variables. With BIC differences of 14.088–24.667, the systemic dispute models with SNPI are very 
strongly preferred over those with CINC. The BIC differences of 17.419–24.702 show that the same 
conclusion holds for the systemic crisis models. For the dyadic conflict study, Table 4.10 shows that five of 
six models with SNPI variables are favored against that with the CINC variable (with BIC differences of 
2.013–52.515) and against that with the GNP variable (with BIC differences of 4.176–74.678). The 
evidence from the information criteria measures seems conclusive and confirms the findings with the 
nonparametric model discrimination tests; the models with SNPI variables statistically outperform and are 
preferred over those with CINC and GNP variables in both systemic and dyadic conflict studies. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the determinants of the onset of international conflicts from the social 
network perspective. In this chapter, the new social network power concept was applied to the previous 
empirical attempts of balance of power and power preponderance theories at both systemic and dyadic 
levels.  The main hypotheses being: (1) do the increased levels of systemic structural network power 
concentration, change, and movement lead to the increased or decreased levels of systemic conflict onset, 
and (2) does the structural network power balance between the two states in a dyad increase or decrease 
the probability of dyad conflict onset? The focus of hypothesis testing in this empirical chapter was on how 
my new social network conceptions of international system structure and national power lead to more 
accurate and powerful empirical models than previous ones mainly rooted in attribute logic. This chapter 
took existing theories and tested them using my newer network conceptions of the international system 
and national power, focused on the conceptions of the international system as networks and of a state’s 
power based on its relational structural network power, and was primarily interested in how these newer 
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 conceptions lead us to recast a great deal of existing empirical work on the subject. Does a structurally 
centralized or concentrated international system induce a more peaceful world, or just the opposite (for 
the systemic conflict analysis)?  How is the structural network power balance between states related to 
their conflict behaviors (for the dyadic conflict analysis)? What are some distinctive characteristics of 
militarized disputes networks (for the graphical representations of conflicts)? These are some of the 
research questions that were examined in this chapter of social network application to militarized conflicts.  
In examining the hypotheses on balance of power theory and power preponderance theory, this 
chapter found that: (1) at the system level the overall results do not reveal any clear support for either 
theory, but (2) at the dyadic level the overall results do strongly support power preponderance theory over 
balance of power theory. From the system level analyses, balance of power theory, in general, does 
support the hypotheses on systemic crises but, conversely, power preponderance theory generally does 
support the hypotheses on the systemic disputes. However, from the dyadic level analyses, the results are 
clear from all the analyses using four different estimation methods (i.e., logistic estimation clustered on 
dyads, WSEV estimation, ReLogit estimation, and the pooled GEE estimation controlling for the AR1 
process) that when the two states in a dyad share disproportional structural network power, they will be far 
less likely to be involved in conflicts with each other (i.e., the more skewed the distribution of structural 
network power in a dyad, the less likely a militarized interstate dispute will occur), supporting the power 
preponderance-leads-to-peace argument. The marginal impact analysis also shows that the 
preponderance of structural network power has a strong effect on interstate dispute, cutting the probability 
of a dispute by 54.1% to 83.2% (depending on the model specifications) from the baseline rate. The 
evidence from nonparametric model discrimination statistics and information criteria measures also shows 
that those models with network power measures statistically outperform and are preferred over those with 
attributional power measures such as COW index and GNP in both systemic and dyadic conflict onsets 
studies.  
In addition to the empirical analyses, this chapter also emphasized how useful sociograms 
(produced by the social network analysis) are in depicting and highlighting the distinctive characteristics of 
international dispute networks. First, the general graphical patterns of monadic and dyadic factors 
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 affecting the onset of disputes revealed from the sociograms in Figure 4.3 are also in line with the results 
from the dyadic dispute onset analysis. Second, the sociograms in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 revealed that a 
significant majority of international conflicts are “connected” conflicts, and that there are relatively few 
“disconnected” or “isolated” conflicts in the network of international conflicts (e.g., during the 1950s, only 
one crisis-dyad, Morocco-Spain, was isolated in the network that was composed of 75 different crisis-
dyads). This provides graphical insight for why the conflict dyadic study needs to incorporate the extra-
dyadic conflict information in the networks. The sociograms in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also provide graphical 
insight for studies of “recurrent” international conflicts (e.g., on enduring rivalries). Third, the global maps 
of monadic dispute and crisis onset distributions in 1950–2000 in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 revealed the zones 
of conflict or peace in the world (i.e., groups of states that have relatively more or less conflict).  
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 Table 4.1 Pearson Correlations of Systemic Structural Network Power Centralization and Density Measures with Systemic Conflicts, 1950–2000  
 Centralization Centralization Centralization Centralization 
 (Degree) (Betweenness) (Flow-Betweenness) (SNPI)  Density 
 Proportion of MIDs .061 .601*** .756*** .694*** .487*** 
 Proportion of ICBs -.001 .473*** .543*** .497*** .521*** 
 Number of MIDs .127 -.228 -.329* -.205 -.322* 
 Number of ICBs -.109 .236* .237* .175 .172 
              NOTE: All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Pearson Correlations of Systemic Structural Network Power Concentration Measures with Systemic Conflicts, 1950–2000  
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SCON 
(Degree) 
SCON 
(Betweenness) 
SCON 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
SCON 
(Coreness) 
SCON 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
SCON 
(SNPI) 
 Proportion of MIDs .477*** .425** .718*** .306* .638*** .582*** 
 Proportion of ICBs .426** .545*** .682*** .301* .562*** .525*** 
 Number of MIDs -.607*** -.372** -.423** -.485*** -.509*** -.593*** 
 Number of ICBs .372** .454*** .405** .323* .339* .396** 
                  NOTE: All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
 Table 4.3 Pearson Correlations of Systemic Structural Network Power Change Measures with Systemic Conflicts, 1950–2000 
 
  
SCHANGE5 
(Degree) 
SCHANGE5 
(Betweenness) 
SCHANGE5 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
SCHANGE5 
(Coreness) 
SCHANGE5 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
SCHANGE5 
(SNPI) 
 Proportion of MIDs .160 -.406** -.621*** -.043 -.060 -.077 
 Proportion of ICBs .191 -.263* -.422** .090 -.037 .012 
 Number of MIDs -.224 .093 .104 -.220 -.060 -.177 
 Number of ICBs .015 .084 .058 .137 .045 .088 
             NOTE: All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Pearson Correlations of Systemic Structural Network Power Movement Measures with Systemic Conflicts, 1950–2000 
  SMOVE5 
(Degree) 
SMOVE5 
(Betweenness) 
SMOVE5 
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(Flow-Betweenness) 
SMOVE5 
(Coreness) 
SMOVE5 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
SMOVE5 
(SNPI) 
 Proportion of MIDs -.184 .325* .581*** .083 .058 -.015 
 Proportion of ICBs -.181 .373* .534*** .173 -.103 -.033 
 Number of MIDs .192 -.158 -.225 -.027 .124 .166 
 Number of ICBs .015 .174 .120 .092 -.094 -.011 
                  NOTE: All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
  
 
 Table 4.5 Analysis of Systemic Conflict Onset, 1950–2000 (Proportion of MIDs and ICBs) 
 
Dispute Onset 
Model 1-1 
(CINC) 
Model 1-2 
(Degree) 
Model 1-3 
(Betweenness) 
Model 1-4 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model 1-5 
(Coreness) 
Model 1-6 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model 1-7 
(SNPI) 
 SCON -0.613** -0.399*** -0.357* -0.092 -0.075 -0.680*** -0.319*** 
  (0.207) (0.106) (0.184) (0.064) (0.046) (0.129) (0.091) 
 SCON2 1.257*** 0.777*** 0.482* 0.152 0.072 1.877*** 0.690** 
  (0.355) (0.227) (0.250) (0.099) (0.076) (0.360) (0.222) 
 SCHANGE5 -0.031 -0.411* -0.112* -0.087* 0.038* -0.063 -0.152* 
  (0.049) (0.156) (0.045) (0.039) (0.020) (0.068) (0.075) 
 SMOVE5 -0.090 -0.237** -0.028 -0.017 -0.051*** -0.046 -0.093* 
  (0.160) (0.079) (0.036) (0.028) (0.013) (0.030) (0.044) 
 YEAR 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant 0.054 0.355*** 0.331*** 0.220*** 0.412*** 0.375*** 0.371*** 
  (0.189) (0.048) (0.058) (0.042) (0.046) (0.071) (0.055) 
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 Crisis Onset        
 SCON 0.118 -0.038 0.029 0.043 0.055* -0.035 -0.010 
  (0.136) (0.078) (0.112) (0.039) (0.031) (0.092) (0.063) 
 SCON2 -0.218 0.098 -0.023 -0.052 -0.097* 0.153 0.055 
  (0.234) (0.167) (0.153) (0.060) (0.051) (0.256) (0.155) 
 SCHANGE5 0.002 -0.036 -0.053* -0.028 0.021 -0.054 -0.015 
  (0.032) (0.115) (0.028) (0.023) (0.014) (0.048) (0.052) 
 SMOVE5 -0.086 -0.008 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 0.013 
  (0.106) (0.058) (0.022) (0.017) (0.008) (0.021) (0.031) 
 YEAR 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant 0.042 0.062* 0.086* 0.054* 0.130*** 0.052 0.055 
  (0.125) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.031) (0.050) (0.039) 
 
       NOTE: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 4.6 Analysis of Systemic Conflict Onset, 1950–2000 (Number of MIDs and ICBs) 
 
Dispute Onset 
Model 2-1 
(CINC) 
Model 2-2 
(Degree) 
Model 2-3 
(Betweenness) 
Model 2-4 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model 2-5 
(Coreness) 
Model 2-6 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model 2-7 
(SNPI) 
 SCON -106.252* -34.514* -50.529* -16.856 -27.880*** -56.565* -28.354* 
  (44.275) (19.559) (30.023) (11.401) (8.020) (24.673) (16.173) 
 SCON2 194.614** 61.142 63.205 22.104 42.168** 135.225* 49.652 
  (75.417) (42.024) (40.917) (17.683) (13.516) (69.322) (39.746) 
 SCHANGE5 -8.490 -29.107 1.108 -3.545 0.759 14.452 6.398 
  (10.076) (29.606) (7.714) (6.865) (3.465) (13.089) (13.442) 
 SMOVE5 6.618 -21.402 -3.021 -4.200 -3.841* 3.951 -5.516 
  (34.928) (14.960) (5.986) (4.938) (2.125) (5.813) (7.699) 
 YEAR 0.001 0.000 0.006* 0.004 0.008* -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.019) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
 Constant 17.389 8.105 1.216 -1.651 -6.781 16.522 15.084 
  (42.893) (9.066) (9.528) (7.309) (8.267) (13.404) (9.853) 
 /lnalpha -3.652*** -4.002*** -3.986*** -3.769*** -3.986*** -3.671*** -3.950*** 
  0.393 (0.461) (0.448) (0.404) (0.455) 
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(0.386) (0.450) 
 Chris Onset        
 SCON 457.941** 162.395** 127.026 91.303** 103.368*** 357.527*** 221.411*** 
  (157.296) (57.809) (108.432) (33.880) (27.923) (92.651) (50.342) 
 SCON2 -879.039*** -230.125* -154.085 -133.326* -132.501** -934.833*** -430.560*** 
  (276.656) (113.241) (146.719) (52.125) (42.663) (251.790) (114.258) 
 SCHANGE5 52.921 67.615 -13.958 -0.078 -34.873* -24.405 6.803 
  (38.634) (67.104) (24.975) (20.786) (13.911) (40.677) (32.092) 
 SMOVE5 -47.767 130.392** -4.968 -1.735 34.603*** 9.694 74.245*** 
  (108.231) (44.652) (19.816) (15.699) (9.353) (17.083) (23.338) 
 YEAR -0.040 0.043** -0.016* -0.010 0.009 0.019 0.029* 
  (0.056) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) 
 Constant 21.552 -110.984*** 9.014 6.837 -34.880 -68.898* -84.054** 
  (124.327) (29.725) (33.879) (21.208) (24.658) (41.873) (27.042) 
 /lnalpha -1.096*** -1.795*** -1.177*** -1.122*** -1.427*** -1.217*** -1.746*** 
  (0.314) (0.335) (0.312) (0.310) (0.315) (0.309) (0.345) 
   NOTE: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 4.7 Analysis of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–1992  
Logit Analysis  
Clustered on Dyads 
Model 3-1 
(CINC) 
Model 3-2 Model 3-3 
(Degree) 
Model 3-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 3-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 3-6 
(GNP) (Coreness) 
Model 3-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 3-8 
(SNPI) 
Balance of Power -0.121** -0.116** -0.097*** -0.118*** -0.153*** 0.010 -0.058*** -0.161*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.063) (0.017) (0.047) 
Interdependence Low -19.982* -24.769* -21.296* -26.922* -27.241* -16.988 -20.349* -21.712* 
 (11.927) (13.248) (12.382) (13.854) (13.686) (11.605) (12.105) (12.380) 
Democracy Low -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Allies -0.431** -0.421** -0.400** -0.435** -0.387* -0.413** -0.397** -0.414** 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) 
Contiguity 2.550*** 2.530*** 2.514*** 2.503*** 2.490*** 2.564*** 2.522*** 2.525*** 
 (0.207) (0.203) (0.208) (0.199) (0.201) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208) 
Distance -0.581*** -0.569*** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.559*** -0.575*** -0.559*** -0.554*** 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.079) (0.071) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Major Power 1.735*** 1.867*** 1.693*** 1.845*** 1.831*** 1.683*** 
124 1.669*** 1.748*** 
 (0.166) (0.186) (0.165) (0.169) (0.168) (0.158) (0.164) (0.167) 
Peace Year -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.338*** -0.340*** -0.345*** -0.343*** -0.344*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Spline 1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spline 2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spline 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.410 -0.433 -0.549 -0.363 -0.357 -0.636 -0.559 -0.531 
 (0.655) (0.627) (0.670) (0.606) (0.618) (0.670) (0.666) (0.667) 
              
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 4.8 Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Onset from Fitted Logit Models 
 
 Minimum 
Mean 
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(Baseline) Maximum 
Min 
=> Mean 
Mean 
=> Max 
Min => Mean 
(Reduction, %) 
Mean => Max 
(Reduction, %) 
Min => Max 
(Reduction, %) 
 Model 3-1 0.00092 0.00077 0.00031 -0.00015 -0.00045 -20.0 -59.2 -66.0 
 Model 3-2 0.00098 0.00077 0.00034 -0.00021 -0.00043 -27.6 -56.1 -65.6 
 Model 3-3 0.00094 0.00077 0.00039 -0.00018 -0.00038 -22.9 -49.2 -58.7 
 Model 3-4 0.00116 0.00077 0.00028 -0.00039 -0.00048 -50.9 -62.8 -75.3 
 Model 3-5 0.00111 0.00076 0.00019 -0.00035 -0.00057 -46.4 -75.3 -83.2 
 Model 3-7 0.00091 0.00077 0.00042 -0.00015 -0.00035 -19.4 -45.2 -54.1 
 Model 3-8 0.00098 0.00077 0.00019 -0.00020 -0.00058 -26.1 -74.9 -80.1 
         NOTE: The marginal analyses were calculated using Clarify software. 
 
 Table 4.9 Model Comparisons for the Systemic Conflict Analyses 
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Model  
1-1/2-1 
(CINC) 
Model  
1-2/2-2 
(Degree) 
Model  
1-3/2-3 
(Betweenness) 
Model  
1-4/2-4 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model  
1-5/2-5 
(Coreness) 
Model  
1-6/2-6 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model  
1-7/2-7 
(SNPI) 
 Dispute Onset        
 AIC -456.799 -481.880 -472.652 -471.301 -477.396 -479.452 -477.592 
 BIC -446.373 -471.040 -461.812 -460.461 -466.556 -468.612 -466.752 
 Clarke Tests        
 Against CINC  59.5% 61.9% 59.5% 61.9% 69.0% 61.9% 
         
 Crisis Onset        
 AIC -491.817 -509.650 -516.933 -516.589 -513.058 -509.936 -510.051 
 BIC -481.391 -498.810 -506.093 -505.749 -502.218 -499.096 -499.211 
 Clarke Tests        
 Against CINC  50.0% 54.8% 50.0% 57.1% 64.3% 69.0% 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 Model Comparisons for the Dyadic Conflict Analyses 
 
 
 
Model 3-1 
(CINC) 
Model 3-2 
(GNP) 
Model 3-3 
(Degree) 
Model 3-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 3-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 3-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 3-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 3-8 
(SNPI) 
 AIC 9432.946 9435.097 9424.009 9383.360 9380.418 9460.076 9430.177 9430.920 
 BIC 9559.551 9561.714 9550.626 9509.977 9507.036 9586.694 9556.794 9557.538 
          
 Clarke Tests         
 Against CINC   62.6% 56.0% 62.9% 53.9% 60.8% 58.8% 
 Against GNP   56.7% 53.3% 61.6% 57.0% 53.9% 53.6% 
 
 Figure 4.1 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–2000 
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 Figure 4.1 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–2000 (Continued) 
1970s  
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 Figure 4.1 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–2000 (Continued) 
1990s  
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 Figure 4.2 Networks of Dyadic Crisis Onset, 1950–2000 
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 Figure 4.2 Networks of Dyadic Crisis Onset, 1950–2000 (Continued) 
1970s  
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 Figure 4.2 Networks of Dyadic Crisis Onset, 1950–2000 (Continued) 
1990s  
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 Figure 4.3 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset in 1960 
 
Dispute Onset in 1960 
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Dispute Onset-Ally in 1960: 
disputes between allied states represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 4.3 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset in 1960 (Continued) 
Dispute Onset-Contiguity in 1960:  
disputes between contiguous states represented by green arrow. 
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Dispute Onset-Distance in 1960: 
disputes between distant states represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 4.3 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset in 1960 (Continued) 
Dispute Onset-Economic Interdependence in 1960: 
disputes between economically interdependent states represented by green arrow. 
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Dispute Onset-Past Conflict Interaction Level in 1960: 
disputes between hostile states represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 4.3 Networks of Dyadic Dispute Onset in 1960 (Continued) 
Dispute Onset-Alliance Agreements in 1960: 
disputes between states with alliance agreements represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 4.4 Global Map of Dispute Onset Distribution, 1950–2000 
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NOTE: Black (the top third of all dispute onsets); Gray (the middle third of all dispute onsets); White (the bottom third of all dispute onsets). 
 
 Figure 4.5 Global Map of Crisis Onset Distribution, 1950–2000 
 
 
 
NOTE: Black (the top third of all crisis onsets); Gray (the middle third of all crisis onsets); White (the bottom third of all crisis onsets).
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CHAPTER 5. DETERMINANTS OF THE ONSET AND SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
In addition to applying network analysis to the onset of militarized conflicts, it can also be applied 
to other international processes. Network analysis is likely to be especially relevant to studying sanctions 
because prior work has shown that sanctions success depends on whether a sufficiently large proportion of 
nations in the target state’s trading network can be induced to join the sanctioning effort. Understanding 
the dynamics of that network is essential to understanding when sanctions are attempted and when they 
succeed.  
In what follows I first present some graphical representations of international sanctions. This 
section argues for the importance of graphical representations of dyadic sanctions onsets from the social 
network perspective, and it focuses on describing how each set of figures from the social network 
perspective represents the study of economic sanctions. I then devote the next two sections to empirical 
analyses of economic sanctions using the sample selection method. First, regarding the first stage of 
sample selection analyses: even though there have been many recent efforts to identify the determinants 
of economic sanction success, we lack empirical analyses of the factors affecting the onset of economic 
sanctions; when do states initiate the use of economic sanctions? Although we now know quite a lot about 
the determinants of the onset of militarized interstate disputes, which was examined in Chapter 4, we 
know far less about the onset of economic sanctions. This study addresses this gap in empirical analysis. 
Second, regarding the second stage of sample selection analyses, many different attributes of the sender or 
target state, as well as the relationship between the two, have been hypothesized to affect the success of 
economic sanctions. However, I argue that two important factors have been neglected or tested 
inadequately in the previous empirical studies: the relative structural network power difference between 
sanctioning and target states, and the target’s structural network power. I posit that the lower the 
difference in the levels of structural network power between sender and target, the higher the probability 
 of success; and that the greater the structural network power for the target, the higher the probability of 
success. The measurements of structural network power (for the sender-target balance and for the target) 
are derived from six different interaction measures (on the dimensions of communication patterns and 
resource flows) using social network analysis. This chapter also argues that the previous research on the 
success of economic sanctions does not adequately take into account the selection effects that take place; 
states involved in economic sanctions do select or are selected into the sanction phase by a strategic 
process. To control for this selection bias, I use a censored probit model connecting sanction onset and 
sanction success. The use of censored probit in addition to the structural network power concept provides 
a more accurate picture of the factors affecting the success of economic sanctions. In addition to the more 
appropriate sample selection method, the focus of hypothesis testing in the latter two parts of this 
empirical chapter is on how my new social network conceptions (of international system structure and 
national power) lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models of economic sanctions than 
previous ones that are mainly rooted in attribute logic. The performance of sanction models (both on 
onset and success) using structural network power measures is compared against those using attribution-
based power measures, through nonparametric model discrimination statistics and information measures. 
 
5.1. Graphical Representations of Dyadic Economic Sanctions Onset 
The sociograms of dyadic sanction onsets in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and through 1950–
1990 show the following: (1) sanction onsets for all states, (2) sanction onsets by major powers, (3) 
sanction onset in each of five regions in the world, (4) changing patterns of sanction networks, and (5) 
connections among different sanction onsets in the international system.63 More specifically, these 
sociograms of economic sanctions reveal how sanction cases are or are not connected to each other, some 
general structural characteristics of international sanction networks in each decade and their changing 
patterns over decades, and the bilateral relationships between some monadic or dyadic factors and dyadic 
                                                        
63 See Appendix 4.1 for discussion of graphical network data representation (especially sociograms) versus 
tables and for an exercise that compares the two methods. 
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 sanction onsets (e.g., regime type, economic development, major power status, alliance, contiguity, 
distance, economic interdependence, past conflict interaction level, and alliance agreements). 
Figures 5.1–5.2 display the graphical representations of dyadic economic sanctions onset. In each 
of the sociograms, the two states involved in the onset of sanctions are connected by a one-way arrow 
from the sender to the target state. To account for the major power-sanction onset relationship, the five 
major powers as defined by the COW project (the U.S., the United Kingdom., France, the Soviet Union, 
and China) are represented by the circle-in-box shape rather than the circle shape used for all other states. 
To account for the pattern of regional sanctions64, the region of each state as defined by the COW project 
is represented by a different color: yellow for the Middle East, pink for North and South America, green for 
Africa, blue for Asia, and red for Europe. To represent the pattern of recurrent sanctions65, the frequency 
of sanction onset in a dyad is represented by the thickness of lines connecting the dyad.   
The sociograms in the figures represent the networks of dyadic economic sanctions onset in the 
1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and throughout 1950–1990, and only successful cases of dyadic economic 
sanctions onset throughout 1950–1990. Each of the sociograms displays all pairs of states that had at least 
one sanction case in each period. If there was more than one sanction case for the same dyad, the 
frequencies of sanction onset are represented by the thickness of lines connecting the dyad; for example, 
the thickest arrow in the sociograms between the U.S. and the Soviet Union represents the highest 
number of sanction onsets in the networks of economic sanctions. We should be able to derive from the 
networks of dyadic sanctions onset several general characteristics of sanctions networks: the 
predominance of sanctions initiated by the U.S. (especially since 1960 and toward states in North and 
South America), the dominance of sanction initiations by just four major powers throughout the study 
period (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union), the high connectedness of sanction 
                                                        
64 A regional sanction is defined as a sanction where both sender and target states belong to the same 
region. For example, the sanction involving Spain and the United Kingdom in 1954 is identified as a 
regional sanction. 
65 A recurrent sanction identifies a situation where the same dyad experiences more than one sanction 
case. For example, the sanction between the United States and South Korea is identified as a recurrent 
sanction because the two states experienced more than one sanction (in 1973 and in 1975). 
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 onset cases, especially in the later decades, and some isolated66 (disconnected) sanction cases among 
communist countries, especially those initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and China in the 1970s. 
The sociograms of sanction onsets (from Figures 5.1 and 5.2) also reveal: (1) how each of the sanction 
cases is connected to other sanction case(s), (2) which types of actors (major or non-major powers) of 
which regions are involved with which other actors in the network, (3) some major sanction cases to 
define the structural characteristics of sanction network in each decade (e.g., for the sanction network of 
1950s, the sanction case in 1956 for “Nationalization of Suez Canal” involving such states as the U.S., the 
United Kingdom, France, and Egypt can be characterized in this way because it is connected with most of 
the other sanction cases in the period), and (4) the changing patterns of sanction onset networks over time 
(e.g., increased regional and recurrent sanctions).  
The 1950s sanctions network in Figure 5.1 displays some general patterns of isolated and 
connected sanctions among different states in the network of economic sanctions. First, there are only a 
few isolated sanction cases (such as a sanction by Indonesia toward the Netherlands in 1957 for “West 
Irian” [as titled by HSE 1990] and a sanction by India toward Portugal in 1954 for “Surrender Goa”). 
Second, all other sanction cases in the 1950s are connected sanctions, mostly initiated by the four major 
powers (the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union). So, for example, with the sanction 
onset of the U.S. toward France in 1956 for “Suez,” two sanction cases initiated by France (such as one 
against Egypt in 1956 for “Nationalization of Suez Canal” and the other against Tunisia in 1957 for “Halt 
Aid to Algerian Rebels”) are connected to five sanction cases initiated by the U.S. (such as one against 
North Korea in 1950 for “Korean War,” one against Iran in 1951 for “Expropriation,” one against North 
Vietnam in 1954 for “Vietnam War and Its Aftermath,” one against Israeli 1956 for “Palestinian and 
Border Questions,” one against Laos in 1956 for “Prevent Communist Takeover,” and, one against Egypt 
in 1956 for “Nationalization of Suez Canal”). Those sanction cases initiated by the U.S. and France are 
                                                        
66 A sanction case is defined as “isolated” or “disconnected” in the network if it does not have any 
connection with other sanction cases in the network. The sanction case is defined as “connected” in the 
network if it has any connection to other sanction cases in the network.  
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 also connected to two sanction cases initiated by the United Kingdom, with the United Kingdom sanction 
toward France in 1956 for “Suez.”  
Figure 5.3 shows us how the sociograms of economic sanctions reveal the general graphical 
patterns of monadic or dyadic factors affecting the onset of sanctions (of regime type67, economic 
development, major power status, alliance, contiguity, distance, economic interdependence, past conflict 
interaction levels, and alliance agreements). For each of the sociograms in Figure 5.3, the two nodes 
(states) involved in a sanction are connected by a one-way arrow from the sender to the target state. Each 
state’s regime type is represented by the color of the node (blue for a democratic regime, red for a non-
democratic regime); each state’s economic development level, measured by its total trade size, is 
represented by the size of the node (bigger for more economically developed, smaller for less 
economically developed); and each state’s major power status is represented by the shape of the node 
(circle-in-box shape for major, circle for all others). We can see that, among 24 total sanctions dyads in the 
1970s, only 4 (or 17%) were democratic-democratic sanctions dyads (the U.S. toward India, Turkey, 
Chile, and Uruguay), and major powers were involved in all 24 sanctions (2 sanctions by China, 1 
sanction by the United Kingdom, and 21 sanctions by the U.S.). The remaining sociograms reveal that 
allied states were more involved than non-allied states. Contiguous states, including colonial contiguities, 
were far less involved than non-contiguous states. Distant states were more involved than non-distant 
states. Economically interdependent states, measured by bilateral trade, were far more involved than 
economically non-interdependent states. Hostile states, measured by the past conflict interaction level, 
were far less involved than non-hostile. States with alliance agreements, measured by Tau-b, were more 
involved than states without alliance agreements.  
 
                                                        
67 The measurements and data sources for all the variables in this section will be discussed later in detail.  
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 5.2. Analysis of the Onset of Economic Sanctions 
5.2.1. General Approach    
The second section of this chapter is devoted to the study of economic sanction onset. As noted 
in Chapter 2, research has been focused on the sanction success models rather than on the sanction onset 
models, that is, on whether implemented sanctions worked rather than when those sanctions are first 
implemented. Our model setup for sanction onset is based on some of the rare empirical literature on 
economic sanction onsets (e.g., Lektzian and Souva 2003; Sandoval-Bustos 2004; Goenner 
forthcoming;); I base my analysis on their sanction onset model setups to facilitate comparison with 
previous research. However, I performed a set of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of the results 
found in the chapter (e.g., by varying the models through adding or dropping some of the control 
variables and by using different samples such as all dyads or major-power dyads); the overall pattern with 
the set of sensitivity tests confirms my findings. Equation (5-1) summarizes the set of hypotheses that will 
be tested for onset analysis of economic sanction (Table 5.1 summarizes the expected sign of each 
coefficient in the analysis):   
Onset of Economic Sanctions,
t 
= ß0 + ß1*Interdependence Low,
t 
+ ß2*Democracy Low,
t 
+ 
ß3*Balance of Power,
t
 + ß4*Allies,
t 
+ ß5*Contiguity,
t 
+ ß6*Distance,
t 
+ ß7*Major Power,
t 
+ 
ß8*Militarized Dispute Onset,
t
 + e                  (Equation 5-1) 
 
1. Hypotheses   
Hypothesis 3. The preponderance of power decreases the probability of the onset of economic 
sanction. That is, the more skewed the distribution of power in a dyad, the less likely are sanctions. 
Hypothesis 3’. Parity of power decreases the probability of the onset of economic sanction. That is, 
the less skewed the distribution of power in a dyad, the less likely are sanctions. 
Regarding hypothesis 3 and 3’, many realists (particularly “balance of force” theorists) argue that if a state 
enjoys a power advantage over its adversary, it will be more likely to use coercive actions because it is 
more likely to succeed and the cost of using coercive actions is likely to be low. Weaker states will view the 
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 initiation of violence as a very risky strategy that is likely to result in substantial costs. On the other hand, 
others (“power preponderance” theorists) argue that the power preponderance between states will 
preserve peace since it reduces the uncertainties of winners and losers in a coercive action. Power parity 
creates a greater opportunity for sanctions; as there is a highly asymmetric power distribution, the target 
will more likely concede to the sender’s demand since it knows it is less likely to prevail in a crisis 
bargaining situation (Lektzian and Souva 2003). All the other hypotheses to be tested in this section of 
economic sanctions onset analysis (hypotheses 1–2, 4–8) are in Appendix 5.1 In this section, the main 
purpose of hypotheses testing will be to determine how the power hypotheses using the new power 
measures behave in models of economic sanction onsets. 
 
2. Data and Measurements 
I use the extensive data on economic sanction cases of the twentieth century collected by HSE 
(1990). They have collected 116 cases of economic sanctions imposed since World War I and prior to 
1990. Even though there have been other data collection efforts on economic sanctions68, researchers 
agree that the data collection of HSE is the best available in economic sanction studies (Drezner 1999; 
Ellings 1985; Mansfield 1995; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997).69 This data set is then merged 
                                                        
68 Even though most of the literature has been using this data collection, there have been several other 
data collection efforts on economic sanctions (see Drezner 1999, 60–62; Drezner 2003, 652). First, Elings 
(1985) assembled information on 107 instances of economic sanctions between 1945 and 1981 (for the 
cause of sanction initiation). Second, Blessing (1975) collected data on 126 U.S. coercion attempts 
between 1948 and 1972 (for the causes of sanction initiation and outcome). Third, Bayard and Elliott 
(1994) compiled data on the use of U.S. economic coercion to extract trade concessions via Section 301 
from 1975 to 1994. Fourth, Elliott and Richardson (1997) catalogued the threats and suspensions of 
Generalized System of Preferences benefits to developing countries to enforce core labor standards since 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Fifth, DeSombre (2000) chronicled U.S. sanctioning activity to raise other 
countries' environmental standards from the mid-1970s to the present. Sixth, Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 
(2006) provide data collection of sanctions, focusing on the instances in which sanctions were threatened 
but not imposed (Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Version 3.5, 1971–2000). See also Marinov 
(2005) and Drezner (2000) for other data collection efforts. The main problems with all of those data 
collections are that they are either based on a single sender country (usually, the U.S.), limited in the time 
frame of their collected cases, or missing many of the variables present in the HSE data set. 
 
69 Drezner (1999, 103) posits that “the [HSE] study provides the most comprehensive data about 
sanctions. No other data set contains as many documented cases of economic coercion.” Ellings (1985, 
xvi) observes that the HSE effort “is very likely the best sanctions policy analysis yet to be published. Its 
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 with the set of all politically relevant dyads70 for the study period of 1950–1990.71 The dichotomous Onset 
of Economic Sanctions dependent variable is coded as 1 if any kind of economic sanction is ongoing 
between two states in a particular year, based on the HSE (1990) database; if there was no sanction, it is 
coded as 0.72 The measurements on all the independent variables used in this section of economic 
sanctions onset analysis are presented in detail in Appendix 5.1.  
 
5.2.2. Estimation Methods 
As noted earlier, research on the success of economic sanctions should take into account the 
selection effects.73 I model the sample selection process of sanctions onset and sanctions success using the 
censored probit estimation, controlling for statistical linkages of the two dependent variables (more details 
on the issue of the censored probit or sample selection probit estimation versus the ordinary probit 
                                                                                                                                                                            
data base is the largest of this genre of research.” Mansfield (1995, 579) notes that the HSE data “are 
widely recognized as the best of their kind.” 
70 HSE (1990, 10–11) posit that the majority of sanctions are imposed by major powers and most of the 
sanctions imposed by non-major powers are against neighboring states: “Among the cases we have 
documented, the countries that impose sanctions are for the most part large nations that pursue an active 
foreign policy. To be sure, there are instances of neighboring fights: Indonesia versus Malaysia in the 
1950s until 1984; India versus Nepal over the latter’s rapprochement with China in 1989-90.” 
 
71 As in most empirical dyadic sanction studies, I deleted the sanction cases initiated by international 
organizations. For the sanction cases that involve multiple senders or targets, I disaggregated the cases into 
“state a – state b” format (i.e., dyadic format). 
 
72 See Chapter 4 for the discussion on including versus excluding ongoing events in the dyadic analyses. 
 
73 For a general discussion on sample selection bias (the nature of bias and econometric methods for 
correcting it), see Greene (1981), Heckman (1979, 1990), Puhani (2000), Stolzenberg and Relles (1997), 
Winship and Mare (1992), Vella (1992), and Vella and Verbeek (1999). The use of an economic 
approach to selection processes is, however, not limited to sanction studies. Other scholars have also used 
the approach (e.g., see Reed and Clark 2000, Clark and Reed 2003, and Sweeney 2003b for the unified 
model of war onset and outcome using the simple selection method; see the special issue of International 
Interactions 28(1), 2002, for more discussions on the selection bias and its effects on research in 
international relations). 
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 estimation follow in the later section). This sample selection model has two stages: the sanctions onset for 
the first stage and the sanctions success for the second stage.74
 My approach to estimation follows Greene (2003) and Reed (2000). Let y*1 be a latent variable 
that measures sanctions onset; let y*2 be a latent variable that measures sanctions success. I assume that 
y*i is influenced by a vector of observed explanatory variables Xi and a disturbance tem ui. The latent 
variables y*1 and y*2 are not observed; instead we observe the dichotomous realizations of y1 and y2 
(sanctions onset and success).  
y*1 = X1ß1 + μ1 
y*2 = X2ß2 + μ2 
We can only observe sanctions success, y2, if there is a sanctions onset, y*1i > 0. That is, 
Sanctions Onset (y1) =  1, if y*1 > 0 
0, if y*1 <= 0 
                                                        
74 Morgan and Schwebach (1997), Smith (1996), Van Bergeijk (1989), Tsebelis (1990), Blake and Klemm 
(2006), Losman (1979), Baldwin (1985, 1999-2000), Doxey (1987), Leyton-Brown (1987), Drezner 
(2003), Croco and Teo (2005), and Martin (1992) all suggest that the literature on economic sanctions 
suffers from selection bias because it focuses on situations in which economic sanctions were used or 
threatened. For example, Drezner (2003) asks two main questions on the selection bias in sanction 
studies, both of which he answers affirmatively: “Has there been a failure to appreciate the strategic 
interaction underlying the use of economic coercion?” and “Is there significant selection bias?” Baldwin 
(1999-2000) discusses in detail some methodological issues (including selection bias) that have been 
raised with respect to the study of economic sanctions. He points out that identifying the universe of cases 
is crucial when dealing with selection bias but that “it is not obvious how the universe should be defined” 
with respect to economic sanctions. He suggests several possible cases for economic sanctions (97): 
“instances in which economic sanctions were used or threatened,” “instances in which sanctions were 
seriously considered,” “instances in which an influence attempt was made,” “instances in which an 
influence attempt was seriously considered,” and “instances of international interactions in which an 
influence attempt could have been considered, regardless of whether it was or not.” Drezner (2003, 644) 
also argues the difficulty in finding the right sample to address selection bias in sanction studies: “To test 
the selection effects argument, the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not 
implemented. If these cases exist in significant quantity and have an appreciably higher success rate than 
cases in which sanctions are imposed, it strengthens the argument that selection bias has adversely 
affected the trajectory of research about sanctions, underestimating the role of strategic interaction. 
However, locating these cases is an empirical challenge, because of the difficulty in identifying sanctions 
events that end at the threat stage.” I believe that instead of disregarding selection bias in analyzing 
sanction outcome, due to the lack of available “perfect” samples to address selection bias, our next best 
strategy should be to use the sample selection technique based on one of the populations for sanction 
studies suggested by Baldwin (1999-2000). I use the politically relevant dyads that consist of major powers 
and continuous states. In fact, HSE (1990, 10–11) posit that the majority of sanctions are imposed by 
major powers and that most of the sanctions imposed by non-major powers are against neighboring 
states. 
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 Sanctions Success (y2) =  observed, if y1 = 1 
unobserved, if y1 = 0  
 
5.2.3. Results and Discussion 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the results from the censored probit estimations of economic sanctions 
onset.75 Hypotheses 3 and 3’ test the argument that a preponderance or parity of power between the 
states decreases the probability of the onset of economic sanctions. The results weakly support power 
preponderance over balance of power hypothesis. In two sanction onsets models, the coefficients for the 
variable are negative and statistically significant. Dyads with highly asymmetric national power seem to be 
less likely to be involved in economic sanctions. As power preponderance theorists argue, power 
preponderance will preserve peace because it reduces the uncertainties of prospective winners and losers 
in a dispute. As there is a highly asymmetric power distribution, the target will more likely concede to the 
sender’s demand, yielding the success of a sanction, since it knows it is less likely to prevail in a crisis 
bargaining situation (Lektzian and Souva 2003). This also implies that sanctions will be unnecessary, 
hence used less often.   
 
5.3. Analysis of the Success of Economic Sanctions 
5.3.1. General Approach 
The third section of this chapter is devoted to the dyadic study of economic sanctions success. As 
noted in Chapter 2, even though there has been a large volume of empirical analyses on sanction success, 
HSE (1990) provide the benchmark for data analyses on sanction success. Our sanctions success model 
setup focuses on the HSE original analyses and the Drury (1998) revised model setup (see also Cox and 
Drury 2006), which have been regarded as fully specified models on sanction success. I base my analysis 
                                                        
75 This section only provides the results on the main hypotheses (balance of power versus power 
preponderance) in the onset models. The discussion on the remaining hypotheses is presented in 
Appendix 5.1. 
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 on their sanction success model to facilitate comparison with previous research. However, I performed a 
set of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of the results (e.g., varying the models with adding or 
dropping some of the control variables and using different samples such as all dyads or major-power 
dyads); the overall pattern with this sensitivity test confirms my findings. Equation (5-2) summarizes the set 
of hypotheses on economic sanctions success that are tested below (see Table 5.1 for the expected sign of 
each coefficient in the analysis): 
Success of Economic Sanctions,
t 
= ß0 + ß1*Relative Structural Network Power,
t 
or ß2*Target’s 
Structural Network Power,
t
 + ß3*Sender Cooperation,
t 
+ ß4*Institution Sanctions,
t
 + ß5*Sender 
Cooperation*Institution Sanctions,
t 
+ ß6*Sender Cost,
t 
+ ß7*National Security,
t 
+ ß8*Additional 
Policies,
t 
+ ß9*U.S. Sanctions,
t
 + ß10*Target Assistance,
t 
+ ß11*Target Stabilities,
t
 + ß12*Target 
Cost,
t 
+ ß13*Pre-sanctions Economics,
t 
+ ß14*Pre-sanctions Relationships,
t 
+ ß15*Pre-sanctions 
Trade Level,
t 
+ ß16*Target Assistance*Pre-sanctions Trade Levels,
t
 + e             (Equation 5-2) 
 
1. Hypotheses  
The main hypotheses to be tested (hypotheses 1 and 2) are presented in detail in Chapter 3; all 
other hypotheses to be tested in this section of economic sanction success analysis (hypotheses 3–15) are 
in Appendix 5.2. In addition to those hypotheses, the variable of Year will be controlled to capture the 
passage of time. The main purpose of this section’s hypothesis testing is to determine how the two main 
hypotheses (regarding the power explanations) affect the success of dyadic economic sanctions, using the 
new power measures. 
 
2. Data and Measurements 
The data to be used in this empirical chapter are from international economic sanction cases from 
1950 to 1990, as obtained from the HSE (1990) collection of each sanction’s episodes76. This data set is 
                                                        
76 The sanction episodes by HSE (1990, 2) are described as “the deliberate, government inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial resources,” where foreign policy goals 
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 merged with my data set of each state’s structural network power. Using the data on diplomatic 
exchanges, foreign student exchanges, and international telecommunications for the dimension of 
communication patterns, and arms transfers, international exports, and international assistance for the 
dimension of resource flows of international system structure, I have derived each state’s scores on 
different aspects of structural network power based on the social network perspective of international 
relations (details on the measures can be found in Chapter 3).  
I use a dichotomous dependent variable to indicate the policy result. HSE (1990) assessed both 
the “policy result” (that measures “the extent to which the outcome sought by the sender was in fact 
achieved”) and the “sanctions contribution” (that measures “the extent to which the sanctions contributed 
to a positive result,” 1990, 41), and then these two measurements, which have ordinal values between 1 
and 4, are multiplied to get their “success score” dependent variable. However, some problems have been 
noticed with this procedure. As Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997, 611) point out, there is a 
reliability problem with the HSE measurements of both “policy result” and “sanctions contribution.” In 
addition, Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997, 611) and Bergeijk (1989) argue that there is “no 
theoretical, empirical, or statistical reason for the policy outcome to be multiplied by another variable 
designed to assess the contribution of sanctions to the observed result.” To overcome some of these 
problems, following the convention of sanction empirical studies, I dichotomize the “policy result” variable 
of HSE by taking the value of 1 (success) when there is a successful outcome (the values of 3 and 4 from 
HSE) and of 0 (failure) otherwise.77 By using the dichotomous dependent variables, I expect to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“encompass changes expressly and purportedly sought by the sender state in the political behavior of the 
target state” (see also Goenner forthcoming). For the participants in a sanction episode, the term “sender” 
designates the country (or international organization) that is “the principal author of the sanction episode” 
(35) and “target” designates the country that is “the immediate object of the episode” (36). However, 
some scholars use different definitions of sanctions in their studies: Morgan and Miers (2002) define 
sanction as an “action that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a 
target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies” (117); Blanchard, Mansfield, 
and Ripsman (2000, 3) define sanction as an action “taken by one state—the sender—to interfere with 
the economy of another state—the target—for the purpose of coercing its compliance with the sender’s 
wishes.” Drezner (2003) uses the terms “economic sanctions,” “economic coercion,” and “economic 
statecraft” interchangeably, but Baldwin (1985) provides the rationale to differentiate among those terms. 
 
77 The conventional wisdom in the sanction success study is to use a “policy result” dependent variable by 
dichotomizing the four-point scale variable by HSE; in fact, HSE define economic sanction as financial or 
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 some of the unreliability and ambiguity of the data from HSE (see Appendix 5.3 for the three issues that 
have been raised regarding the dependent variable of sanction success used in this project – the definition, 
measurement, and rate of economic sanction success). 
The measurements of the main independent variables (relative structural network power and 
target’s structural network power) are presented in detail in Chapter 3. These variables measure the 
balance of structural network power between the two states in a dyad (for the former) and target’s 
structural network power (for the latter). They are based on five different measures of point centralities 
from network analyses of interaction data (i.e., degree, betweenness, flow-betweenness, coreness, ego 
network brokerage, and their composite index). The measurements used for this section’s other 
independent variables of economic sanctions success analysis are presented in detail in Appendix 5.2. 
 
5.3.2. Results and Discussion  
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the results from the censored probit estimations of economic sanctions 
success. Table 5.2 shows the censored probit results of sanctions success with hypothesis 1 of structural 
network power balance between sender and target (based on five different aspects and their composite 
index), and Table 5.3 shows the censored probit results of economic sanctions success with hypothesis 2 
of structural network power of target78 (based on five different aspects and their composite index). The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
trade restrictions used by a state in order to change another nation’s policies in some pre-specified 
manner, see also Drury (1998, 500). Drury (1998) argues that using a “sanctions contribution” (or its 
interaction with “policy result”) dependent variable causes redundancy and endogenous problems 
(contribution affecting some of the conventional independent variables). Drezner (1999) argues that 
“using a dependent variable that consists partially of whether sanctions contributed to the outcome is 
tautological in the extreme. The goal of the research effort is to determine if the dependent variables have 
an effect on the policy outcome. Their contribution is determined by the sign and significance of their 
coefficients in a multivariate regression. Including the contribution part of the dependent variable distorts 
the results” (68, footnote 21). Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) and many others emphasize the 
ambiguity in the four-point scales of the HSE “policy result” variable and recommend using the binary 
ersion of the variable.   v 
78 The two hypotheses are not completely distinct, and hypothesis 2 is rather contained to the hypothesis 
1. This will be clear when we consider how the measures to test the two hypotheses are constructed; to 
measure the relative structural network power difference of sanctioning and target states (for hypothesis 
1), one would first have to measure the target’s structural network power (for hypothesis 2). For this 
reason, I run two different sets of censored probit estimations of economic sanctions onset and success. 
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 two main hypotheses are generally supported by the results.79 Hypothesis 1 argues that economic 
sanctions are less likely to be successful when the difference in the levels of structural network power 
between sender and target is high (i.e., the more skewed the distribution of structural network power 
between sanctioning state and target, the less likely an economic sanction is to be successful). The results 
in Table 5.2 show that the coefficient on the variable is negative as expected and statically significant in 
five of my models (in one model when we use the structural network power measure of egonet brokerage, 
the coefficient on the variable has the expected negative signs, but the p-value is just outside the 
conventional significance .10 level—.202). The result from sample selection analysis reveals that sanctions 
in cases of disproportionate structure network power between sender and target are less likely to be 
successful. This set of results is consistent with the argument that the larger the sender’s power relative to 
the target’s, the lower the stakes involved and therefore the weaker the commitment of the sender (Elliott 
and Uimonen 1993, 408–9). Either the low stakes involved or the low commitment of the sender 
ultimately leads to sanction failure. The results are also in line with the empirical findings of HSE (1990), 
Lam (1990), Elliottt and Uimonen (1993), and Drezner (1998, 1999). 
Table 5.4 displays the results from the marginal effects analysis for the statistically significant 
variables found from the censored probit estimations. I calculate the changes of conditional probability of 
economic sanctions being successful given that they occurred in the first place. For the model of degree 
aspect which uses the relative structural network power of sender/target, the marginal impact analysis 
shows that the baseline conditional probability of sanctions success, holding all the included variables at 
their means, is 2.0%80 (this baseline rate represents the chance of the “typical” sanction being successful). 
Increasing the degree aspect of relative structural network power from one standard deviation below the 
mean of the variable to its mean, while holding all other independent variables at their means, decreases 
the probability of sanctions success by 55.0%. Increasing the change to one standard deviation above the 
                                                        
79 This section only discusses the results for the two main hypotheses. The discussion on the remaining 
hypotheses is presented in Appendix 5.2. 
80 The value is the conditional (on selection) predicted probability of success; i.e., Pr (depvar_outcome=1 
| depvar_seletion=1) = Pr (depvar=1,depvar_selection=1) / Pr(depvar_selection=1). 
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 mean triggers an additional decrease of 2.0%. In other words, increasing the level of the variable from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard above the mean decreases sanctions success by 
57.1% (a drop of more than half from the baseline rate in the likelihood that the sanction will be 
successful). As seen in Table 5.4, the decrease of predicted probabilities of sanction success (changing the 
values for the relative structural network power variable from one standard below the mean to one 
standard above the mean, holding all other independent variables at their means), ranges from 29.6% to 
57.1%.  
Hypothesis 2 argues that economic sanctions are more likely to be successful when the structural 
network power of the target is high. The results in Table 5.3 show that the coefficient of the variable is 
positive as expected and statistically significant in five of my models (in one model when we use the 
structural network power measure of coreness, the coefficient on the variable has the expected positive 
sign, but the p-value is just outside the conventional significance .10 level, .191). The result from sample 
selection analysis reveals that sanction cases with the target state possessing high structural network power 
are more likely to be successful. This set of results supports the argument that the sender is usually less 
likely to put much importance on foreign policy goals (of economic sanctions) toward a less powerful 
target (Lam 1990, 245), and that this low resolve or commitment of the sender toward a less powerful 
target leads to sanction failure.  
Regarding the marginal effect analysis for hypothesis 2—for the model of degree aspect with the 
target’s structural network power—the marginal impact analysis (in Table 5.4) shows that the baseline 
conditional probability of sanctions success, holding all the included variables at their means, is 1.1%. 
Increasing the degree aspect of the target’s structural network power from one standard deviation below 
the mean of the variable to its mean, while holding all other independent variables at their means, 
increases the probability of sanctions success by 1.1%. Increasing the change to one standard deviation 
above the mean triggers an additional increase of 57.4%. Specifically, the predicted probability of being 
successful increases from 0.0% to 58.5%, an increase of more than half from the baseline rate in the 
likelihood that the sanctions will be successful. As seen in Table 5.4, the increase of predicted probabilities 
(changing the values for the target’s structural network power variable from one standard below the mean 
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 to one standard above the mean, holding all other independent variables at their means), ranges from 
19.0% to 58.5%. The results from the censored probit analysis displayed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, and from 
the marginal impact analysis displayed in Table 5.4, all show that our two main hypotheses in the study 
are strongly supported: the higher sender/target structural network power balance is associated with the 
decreased probability and the higher target structural network power is associated with the increased 
probability of economic sanctions success.  
As I noted earlier, this set of results (supporting the two main hypotheses in the study) also 
provides insight into the relationship between the levels of globalization of sender and target and the 
success of economic sanctions. In Chapter 3, I argue that the structural network power of each state also 
represents how well it is globalized (communication globalization from the first dimension of 
communication patterns, economic globalization from the second dimension of resource flows). Structural 
network power also represents each state’s level of globalization (or openness) in the system. How 
centrally each state is positioned in the network of relations shows how well each state is globalized in the 
web of network relations. The results also provide evidence that a highly globalized target (i.e., a target 
with relatively high structural network power) will be more severely hurt by economic sanctions and 
therefore be more likely to concede to the sender’s demands, because the sender usually puts forward its 
best efforts to disconnect a target’s globalization web (i.e., isolate the target from its interactive relations 
with other states), especially in the economic arena (e.g., the target’s access to international trade or 
investment market). The well-globalized target will be more seriously hurt by the sanction, and the high 
cost paid by the target ultimately leads it to concede to the sender. Since economic sanctions are usually 
initiated by highly-globalized senders such as the U.S. (i.e., senders with relatively high structural network 
power), if the above argument holds (suggesting the higher globalization level of target leads to the higher 
sanction success rate), the lower sender/target globalization level balance (meaning highly-globalized 
senders initiate sanctions on highly-globalized targets) should be associated with increased probability of 
sanction success. As a consequence, sanction cases with a higher globalization level balance between 
sanctioning and target states (meaning highly globalized senders initiate sanctions on less-globalized 
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 targets) will be less likely to be successful as the results from both sample selection analysis and marginal 
impact analysis indicate.    
 
5.4. Model Comparisons for the Sanction Studies 
 
5.4.1. Using Nonparametric Model Discrimination Test 
To compare the sanction models using SNPI (Structural Network Power Index) variables against 
the sanction models using CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) or GNP variables, I first use 
Clarke’s (2001a, 2001b, 2003) pair-signed test of nonnested model discrimination81 (see also Conover 
1980). The general discussion and specific procedures for the nonparametric discrimination test and its 
applications in the international relations field can be found in Chapter 4. Tables 5.5–5.6 present the 
results of pair-signed tests for both sanction onset and success models (comparing the models with the 
attribute-based power variables against those with the structural network power variables). For the 
sanction onset study, the results show that in all twelve models, the sanction onset models with SNPI 
variables have greater explanatory power than that with CINC or GNP variables. In other words, the 
model comparison test confirms that the models with SNPI account for more variation in sanction onsets 
and are statistically better than the model with CINC or GNP. For example, in 50.7–66.6% of all the 
sanction cases, the models with SNPI outperform the model with CINC (if the two models performs 
equally, each should account for 50%). In all the models, the null hypothesis of equality (between the two 
sets of models) is rejected at the 0.001 level. The comparison of the models with SNPI against the model 
with GNP also shows the similar results: in 50.6–63.7% of all the sanction cases, the former outperforms 
the latter. The results for the sanction success study also reveal the similar patterns. In all twelve models, 
the sanction success models with SNPI variables perform better than that with CINC or GNP variables. In 
50.6–74.7% of all the sanction cases, the models with SNPI outperform the model with CINC; in 58.7–
                                                        
81 The two sets of sanction models tested in this chapter are nonnested because one model cannot be 
reduced to the other model by imposing a set of linear restrictions on the parameter vector (see Clarke 
2001a and 2001b for the definition of nonnested models). 
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 78.7% of all the sanction cases, the models with SNPI outperform that with GNP. In all the models, the 
null hypothesis of equality (between the two sets of models) is rejected at the 0.001 level. After comparing 
the models head-to-head, we can conclude that the models with SNPI variables have greater explanatory 
power than (or statistically outperforms) those with CINC or GNP variables for both sanctions onsets and 
success studies. 
 
5.4.2. Using Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria 
The second set of statistics used to compare the two sets of nonnested models in sanction studies 
are information criteria measures such as Akaike’s (1973) information criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC) proposed by Raftery (1996). The general discussion for information criteria 
measures used in this section can be found in Chapter 4. Tables 5.5–5.6 contain the AIC and BIC 
measures for the dyadic sanction models (comparing the models with the attribute-based power variables 
against those with the structural network power variables). In eleven out of twelve models, the models with 
SNPI variables are favored against those with CINC variables. With the BIC differences of 2.836–21.574, 
the sanction models with SNPI are preferred over that with CINC. The statistics also show that all twelve 
models with SNPI variables are favored against that GNP variable (with the BIC difference of 5.159–
25.827). The evidence with the information criteria measures seems pretty conclusive and confirms the 
findings with the nonparametric model discrimination tests; the models with SNPI variables statistically 
outperform and are preferred over those with CINC or GNP variables for both sanctions onsets and 
success studies. 
 
5.5. Censored Probit Estimates versus Ordinary Probit Estimates 
How do the results from the sample selection analysis of sanctions success differ from those of the 
ordinary probit analysis of sanctions effectiveness ignoring the selection bias (in the previous empirical 
studies of economic sanctions)? I model this sample selection process of sanctions onset and sanctions 
success using the censored probit estimation, controlling for statistical linkages of the two dependent 
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 variables. This sample selection model has two stages: the sanctions onset for the first stage, and the 
sanctions success for the second stage as I noted earlier (see also Greene 2003 and Reed 2000).  
The important question that should be answered before we conclude that this was the right 
procedure to use is whether the statistics show that, in addition to the theoretical linkage, the two 
processes are indeed linked to each other, and therefore should be estimated simultaneously. The 
parameter rho from the censored probit models provides us the information we need; the statistically 
significant rho reveals that there is a statistically significant correlation between the errors in the selection 
model (the sanctions onset model) and the outcome model (the sanctions success model). Therefore, the 
separate probit estimations of each process will yield biased and inconsistent coefficients. The results in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that in the rho is negative and statistically significant in all but one model, thus 
validating the decision to combine the sanctions onset and the sanctions success. The next question 
should be how to interpret the sign of rho in my models. As Sweeney (2004) points out, the interpretation 
of rho is very tricky since it is sensitive to the model specifications; rho is a correlation between the 
selection and outcome equations and we all know that the errors are related to the model specification. 
However, based on Sweeney’s suggestion, we can argue that the negative (and statically significant) rho in 
my models shows that any unobservable component of the error that makes the sanctions selection more 
likely will make the sanctions success less likely. 
If the reasons to use the censored sample selection models are appropriate, then separate probit 
equations will yield biased and inconsistent coefficients (Greene 2003 and Reed 2000). How are the 
results from the separate probit analysis in Appendix 5.4 (of sanctions onset and success) compared to 
those from the sample selection analysis in Tables 5.2 and 5.3? First, regarding the sanctions onset 
equation, the results show that there is no difference between the two estimations; this is also found in 
other empirical research of the sample selection model (e.g., the models of existence of rivalry and the 
onset of war by Lemke and Reed 2001b; the models of conflict onset and escalation by Reed 2000). The 
results for the sanctions success, however, differ for mainly two hypotheses (hypothesis 3: international 
cooperation with the sender decreasing sanctions success; hypothesis 12: cost to target increasing 
sanctions success). The coefficients for the two variables are (with the expected signs) statistically 
 157
 significant in the ordinary probit estimations but not in my censored probit estimations. The previous 
research on sanctions success (e.g., the negative effect of international cooperation and positive effects of 
target GNP cost found in Drury [1998]) might have been misleading empirical findings because of a lack 
of control of the selection bias.   
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the determinants of onset and success of economic sanctions from the 
social network perspective. In this chapter, the new social network power concept was compared to 
previous empirical explorations of the power or capability-based treatments of the subject. I found that the 
two main hypotheses are generally supported by the results of the sample selection analyses (controlling 
for statistical linkages of the processes of sanction onset and sanction success). Regarding the determinants 
of sanction onset, I found that the shared military alliance, geographical proximity, and existence of 
militarized dispute between states are all associated with a decreased probability of sanction onset. 
Regarding the determinants of sanction success, the first main hypothesis of this study argued that 
economic sanctions are less likely to be successful when the difference in the levels of structural network 
power between sender and target is high. The result from sample selection analysis and marginal impact 
analysis revealed that sanction cases with disproportional structural network power between sender and 
target were far less likely to be successful (i.e., the more skewed the distribution of structural network 
power between sanctioning state and target, the less likely an economic sanction is to be successful). The 
chapter also posited that the result does provide evidence that the lower sender/target globalization level 
balance (meaning highly globalized senders initiate sanctions upon highly globalized targets) is associated 
with an increased probability of sanction success. The second main hypothesis argued that economic 
sanctions are more likely to be successful when the structural network power of the target is high. The 
result from sample selection analysis and marginal impact analysis revealed that sanction cases with the 
target state possessing high structural network power were far more likely to be successful. The chapter 
also posited that the result provides the evidence that a highly globalized target (i.e., a target with relatively 
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 high structural network power) will be more severely hurt by the economic sanction, and therefore more 
likely to concede to the sender’s demands. The evidence from nonparametric model discrimination 
statistics and information criteria measures also shows that the models with network power measures 
statistically outperform and are preferred over those with attributional power measures, such as COW 
index and GNP in both sanctions onsets and success studies. 
In addition to the empirical analyses, this chapter also emphasized how useful the sociograms 
(produced by the social network analysis) are in depicting and highlighting the distinctive characteristics of 
international sanction networks. First, the general graphical patterns of monadic and dyadic factors 
affecting the onset of sanctions revealed from the sociograms in Figure 5.3 are also in line with the results 
from the sanction onset analysis. Second, the sociograms in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 revealed that a significant 
majority of international sanctions are “connected” sanctions and there are relatively few “disconnected” 
or “isolated” sanctions in the network of economic sanctions (e.g., during the 1980s, only two sanction 
onset dyads, France-Australia and India-Nepal, were isolated in the network that was composed of 26 
different sanction onset dyads; during the 1970s, no successful sanction onset dyad was isolated in the 
network that was composed of 16 different successful sanction onset dyads), and this provides graphical 
insight as to why the dyadic sanction onset and success studies need to incorporate the extra-dyadic 
sanction information in the networks. The sociograms in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also provide graphical insight 
for the studies of “recurrent” international sanctions where the same dyad experiences more than one 
economic sanction.  
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 Table 5.1 Hypotheses for Analyses of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success 
 Hypothesis Expected Sign of the Hypothesis 
 Sanctions Success Analysis  
(Outcome Equation) 
 Hypothesis 1 Relative Structural Network Power of Sender/Target -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 2 Target’s Structural Network Power -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 3 International Cooperation with Sender -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 4 Sanctions of International Institution -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 5 International Cooperation with Sender*Sanctions of International Institution -----(-)-----> Sanctions 
Success 
 Hypothesis 6 Cost to Sender -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 7 Sanctions with National Security of Sender -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 8 Sanctions with Additional Policies of Sender -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 9 Sanctions of the U.S. -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 10 International Assistance to Target -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 160  Hypothesis 11 Political and Economic Stabilities of Target -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 12 Cost to Target -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 13 Pre-sanction Relationship of Sender/Target -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 14 Pre-sanction Trade Levels of Sender/Target -----(+)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Hypothesis 15 International Assistance to Target* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels of Sender/Target -----(-)-----> Sanctions Success 
 Sanctions Onset Analysis 
(Selection Equation)  
 Hypothesis 1 Economic Interdependence -----(-)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 2 Democracy -----(-)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 3 Balance of Structural Network Power -----(-) or (+)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 4 Shared Alliance Ties -----(-)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 5 Contiguity -----(+)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 6 Distance -----(-)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 7 Major Power -----(-)-----> Sanctions Onset 
 Hypothesis 8 Militarized Dispute Onset -----(+)-----> Sanctions Onset 
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 (Sanctions Success Model) Model 1-1 (CINC) Model 1-2 (GNP) Model 1-3 (Degree) Model 1-4 (Betweenness) 
 -0.146 (0.106) -0.212* (0.103) Power Balance -0.301* (0.126) -0.126* (0.058) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.202 -0.013 (0.228) -0.061 0.041 (0.195) (0.271) (0.254) 
 Institution Sanction 3.192** (1.232) (1.366) 3.801* (1.822) 3.638** 3.445* (1.504) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -1.398* (0.565) -1.699** (0.602) -1.884* (0.872) -1.652* (0.679) 
 Sender Cost 0.186 (0.285) 0.087 (0.276) 0.387 (0.349) 0.164 (0.210) 
 National Security 0.292 (0.409) 0.315 (0.418) 0.210 (0.393) 0.053 (0.341) 
 Additional Policies -0.639* (0.348) -0.595* (0.356) -0.129 (0.359) -0.275 (0.324) 
 U.S. Sanction -0.139 (0.396) 0.302 (0.394) 0.230 (0.298) 0.220 (0.306) 
 Target Assistance 0.292 (0.712) 0.147 (0.629) 0.697 (0.530) 0.328 (0.528) 
 Target Stabilities -0.638* (0.275) -0.681* (0.284) -0.796* (0.317) -0.663** (0.243) 
 Target Cost 0.113 (0.100) 0.145 (0.101) 0.192 (0.164) 0.106 (0.076) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.485* (0.265) 0.438 (0.280) 0.586* (0.326) 0.629* (0.269) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.018* (0.007) 0.021* (0.009) 0.018* (0.009) 0.017* (0.008) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels 0.004 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014) -0.002 (0.012) 0.007 (0.012) 
 Year -0.059*** (0.016) -0.063*** (0.018) -0.062** (0.020) -0.064*** (0.017) 
 Constant 118.839*** (31.383) 126.764*** (35.108) 125.965*** (39.642) 129.333*** (33.781) 
 (Sanctions Onset Model)          
 Interdependence Low 1.087 (7.265) 1.750 (6.631) 1.608 (6.994) -5.877 (11.268) 
 Democracy Low -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) 
 Balance of Power 0.010 (0.028) 0.013 (0.028) 0.005 (0.011) -0.015 (0.014) 
 Allies -0.221*** (0.052) -0.219*** (0.052) -0.216*** (0.056) -0.224*** (0.053) 
 Contiguity -0.328 (0.342) 0.413*** (0.107) -0.374 (0.385) -0.400 (0.362) 
 Distance 0.410*** (0.106) -0.341 (0.348) 0.414*** (0.110) 0.400*** (0.106) 
 Major Power -0.251 (0.377) -0.283 (0.377) -0.330 (0.387) -0.260 (0.374) 
 Militarized Dispute Onset 1.103*** (0.129) 1.104*** (0.129) 1.106*** (0.138) 1.080*** (0.133) 
 Constant -5.236*** (0.832) -5.248*** (0.849) -5.201*** (0.937) -4.991*** (0.862) 
 /athrho -1.107* (0.436) -1.133* (0.481) -1.318* (0.612) -1.435** (0.479) 
 Rho -0.803 (0.155) -0.812 (0.164) -0.866 (0.153) -0.893 (0.097) 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 5.2 Censored Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Models for Sender/Target Power Balance, Continued) 
 (Sanctions Success Model) Model 1-5 (Flow-Betweenness) Model 1-6 (Coreness) Model 1-7 (Egonet Brokerage) Model 1-8 (SNPI) 
 Power Balance -0.186* (0.076) -0.378* (0.203) -0.053 (0.040) -0.334* (0.149) 
 Sender Cooperation 0.106 (0.225) -0.092 (0.235) -0.002 (0.231) 0.042 (0.189) 
 Institution Sanction 3.353* (1.637) 3.399** (1.263) 3.768* (1.508) 3.166 (2.195) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -1.561* (0.712) -1.494** (0.536) -1.751** (0.677) -1.497 (0.967) 
 Sender Cost 0.249 (0.241) 0.190 (0.265) 0.241 (0.273) 0.125 (0.213) 
 National Security 0.144 (0.375) 0.409 (0.412) 0.168 (0.450) 0.191 (0.373) 
 Additional Policies -0.284 (0.316) -0.472 (0.339) -0.411 (0.376) -0.298 (0.300) 
 U.S. Sanction 0.336 (0.329) 0.418 (0.447) -0.136 (0.405) 0.259 (0.315) 
 Target Assistance 0.579 (0.543) 0.266 (0.698) 0.044 (0.640) 0.177 (0.451) 
 Target Stabilities -0.742** (0.277) -0.604* (0.286) -0.646* (0.292) -0.623* (0.265) 
 Target Cost 0.085 (0.100) 0.087 (0.091) 0.116 (0.102) 0.133 (0.085) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.685* (0.323) 0.481* (0.264) 0.594* (0.335) 0.586* (0.271) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.018* 
162 (0.010) 0.018** (0.006) 0.018* (0.008) 0.016 (0.013) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.012) 
 Year -0.074*** (0.022) -0.051** (0.018) -0.065*** (0.018) -0.054* (0.022) 
 Constant 148.401*** (43.125) 103.921** (34.443) 129.814*** (35.411) 109.222* (43.514) 
 (Sanctions Onset Model)         
 Interdependence Low -4.133 (10.790) 8.078** (2.870) -5.139 (10.797) 2.075 (6.173) 
 Democracy Low -0.006 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 
 Balance of Power -0.016 (0.015) -0.165*** (0.026) -0.011 (0.008) 0.017 (0.029) 
 Allies -0.216*** (0.056) -0.199*** (0.052) -0.216*** (0.056) -0.215*** (0.057) 
 Contiguity -0.405 (0.378) -0.296 (0.368) -0.362 (0.375) -0.369 (0.362) 
 Distance 0.401*** (0.107) 0.410*** (0.117) 0.406*** (0.105) 0.412*** (0.117) 
 Major Power -0.289 (0.387) -0.443 (0.380) -0.269 (0.390) -0.335 (0.372) 
 Militarized Dispute Onset 1.080*** (0.136) 1.112*** (0.138) 1.074*** (0.135) 1.103*** (0.142) 
 Constant -5.017*** (0.887) -5.458*** (0.974) -5.092*** (0.853) -5.210*** (0.958) 
 /athrho -1.414* (0.649) -1.073** (0.361) -1.005* (0.399) -1.540 (1.252) 
 Rho -0.888 (0.137) -0.791 (0.135) -0.763 (0.167) -0.912 (0.210) 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 5.3 Censored Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Models for Target’s Power) 
 (Sanctions Success Model) Model 2-1 (CINC) Model 2-2 (GNP) Model 2-3 (Degree) Model 2-4 (Betweenness) 
 Target’s Power 0.147 (0.110) 0.190* (0.115) 0.341* (0.140) 0.136* (0.063) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.133 (0.231) -0.075 (0.238) -0.085 (0.269) 0.027 (0.206) 
 Institution Sanction 2.813* (1.453) 3.687** (1.318) 4.226* (1.857) 3.649* (1.517) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -1.227* (0.699) -1.659** (0.581) -2.095* (0.887) -1.733* (0.685) 
 Sender Cost 0.223 (0.267) 0.223 (0.280) 0.431 (0.395) 0.182 (0.223) 
 National Security 0.333 (0.396) 0.376 (0.425) 0.208 (0.409) 0.104 (0.365) 
 Additional Policies -0.654* (0.347) -0.692* (0.410) -0.072 (0.380) -0.291 (0.346) 
 U.S. Sanction -0.202 (0.372) -0.211 (0.393) -0.179 (0.333) -0.087 (0.330) 
 Target Assistance 0.130 (0.650) 0.022 (0.732) 0.856 (0.558) 0.284 (0.575) 
 Target Stabilities -0.682* (0.301) -0.773* (0.330) -0.800* (0.327) -0.694** (0.253) 
 Target Cost 0.107 (0.094) 0.122 (0.107) 0.197 (0.182) 0.105 (0.081) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.485* (0.271) 0.540* (0.300) 0.547 (0.337) 0.678* (0.301) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.017* 
163 (0.008) 0.020* (0.008) 0.021* (0.010) 0.017* (0.008) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels 0.007 (0.013) 0.010 (0.015) -0.005 (0.013) 0.008 (0.013) 
 Year -0.058*** (0.016) -0.071*** (0.018) -0.068*** (0.021) -0.065*** (0.016) 
 Constant 118.149*** (31.486) 141.265*** (35.862) 136.934*** (40.206) 132.510*** (31.856) 
 (Sanctions Onset Model)         
 Interdependence Low 0.874 (6.957) 1.733 (6.709) 1.573 (7.073) -5.750 (11.396) 
 Democracy Low -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) 
 Balance of Power 0.006 (0.028) 0.014 (0.028) 0.005 (0.011) -0.015 (0.015) 
 Allies -0.219*** (0.052) -0.218*** (0.053) -0.218*** (0.056) -0.224*** (0.054) 
 Contiguity -0.333 (0.344) 0.414*** (0.106) -0.364 (0.379) -0.398 (0.371) 
 Distance 0.401*** (0.107) -0.334 (0.352) 0.414*** (0.110) 0.404*** (0.104) 
 Major Power -0.259 (0.371) -0.280 (0.386) -0.321 (0.382) -0.275 (0.391) 
 Militarized Dispute Onset 1.070*** (0.135) 1.110*** (0.128) 1.107*** (0.137) 1.080*** (0.133) 
 Constant -5.145*** (0.852) -5.263*** (0.839) -5.210*** (0.922) -5.019*** (0.855) 
 /athrho -1.179* (0.493) -1.007* (0.422) -1.267* (0.566) -1.299*** (0.400) 
 Rho -0.827 (0.156) -0.765 (0.175) -0.853 (0.154) -0.861 (0.103) 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 5.3 Censored Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Models for Target’s Power, Continued) 
(Sanctions Success Model) Model 2-5 (Flow-Betweenness) Model 2-6 (Coreness) Model 2-7 (Egonet Brokerage) Model 2-8 (SNPI) 
Target’s Power 0.218** (0.083) 0.055 (0.040) 0.613* (0.258) 0.386** (0.147) 
Sender Cooperation 0.093 (0.238) -0.006 (0.232) -0.053 (0.201) 0.038 (0.200) 
Institution Sanction 3.418* (1.468) 3.833* (1.543) 3.290* (1.357) 3.615* (1.782) 
Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -1.568* (0.638) -1.783** (0.694) -1.531** (0.581) -1.741* (0.819) 
0.273 (0.281) 0.253 (0.276) 0.262 Sender Cost (0.242) 0.198 (0.223) 
National Security 0.180 (0.382) 0.165 (0.453) 0.245 (0.395) 0.181 (0.358) 
Additional Policies -0.301 (0.319) -0.399 (0.380) -0.355 (0.343) -0.229 (0.328) 
U.S. Sanction -0.018 (0.292) -0.172 (0.417) 0.028 (0.323) -0.068 (0.340) 
Target Assistance 0.591 (0.558) 0.033 (0.647) 0.075 (0.598) 0.068 (0.497) 
Target Stabilities -0.772* (0.280) -0.659* (0.297) -0.665* (0.273) -0.713** (0.248) 
Target Cost 0.071 (0.110) 0.115 (0.102) 0.109 (0.084) 0.125 (0.088) 
Pre-sanction Relationships 0.763* (0.340) 0.593* (0.338) 0.483* (0.259) 0.578* (0.310) 
Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.018* (0.008) 0.018* (0.008) 0.015* (0.008) 
164 0.018* (0.010) 
Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.002 (0.012) 0.010 (0.014) 0.008 (0.013) 0.012 (0.012) 
Year -0.076*** (0.020) -0.066*** (0.018) -0.054** (0.018) -0.063*** (0.019) 
Constant 154.242*** (39.820) 132.709*** (35.691) 111.741*** (34.772) 127.996*** (36.562) 
(Sanctions Onset Model)         
Interdependence Low -4.063 (10.832) -5.103 (10.801) 7.998** (2.831) 2.478 (6.014) 
Democracy Low -0.006 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) 
Balance of Power -0.015 (0.015) -0.011 (0.008) -0.168*** (0.026) 0.021 (0.030) 
Allies -0.218*** (0.055) -0.216*** (0.056) -0.197*** (0.052) -0.216*** (0.055) 
Contiguity -0.410 (0.384) -0.361 (0.375) -0.313 (0.372) -0.356 (0.364) 
Distance 0.405*** (0.104) 0.406*** (0.104) 0.409*** (0.118) 0.416*** (0.109) 
Major Power -0.309 (0.395) -0.269 (0.391) -0.481 (0.375) -0.343 (0.381) 
Militarized Dispute Onset 1.078*** (0.136) 1.075*** (0.135) 1.108*** (0.137) 1.109*** (0.136) 
Constant -5.034*** (0.882) -5.096*** (0.852) -5.424*** (0.991) -5.252*** (0.895) 
/athrho -1.370** (0.522) -0.985* (0.398) -1.223* (0.513) -1.404* (0.668) 
Rho -0.879 (0.119) -0.755 (0.171) -0.840 (0.151) -0.886 (0.143) 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Table 5.4 Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Sanctions Success from Fitted Censored Probit Models 
Sender/Target  
Power Balance 
(Models 1-1 ~ 1-8) 
Target’s Power  
Minus 
1 SD 
Mean Plus 
1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
=> Mean 
Mean 
=> Plus 1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
(Models 2-1 ~ 2-8) 
=> Plus 1 SD 
Model 1-1 0.220 0.094 0.031 -12.6% -6.3% -18.9% 
Model 1-2 0.436 0.137 0.021 -29.8% -11.6% -41.4% 
Model 1-3 0.571 0.020 0.000 -55.0% -2.0% -57.1% 
Model 1-4 0.310 0.062 0.005 -24.9% -5.7% -30.6% 
Model 1-5 0.355 0.044 0.001 -31.1% -4.3% -35.4% 
Model 1-6 0.321 0.113 0.025 -20.8% -8.8% -29.6% 
Model 1-8 0.380 0.058 0.002 -32.2% -5.6% -37.8% 
       
Model 2-1 0.050 0.121 0.243 7.1% 12.2% 19.3% 
Model 2-2 0.050 0.098 0.174 4.8% 7.6% 12.5% 
Model 2-3 0.000 0.011 0.585 1.1% 57.4% 58.5% 
Model 2-4 0.008 0.075 0.312 6.7% 23.6% 30.3% 
Model 2-5 0.001 0.039 0.381 3.9% 34.2% 38.0% 
Model 2-7 0.031 0.093 0.221 6.3% 12.7% 19.0% 
Model 2-8 0.053 0.127 0.252 7.4% 12.5% 19.9% 
       
Model 1-3       
 0  1   0 -> 1 
I nstitution Sanction 0.000  0.998   99.8% 
 0 2 4 0 -> 2 2 -> 4 0 -> 4 
Sender 
Cooperation* 
I nstitution Sanction 0.998 0.000 0.000 -99.8% 0.0% -99.8% 
 1 2 3 1 -> 2 2 -> 3 1 -> 3 
T arget Stabilities 0.409 0.042 0.001 -36.7% -4.1% -40.8% 
 0  1   0 -> 1 
Pre-sanction  
R elationships 0.013  0.135   12.1% 
 Minus 
1 SD 
Mean Plus 
1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
-> Mean 
Mean 
-> Plus 1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
-> Plus 1 SD 
Pre-sanction Trade  
L evel 0.001 0.039 0.359 3.8% 32.0% 35.8% 
 
1950 1970 1990 
1950 ->  
1970 
1970 ->  
1990 
1950 ->  
1990 
Y ear 0.359 0.057 0.000 -30.2% -5.7% -35.9% 
       
Model 2-3       
 0  1   0 -> 1 
I nstitution Sanction 0.000  0.999   99.9% 
 0 2 4 0 -> 2 2 -> 4 0 -> 4 
Sender 
Cooperation* 
I nstitution Sanction 0.904 0.000 0.000 -90.4% 0.0% -90.4% 
 1 2 3 1 -> 2 2 -> 3 1 -> 3 
T arget Stabilities 0.355 0.034 0.000 -32.1% -3.3% -35.4% 
 0  1   0 -> 1 
Pre-sanction  
R elationships 0.011  0.101   9.0% 
 Minus 
1 SD 
Mean Plus 
1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
-> Mean 
Mean 
-> Plus 1 SD 
Minus 1 SD 
-> Plus 1 SD 
Pre-sanction Trade 
evel L 0.000 0.034 0.404 3.3% 37.0% 40.4% 
 
1950 1970 1990 
1950 ->  1970 ->  
1990 
1950 ->  
1990 1970 
Y ear 0.779 0.049 0.000 -72.9% -4.9% -77.9% 
NOTE: The values are the conditional (on selection) predicted probabilities of success. The baseline 
predicted probabilities for each model, holding all variables at their means or modes, are set in italic. 
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 Table 5.5 Model Comparisons for the Sanctions Onset and Success Analyses (Models for Sender/Target Power Balance) 
 
 
Model 1-1 
(CINC) 
Model 1-2 
(GNP) 
Model 1-3 
(Degree) 
Model 1-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 1-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 1-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 1-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 1-8 
(SNPI) 
 AIC 1041.580 1042.440 1028.861 1031.052 1028.575 1020.005 1037.135 1034.620 
 BIC 1255.540 1256.401 1242.821 1245.013 1242.536 1233.966 1251.096 1248.581 
          
 Clarke Tests 
(Onset)         
 Against CINC   53.0% 50.8% 55.4% 63.5% 50.7% 62.6% 
 Against GNP   58.6% 50.6% 55.6% 63.7% 50.7% 50.9% 
          
 Clarke Tests 
(Success)         
 Against CINC   65.3% 74.7% 74.7% 56.0% 62.7% 72.0% 
 Against GNP   72.4% 71.1% 71.1% 58.7% 69.3% 65.8% 
 
Table 5.6 Model Comparisons for the Sanctions Onset and Success Analyses (Models for Target’s Power) 
 
 
Model 2-1 
(CINC) 
Model 2-2 
(GNP) 
Model 2-3 
(Degree) 
Model 2-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 2-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
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Model 2-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 2-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 2-8 
(SNPI) 
 AIC 1035.619 1042.074 1028.016 1031.360 1027.914 1016.202 1036.914 1032.782 
 BIC 1249.579 1256.034 1241.977 1245.321 1241.875 1230.162 1250.875 1246.743 
          
 Clarke Tests 
(Onset)         
 Against CINC   66.6% 54.0% 51.4% 64.3% 51.1% 53.5% 
 Against GNP   50.6% 50.8% 54.7% 62.2% 50.6% 53.3% 
          
 Clarke Tests 
(Success)         
 Against CINC   66.7% 70.3% 71.6% 67.6% 60.8% 71.6% 
 Against GNP   74.2% 74.7% 78.7% 70.7% 66.7% 66.7% 
 
 Figure 5.1 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset, 1950–1990 
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 Figure 5.1 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
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 Figure 5.1 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
1950–1990 
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Figure 5.2 Networks of Successful Dyadic Sanctions Onset, 1950–1990 
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 Figure 5.3 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset in the 1970s 
Sanctions Onset in the 1970s 
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Sanctions Onset-Ally in the 1970s: 
sanctions between allied states represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 5.3 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset in the 1970s (Continued) 
Sanctions Onset-Contiguity in the 1970s: 
sanctions between contiguous states represented by green arrow. 
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Sanctions Onset-Distance in the 1970s: 
sanctions between distant states represented by green arrow. 
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 Figure 5.3 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset in the 1970s (Continued) 
Sanctions Onset-Economic Interdependence in the 1970s: 
sanctions between economically interdependent states represented by green arrow. 
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 Sanctions Onset-Past Conflict Interaction Level in the 1970s: 
sanctions between hostile states represented by green arrows. 
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 Figure 5.3 Networks of Dyadic Sanctions Onset in the 1970s (Continued) 
Sanctions Onset-Alliance Agreements in the 1970s: 
sanctions between states with alliance agreements represented by green arrow. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
The central focus of this project was on the new social network conceptualizations of international 
system structure and national power. This project examined the following two traditional questions using 
the new social network conceptualizations: (1) how do we conceive an individual state’s national power, 
and (2) how does the distribution of national power define the structure of the international system? The 
project also answered the following question (applying the above two questions to the empirical 
phenomena of international relations): how does redefining “power” and “system” in this way contribute 
to a better understanding of international politics?  This project posited that: (1) the old conception of 
national power, which is focused on a state’s attributes (its national capabilities), misses the true 
conception of national power; and (2) the old depiction of international system structure, which is focused 
on the distribution of national attributional powers (its distribution of national capabilities), as a 
consequence, misrepresents the true characteristics of the international system (which are, among others: 
how the components are connected or interact with each other; and how interaction patterns among those 
components are shaped or defined by the structure). The project also argued that defining “power” or 
“system” in terms of the attributes of nations fails to capitalize on information that we already possess 
about the patterned nature of international interaction, and is too coarse a conception to describe a 
system with a wide and continuous range of variation. This project provides social network 
conceptualizations of international system structure and individual state’s national power. Power in a 
social network perspective focuses on an individual state’s relational power: unlike the attributional power 
concept in the previous studies, a state’s power in a social network perspective focuses on its interactive 
behaviors with all other states in a network of relations. International system structure from a social 
network perspective is conceived by considering social network powers of all system members, focusing 
on the different types of interaction networks in which they participate. This is unlike the previous studies, 
 where only a handful of the most powerful actors in the system are considered (e.g., polarity theory, 
power transition theory, and hegemonic stability theory).  
  
The Major Findings of this Dissertation 
The two empirical chapters examined the determinants of the onset of international conflicts and 
the determinants of the onset and success of international sanctions from the social network perspective. 
In the first empirical chapter, the new social network power concept was applied to the previous empirical 
attempts of balance of power and power preponderance theories at both systemic and dyadic levels. The 
main hypotheses included: (1) do the increased levels of systemic structural network power concentration, 
change, and movement lead to the increased or decreased levels of systemic conflict onset, and (2) does 
the structural network power balance between the two states in a dyad increase or decrease the 
probability of dyad conflict onset? In the second empirical chapter, the new social network power concept 
was applied to the previous empirical attempts of the power explanations on the subject. The main 
hypotheses included: (1) does the structural network power balance between sanctioning and target states 
in a dyad increase or decrease the probability of sanction success, and (2) does the structural network 
power of target in a dyad increase or decrease the probability of sanction success? The focus of hypothesis 
testing in the two empirical chapters was on how my new social network conceptions of international 
system structure and national power lead to more accurate and powerful empirical models than previous 
ones mainly rooted in attribute logic. In other words, the empirical chapters took existing theories and 
tested them using my newer network conceptions of the international system and national power. The 
chapters focused on the conceptions of the international system as networks and of a state’s power based 
on its relational structural network power, and were primarily interested in how these newer conceptions 
lead us to recast a great deal of existing empirical work on the subject. The two empirical chapters also 
provided the graphical representations of militarized conflicts and sanctions networks to reveal some of the 
main network characteristics of each type of network. Does a structurally centralized or concentrated 
international system induce a more peaceful world, or is just the opposite (for the systemic conflict 
analysis)?  Furthermore, how is the structural network power balance between states related to their 
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 conflict behaviors (for the dyadic conflict analysis)? What are some distinctive characteristics of militarized 
disputes networks (for the graphical representations of conflicts)? These were some of the research 
questions that were examined in this project of social network application to militarized conflicts. What 
factors determine the onset of economics sanctions (for the sanction onset analysis)? How are the 
structural network powers of the sanction sender and its target, as well as the structural power balance 
between the two, related to the success of economic sanctions (for the sanction success analysis)? What 
are some distinctive characteristics of economic sanctions networks (for the graphical representations of 
sanctions)? These were some of the research questions that were examined in this project of social 
network application to economic sanctions.  
After examining the hypotheses on balance of power theory and power preponderance theory 
using the social network perspective, the empirical chapter on militarized conflicts found that: (1) at the 
system level, the overall results do not reveal any clear support for either theory, but (2) at the dyadic 
level, the overall results do strongly support power preponderance theory over balance of power theory. 
From the system level analyses, the balance of power theory generally supports the hypotheses on 
systemic crises but, conversely, the power preponderance theory generally supports the hypotheses on 
systemic disputes. However, from the dyadic level analyses, the results are clear from using four different 
estimation methods (i.e., logistic estimation clustered on dyads, WSEV estimation, ReLogit estimation, 
and the pooled GEE estimation controlling for the AR1 process) that when the two states in a dyad share 
disproportional structural network power, they will be far less likely to be involved in conflicts with each 
other (i.e., the more skewed the distribution of structural network power in a dyad, the less likely there will 
be a militarized interstate dispute), thus supporting the “power preponderance leads to peace” argument. 
The marginal impact analysis also showed that the preponderance of structural network power has a 
strong effect on interstate dispute, cutting the probability of a dispute by 54.1% to 83.2% (depending on 
the model specifications) from the baseline rate. The evidence from nonparametric model discrimination 
statistics and information criteria measures also shows that the models with network power measures 
statistically outperform and are preferred over those with attributional power measures such as COW 
index and GNP in both systemic and dyadic conflict onsets studies. 
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 In addition to the empirical analyses, this chapter also emphasized how useful the sociograms 
(produced by the social network analysis) are in depicting and highlighting the distinctive characteristics of 
international dispute networks. First, the general graphical patterns of monadic and dyadic factors 
affecting the onset of disputes revealed from the sociograms in Figure 4.3 are also in line with the results 
from the dyadic dispute onset analysis. Second, the sociograms in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 revealed that a 
significant majority of international conflicts are “connected” conflicts, and that there are relatively few 
“disconnected” or “isolated” conflicts in the network of international conflicts (e.g., during the 1950s, only 
one crisis-dyad, Morocco-Spain, was isolated in the network that was composed of 75 different crisis-
dyads), and this provides the graphical insight of why the conflict dyadic study needs to incorporate the 
extra-dyadic conflict information in the networks. Those sociograms in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also provided 
graphical insight for the studies of “recurrent” international conflicts (e.g., on enduring rivalries). Third, the 
global maps of monadic dispute and crisis onset distributions in 1950–2000 in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
revealed the zones of conflict or peace in the world (i.e., groups of states that have relatively more or less 
amounts of conflicts in the world). 
The empirical chapter on economic sanctions found that the two main hypotheses of the study 
are generally supported by the results of the sample selection analyses (controlling for statistical linkages of 
the processes of sanction onset and sanction success). Regarding the determinants of sanction onset, I 
found that the shared military alliance, geographical proximity, and nonexistence of militarized disputes 
between states are all associated with the decreased probability of sanction onset. Regarding the 
determinants of sanction success, the first main hypothesis of this study argued that economic sanctions 
are less likely to be successful when the difference in the levels of structural network power between the 
sender and target is high. The results from the sample selection and marginal impact analyses revealed 
that sanction cases with disproportional structure network power between the sender and target were far 
less likely to be successful (i.e., the more skewed the distribution of structural network power between the 
sanctioning state and the target, the less likely is an economic sanction to be successful). The chapter also 
posited that the result provides the evidence that the lower sender/target globalization level balance 
(meaning highly globalized senders initiate sanctions on highly globalized targets) should be associated 
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 with the increased probability of sanction success. The second main hypothesis argued that economic 
sanctions are more likely to be successful when the structural network power of the target is high. The 
results from the sample selection and marginal impact analyses revealed that sanction cases with target 
states possessing high structural network power were far more likely to succeed. The chapter also posited 
that the result does provide the evidence that a highly globalized target (i.e., a target with relatively high 
structural network power) will be more severely hurt by the economic sanction, and therefore more likely 
to concede to the sender’s demands. The evidence from nonparametric model discrimination statistics and 
information criteria measures also showed that the models with network power measures statistically 
outperform and are preferred over those with attributional power measures such as COW index and GNP 
in both sanctions onsets and success studies.  
In addition to the empirical analyses, this chapter also emphasized how useful the sociograms 
produced by the social network analysis are in depicting and highlighting the distinctive characteristics of 
international sanction networks. First, the general graphical patterns of monadic and dyadic factors 
affecting the onset of sanctions revealed from the sociograms in Figure 5.3 are also in line with the results 
from the sanction onset analysis. Second, the sociograms in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 revealed that a significant 
majority of international sanctions are “connected” sanctions and there are relatively few “disconnected” 
or “isolated” sanctions in the network of economic sanctions (e.g., during the 1980s, only two sanction-
onset dyads, France-Australia and India-Nepal, were isolated in the network that was composed of 26 
different sanction-onset dyads; during the 1970s, no successful sanction-onset dyad was isolated in the 
network that was composed of 16 different successful sanction-onset dyads), and this provides the 
graphical insight of why the dyadic sanction onset and success studies need to incorporate the extra-
dyadic sanction information in the networks. Those sociograms in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also provided 
graphical insight for the studies of “recurrent” international sanctions, where the same dyad experiences 
more than one economic sanction.  
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 Future Directions from this Dissertation 
This project offers several opportunities for future research. The central focuses of this project 
were that the international system is composed of different social networks along the two dimensions of 
communication and resource flows (e.g., networks of diplomatic exchanges, foreign student exchanges, 
and international telecommunication for the first dimension; and networks of arms transfers, international 
trade, and international assistance for the second dimension), and that the structural network power of the 
state and its distribution in the system should be measured using a wide set of different interaction network 
data employing a social network perspective. However, we should be able to extend our social network 
conceptualizations of international system structure and national power in the following manner. First, we 
might want to add some other international interaction networks to depict each of the two dimensions 
used in the project. In Chapter 3, I presented three theoretical and empirical rules to justify the 
international networks used in this project: the international networks on dynamic (rather than static) 
behaviors focused on the directional (rather than non-directional) characteristics of relationships among 
states in the system whose data are available for all the system members over the long period of time 
studied in this project. Some international networks that satisfy the two theoretical decision rules had to be 
excluded due to the lack of consistent data available, either for the time period of this project or for all the 
system member states (e.g., the networks of international mail or Internet correspondence for the 
communication dimension and those of international migration for the resource dimension), and I will 
follow up my initial contacts with the relevant international institute or agency for the availability of such 
data in the future. Second, we might want to add some other dimensions of international system structure. 
During the early stages of this project, I attempted to include the dimension of authority patterns among 
the system members to depict international system structure. Some of the possible candidate networks to 
depict this dimension (i.e., formal alliance membership, IGO membership, and PTA agreement 
membership) were unable to be used, because they lacked the directional characteristics of relationships 
among states in the system (i.e., unable to differentiate between “choices made” and “choices received”) 
(Chapter 3). Some other possible candidates with semi-directional characteristics might be the voting 
records and the member contribution records in different international organizations. Also, if we can find 
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 some longitudinal survey materials conducted on governmental officials (or even citizens) available for all 
international system members, we might be able to include them to depict the additional authority pattern 
dimension of international system structure.  
This project emphasized the graphical representations of states’ interactions within different social 
networks of international relations in the formats of global maps and sociograms. However, as in Kinsella 
(2003, 2004, 2006) for the arms transfer networks, this project was primarily focused on using such 
graphical representations as descriptive tools (i.e., display, identify, and highlight spatial patterns of 
different interaction networks). For example, in Chapters 4 and 5, the graphical representations of 
international conflict and sanction networks revealed that the significant majority of conflicts and sanctions 
are indeed the “connected” and “recurrent” conflicts and sanctions (Chapters 4 and 5), and that the 
general graphical patterns of factors affecting the onset of disputes and sanctions revealed from the 
sociograms are also in line with the results from the dispute and sanctions onset analyses. However, we 
might also want to go further than using those graphical representations as descriptive tools. For example, 
among many others who used the spatial analyses (Anselin and O’Loughlin 1990, 1991; Kirby and Ward 
1987; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; O’Loughlin et al 1998; Gleditsch and Ward 2005; Braithwaite and Li 
2005; Braithwaite 2005), Braithwaite and Li (2005) used the local spatial statistic Gi* (Getis and Ord 
1992; Ord and Getis 1995) to identify local “hot spots” of international conflicts and examined how the 
location of a state in the local hot spot of terrorism affects the level of transnational terrorism a country 
experiences. Gelditsch and Ward (2005) used the spatial statistic to identify the local spots of democracy 
and conflict/peace and examined the relationship between the democracy and international conflicts using 
spatial analysis. In addition to the use of the spatial statistic derived from the graphical representations, we 
might also want to use many other network measures which identify the distinctive characteristics of 
networks as a whole developed by social network theorists. For example, Krackhardt (1994) developed 
several measures to describe the organization network as a whole, namely the degree of network 
connectedness, hierarchy, efficiency, and least upper boundness. Employing his measures, we might want 
to examine, for example, how the level of connectedness in the international conflict network affects the 
amount of conflicts at the system level.   
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 This project applied the social network perspectives of international system structure and national 
power to two international empirical phenomena in the international security arena and the international 
economy arena: militarized conflicts and economic sanctions. However, the potential of the two 
introduced social network conceptualizations are not limited to these two international phenomena. For 
example, among others, we might want to extend the analyses to the study of international terrorism. 
There have been quite a few empirical analyses of transnational terrorism (examining the behavior of 
terrorist organizations focusing on domestic and international variables), especially since 9/11 (e.g., the 
special issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:2 [2005]); however, long before the recent interest in 
transnational terrorism, economists have studied transnational terrorism focusing on terrorists as rational 
actors who maximize some goal subject to resource constraints (e.g., Landes 1978; Sandler, Tschirhart, 
and Cauley 1983). The new social network conceptualizations developed in this project can be applied to 
transnational terrorism analysis. For example, in Chapters 3 and 5, I argued that the structural network 
power of each state also represents how well it is globalized in the international system (communication 
globalization from the first dimension of communication patterns, economic globalization from the second 
dimension of resource flows); in other words, how powerfully each state is structurally positioned in the 
network of relations shows how well each state is globalized in the web of network relations. If this 
argument holds, we can certainly examine Li and Schaub’s (2004, 243) assertion that transnational 
terrorist incidents and globalization either at the systemic or national levels may trend in opposite 
directions, using the social network power measures derived from this project. More specifically, we might 
want to test such hypotheses as “does a level of systemic economic globalization or communication 
globalization affect transnational terrorism in the international system?” and “does a level of national 
economic globalization or communication globalization affect the transnational terrorism that each state 
experiences?” In addition, we might also want to examine transnational terrorism networks using the 
graphical methods used in this project. We should be able to identify and highlight the distinctive 
characteristics of international terrorism networks as we did for the international conflicts and sanctions 
networks in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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 This project focused on (1) developing the social network conceptualizations of international 
system structure and national power, and comparing/contrasting the new conceptualizations to the older 
"scalar" measures in the field of international relations; and (2) applying the new conceptualizations to 
answer the empirical questions of the old material-based power theories and to improve our 
understanding of the two phenomena in international relations. In other words, the project took existing 
theories and tested them using my newer network conceptions, primarily interested in how these newer 
conceptions lead us to recast a great deal of existing empirical work. However, this project represents 
more of a beginning than an end in the application of social network perspectives on international 
relations. In addition, we might want to develop more hypotheses directly originating from the social 
network perspectives of international relations. Some of the possible candidate hypotheses might be: how 
is each type of international network created and how does it evolve over time (the creation and evolution 
of international networks), what are some transformation mechanisms active in each type of international 
network (the transformation of international networks), and what is the relationship between different 
types of international networks (e.g., how does the creation, evolution, or transformation of one type of 
international network affect the creation, evolution, or transformation of other types of international 
network)? 
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 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960) 
(Binary Diplomatic Exchange Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
BEL 0 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BUL 0 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
CZE 0 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
DEN 0 1 0 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FIN 0 1 0 1 1 . 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
FRN 0 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRC 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HUN 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
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1 1 1 1 
ICE 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
IRE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 . 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
ITA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LUX 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
NOR 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
NTH 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
POL 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 . 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
POR 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
ROM 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 . 1 0 1 1 1 1 
RUS 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 . 0 1 1 1 1 
SPN 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 . 1 1 1 0 
SWD 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 
SWZ 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 
UKG 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 
YUG 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 . 
 
 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Valued Foreign Student Exchange Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 3 . 1 3 3 1 127 74 67 1 18 108 213 4 176 21 34 3 8 54 3 48 40 16 
BUL 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZE 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DEN 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRN 1 234 42 22 74 20 . 435 194 9 18 380 283 73 123 166 77 47 36 410 73 244 883 149 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
184 0 0 0 0 
HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE 0 5 0 0 0 1 9 3 1 0 . 2 1 5 10 11 10 0 0 8 5 2 1068 1 
ITA 3 2 6 3 2 8 26 1096 39 1 3 . 1 4 4 7 6 3 2 23 1 65 26 20 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NTH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ROM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RUS 0 0 1268 88 0 0 0 0 1310 0 0 0 0 0 0 503 0 10 . 0 0 0 0 60 
SPN 10 12 0 2 4 1 66 5 5 0 5 59 0 76 7 4 37 5 13 . 5 12 24 4 
SWD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
SWZ 1 78 11 5 16 14 582 299 499 4 15 292 157 204 128 32 38 6 3 96 51 . 121 34 
UKG 0 21 3 4 16 14 53 180 119 27 90 56 6 221 63 34 42 4 13 45 25 55 . 42 
YUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
 
  
Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Binary Foreign Student Exchange Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
BUL 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZE 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DEN 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRN 0 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 0 0 0 
ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NTH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ROM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RUS 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 
SPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 
SWD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
SWZ 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 . 1 1 
UKG 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 . 1 
YUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
 
 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Valued Arms Transfer Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BUL 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZE 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 572 0 0 0 0 0 
DEN 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRN 0 0 0 0 10 0 . 0 0 0 24 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NTH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POL 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ROM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RUS 46 0 504 311 0 3 0 0 876 0 0 0 0 0 0 604 0 173 . 0 0 0 0 11 
SPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 
SWD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
SWZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
UKG 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 . 8 
YUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
 
 
 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Binary Arms Transfer Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BUL 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZE 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
DEN 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRN 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
187 0 0 0 0 
ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NTH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POL 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ROM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RUS 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 
SPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 
SWD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
SWZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
UKG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 1 
YUG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
 
 
 
 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Valued International Export Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 2 8 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 24 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 0 . 5 22 67 31 376 33 12 1 12 111 691 40 771 15 43 8 18 21 106 101 202 9 
BUL 3 2 . 55 0 1 4 2 12 0 0 13 0 0 1 20 0 8 307 1 1 2 6 8 
CZE 8 10 62 . 8 11 14 9 112 3 1 23 1 8 17 128 1 64 659 3 10 13 25 24 
DEN 0 14 0 7 . 26 22 4 2 10 3 68 1 67 28 13 3 1 16 4 131 21 393 4 
FIN 0 36 1 9 34 . 46 7 4 2 10 21 1 13 59 17 1 3 140 2 43 5 236 2 
FRN 2 492 7 17 72 59 . 35 19 1 10 401 21 39 186 22 54 25 116 84 118 314 347 30 
GRC 0 2 3 7 1 3 10 . 5 0 0 13 0 1 5 6 1 3 19 0 2 3 19 9 
HUN 0 4 0 0 3 3 8 5 . 0 0 18 0 2 4 0 0 26 0 1 
188 6 7 11 34 
ICE 0 0 0 3 2 2 1 1 0 . 0 2 0 4 2 1 2 0 10 0 4 0 10 0 
IRE 0 4 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 . 4 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 2 3 1 315 0 
ITA 2 91 8 17 35 17 276 40 23 1 5 . 4 25 107 21 21 16 79 35 73 244 250 105 
LUX 0 7 0 1 3 1 16 1 0 0 1 5 . 2 32 1 2 0 1 1 4 4 8 0 
NOR 0 18 1 7 56 18 23 3 2 5 1 31 1 . 33 5 4 2 13 7 107 10 199 2 
NTH 0 552 2 11 103 39 237 20 6 4 15 129 23 68 . 14 20 3 12 25 191 92 441 14 
POL 3 10 0 0 22 29 15 5 0 1 2 37 0 5 8 . 1 23 0 2 23 8 101 0 
POR 0 10 0 2 5 1 11 2 0 0 1 11 0 3 9 1 . 1 3 3 9 4 44 0 
ROM 2 2 9 63 0 4 20 4 42 0 0 26 0 2 3 21 2 . 281 0 2 11 15 8 
RUS 0 27 0 0 29 151 95 28 0 13 2 126 1 19 44 0 2 266 . 3 63 6 220 57 
SPN 0 20 1 5 9 5 58 2 3 0 2 68 1 9 24 2 5 1 7 . 14 19 126 3 
SWD 0 103 2 12 169 107 100 13 7 3 8 84 4 234 131 20 12 4 38 23 . 40 410 9 
SWZ 0 64 2 15 35 20 127 9 8 1 3 156 3 21 78 13 22 7 10 30 54 . 110 19 
UKG 0 281 8 25 254 138 276 54 13 9 333 261 12 202 353 42 70 12 149 85 376 148 . 41 
YUG 0 4 9 26 2 0 8 19 20 0 0 75 0 1 6 22 0 6 53 0 5 8 44 . 
 
 
 Appendix 1.1 Raw Binary and Valued Directional Matrices (Europe in 1960, Continued) 
(Binary International Export Matrix) 
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ALB . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BEL 0 . 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
BUL 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CZE 0 0 1 . 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
DEN 0 1 0 0 . 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
FIN 0 1 0 0 1 . 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
FRN 0 1 0 1 1 1 . 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
189 0 0 1 1 
ICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ITA 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOR 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
NTH 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
POL 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
POR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ROM 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 . 1 0 0 1 1 0 
RUS 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 . 0 1 0 1 1 
SPN 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 . 1 1 1 0 
SWD 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 . 1 1 0 
SWZ 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 . 1 1 
UKG 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 
YUG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 . 
 
 
 
 Appendix 1.2 Ranking of Countries on Structural Network Power Measures  
Degree 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.634 U.S.A. 0.595 U.S.A. 0.551 U.S.A. 0.600 U.S.A. 0.592 U.S.A. 0.580 
2 U.K. 0.502 U.K. 0.437 U.K. 0.488 France 0.528 France 0.540 France 0.513 
3 France 0.385 France 0.399 France 0.469 U.K. 0.509 U.K. 0.487 U.K. 0.489 
4 Italy 0.292 Italy 0.271 Italy 0.345 Italy 0.375 Italy 0.400 Canada 0.406 
5 Belgium 0.265 
West  
Germany 0.269 Canada 0.272 Belgium 0.316 Canada 0.390 Italy 0.391 
6 Switzerland 0.246 0.238 
West  
Germany 0.265 Japan 0.308 Belgium 0.324 Belgium Belgium 0.327 
7 Canada 0.230 Switzerland 0.222 Japan 0.262 West Germany 0.301 Japan 0.317 Germany 0.324 
8 Sweden 0.175 Japan 0.201 Belgium 0.259 Netherlands 0.294 Netherlands 0.316 Japan 0.320 
9 Netherlands 0.165 Canada 0.195 Switzerland 0.249 Switzerland 0.289 Switzerland 0.311 Switzerland 0.319 
10 0.164 Spain 0.183 Netherlands 0.230 Canada 0.282 
West  
Germany Argentina 0.299 Netherlands 0.319 
11 Brazil 0.156 Netherlands 0.183 Spain 0.192 Sweden 0.235 Sweden 0.260 Spain 0.307 
12 Russia 0.141 Austria 0.158 Sweden 0.188 Spain 0.223 Spain 0.240 Sweden 0.294 
13 Spain 0.128 Sweden 0.156 Austria 0.173 Australia 0.190 Australia 0.205 Australia 0.272 
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14 India 0.126 Russia 0.156 Russia 0.163 Nigeria 0.187 Egypt 0.203 Denmark 0.213 
15 Czechoslovakia 0.124 Argentina 0.144 Denmark 0.158 Argentina 0.187 Germany 0.201 Indonesia 0.212 
Betweenness 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.161 U.S.A. 0.100 U.S.A. 0.097 U.S.A. 0.101 U.S.A. 0.100 U.S.A. 0.106 
2 U.K. 0.067 France 0.075 France 0.066 France 0.051 France 0.048 France 0.038 
3 France 0.052 U.K. 0.048 U.K. 0.060 U.K. 0.046 U.K. 0.035 U.K. 0.034 
4 Italy 0.015 
West  
Germany 0.034 
West  
Germany 0.024 Italy 0.024 Italy 0.023 Germany 0.033 
5 Russia 0.014 Russia 0.020 Italy 0.021 Japan 0.019 Germany 0.018 Italy 0.033 
6 Belgium 0.014 Italy 0.015 Japan 0.021 West Germany 0.015 Japan 0.015 Russia 0.019 
7 Netherlands 0.011 Japan 0.013 Russia 0.017 Russia 0.013 
West  
Germany 0.015 South Africa 0.013 
8 Switzerland 0.009 Netherlands 0.009 Spain 0.009 Saudi Arabia 0.011 Russia 0.014 China 0.012 
9 Saudi Arabia 0.009 China 0.009 Australia 0.009 South Africa 0.011 South Africa 0.009 Japan 0.012 
10 Argentina 0.009 Belgium 0.007 Belgium 0.009 Netherlands 0.010 Canada 0.009 Canada 0.012 
11 Australia 0.008 Saudi Arabia 0.007 Netherlands 0.009 Belgium 0.009 Belgium 0.009 Spain 0.011 
12 Brazil 0.007 Australia 0.006 Canada 0.009 Spain 0.008 Netherlands 0.008 Belgium 0.010 
13 India 0.007 India 0.006 Saudi Arabia 0.006 Canada 0.008 Spain 0.008 Netherlands 0.009 
14 Czechoslovakia 0.007 Canada 0.006 South Africa 0.006 Australia 0.008 Australia 0.006 Turkey 0.008 
15 Taiwan 0.007 Brazil 0.005 India 0.005 Switzerland 0.007 Switzerland 0.006 Poland 0.007 
 
 Appendix 1.2 Ranking of Countries on Structural Network Power Measures (Continued) 
Flow-
Betweenness 
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.131 U.S.A. 0.075 U.S.A. 0.069 U.S.A. 0.068 U.S.A. 0.071 U.S.A. 0.062 
2 U.K. 0.052 France 0.059 France 0.052 France 0.040 France 0.042 France 0.034 
3 France 0.031 U.K. 0.035 U.K. 0.048 U.K. 0.040 U.K. 0.031 U.K. 0.024 
4 Argentina 0.015 
West 
Germany 0.025 Russia 0.026 Italy 0.019 Italy 0.018 Italy 0.023 
5 Taiwan 0.015 Russia 0.021 
West  
Germany 0.019 Japan 0.017 Germany 0.016 Russia 0.022 
6 Belgium 0.013 Italy 0.014 Italy 0.018 Russia 0.015 Japan 0.015 Germany 0.020 
7 Italy 0.013 Japan 0.014 Japan 0.017 
West  
Germany 0.013 Russia 0.014 South Africa 0.016 
8 India 0.012 China 0.011 Australia 0.011 Australia 0.012 
West  
Germany 0.013 Canada 0.013 
9 Netherlands 0.011 Netherlands 0.009 Afghanistan 0.010 Netherlands 0.012 Canada 0.011 China 0.013 
10 Canada 0.011 Australia 0.008 Belgium 0.010 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.011 Belgium 0.011 Japan 0.012 
11 Russia 0.011 Belgium 0.007 Spain 0.010 Belgium 0.010 Spain 0.009 Ghana 0.011 
12 Australia 0.010 Taiwan 0.006 Netherlands 0.009 South Africa 0.009 Australia 0.009 Belgium 0.011 
13 Switzerland 0.009 India 
191 0.006 Canada 0.009 Spain 0.009 Ghana 0.009 Australia 0.010 
14 Brazil 0.008 Canada 0.006 China 0.007 Canada 0.008 Netherlands 0.008 South Korea 0.010 
15 Czechoslovakia 0.007 Argentina 0.006 Brazil 0.006 Switzerland 0.007 South Africa 0.008 Sudan 0.009 
Coreness 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.502 U.S.A. 0.493 U.S.A. 0.257 U.S.A. 0.407 U.S.A. 0.378 U.S.A. 0.347 
2 U.K. 0.262 U.K. 0.227 U.K. 0.254 France 0.220 Italy 0.226 U.K. 0.253 
3 Canada 0.205 France 0.197 France 0.224 U.K. 0.210 France 0.225 Canada 0.229 
4 France 0.205 Italy 0.171 Russia 0.215 Italy 0.175 U.K. 0.224 France 0.211 
5 Switzerland 0.173 Belgium 0.166 
West  
Germany 0.202 
West  
Germany 0.164 Netherlands 0.201 Switzerland 0.208 
6 Italy 0.171 Switzerland 0.156 Switzerland 0.174 Switzerland 0.164 Switzerland 0.194 Italy 0.199 
7 Belgium 0.170 
West 
Germany 0.152 Canada 0.164 Belgium 0.153 Canada 0.185 Sweden 0.185 
8 Sweden 0.114 Canada 0.147 Italy 0.149 Japan 0.151 
West 
Germany 0.185 Japan 0.170 
9 Netherlands 0.103 Austria 0.131 Belgium 0.143 Netherlands 0.143 Japan 0.168 Netherlands 0.167 
10 Brazil 0.094 Japan 0.126 Japan 0.136 Canada 0.139 Belgium 0.160 Austria 0.155 
11 Spain 0.088 Spain 0.114 Austria 0.129 Spain 0.137 Sweden 0.131 Norway 0.153 
12 Argentina 0.083 Netherlands 0.108 Netherlands 0.124 Sweden 0.134 Spain 0.120 Spain 0.152 
13 Iran 0.082 Sweden 0.106 Sweden 0.105 Austria 0.117 Austria 0.114 Belgium 0.150 
14 Greece 0.082 Denmark 0.084 Spain 0.103 Argentina 0.104 Australia 0.108 Australia 0.147 
15 Norway 0.082 Saudi Arabia 0.083 Denmark 0.100 Australia 0.095 Nigeria 0.105 Nigeria 0.132 
 
 
 Appendix 1.2 Ranking of Countries on Structural Network Power Measures (Continued) 
Egonet 
Brokerage 
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.892 U.S.A. 0.876 U.S.A. 0.876 U.S.A. 0.877 U.S.A. 0.872 U.S.A. 0.870 
2 U.K. 0.881 U.K. 0.858 U.K. 0.874 U.K. 0.857 France 0.847 France 0.838 
3 Italy 0.796 France 0.844 France 0.857 France 0.849 U.K. 0.832 U.K. 0.818 
4 Canada 0.689 Italy 0.785 Italy 0.821 Italy 0.809 Canada 0.782 Italy 0.798 
5 France 0.670 
West  
Germany 0.719 Canada 0.749 Japan 0.752 Italy 0.770 Canada 0.778 
6 Belgium 0.594 Belgium 0.689 
West  
Germany 0.725 
West  
Germany 0.738 
West  
Germany 0.751 Spain 0.725 
7 Netherlands 0.523 Canada 0.642 Switzerland 0.666 Switzerland 0.712 Australia 0.701 Netherlands 0.699 
8 Switzerland 0.485 Japan 0.585 Japan 0.604 Australia 0.679 Spain 0.700 Belgium 0.670 
9 Australia 0.436 Netherlands 0.531 Belgium 0.575 Sweden 0.642 Switzerland 0.693 Switzerland 0.664 
10 Sweden 0.435 Sweden 0.480 Australia 0.563 Canada 0.621 Belgium 0.680 Sweden 0.663 
11 Russia 0.417 Russia 0.479 Netherlands 0.556 Austria 0.607 Netherlands 0.677 Russia 0.620 
12 Taiwan 0.348 Norway 0.460 Sweden 0.523 Netherlands 0.573 Sweden 0.657 Austria 0.565 
13 Norway 0.331 Switzerland 0.447 Austria 0.450 Belgium 0.568 Austria 0.586 Australia 0.563 
14 Argentina 0.324 Austria 0.400 
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Russia 0.417 Norway 0.466 Japan 0.564 Belarus 0.560 
15 Syria 0.294 Argentina 0.388 Lebanon 0.361 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.434 Russia 0.500 Japan 0.551 
 
 
 Appendix 1.2 Ranking of Countries on Structural Network Power Measures (Continued) 
SNPI 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  
Ranking Country Value           
1 U.S.A. 0.464 U.S.A. 0.428 U.S.A. 0.370 U.S.A. 0.410 U.S.A. 0.403 U.S.A. 0.393 
2 U.K. 0.353 U.K. 0.321 U.K. 0.345 France 0.337 France 0.340 France 0.327 
3 France 0.269 France 0.315 France 0.333 U.K. 0.332 U.K. 0.322 U.K. 0.323 
4 Italy 0.257 Italy 0.251 Italy 0.271 Italy 0.280 Italy 0.287 Italy 0.289 
5 Canada 0.228 
West  
Germany 0.240 
West  
Germany 0.247 Japan 0.250 Canada 0.275 Canada 0.288 
6 Belgium 0.211 Belgium 0.221 Canada 0.240 
West  
Germany 0.246 
West  
Germany 0.252 Spain 0.241 
7 Switzerland 0.185 Canada 0.199 Switzerland 0.220 Switzerland 0.236 Netherlands 0.242 Netherlands 0.240 
8 Netherlands 0.162 Japan 0.188 Japan 0.208 Canada 0.212 Switzerland 0.242 Switzerland 0.240 
9 Sweden 0.147 Netherlands 0.168 Belgium 0.199 Belgium 0.211 Belgium 0.237 Belgium 0.234 
10 Russia 0.127 Switzerland 0.167 Netherlands 0.185 Netherlands 0.206 Japan 0.216 Sweden 0.230 
11 Australia 0.124 Sweden 0.150 Russia 0.168 Sweden 0.204 Spain 0.216 Japan 0.213 
12 Argentina 0.119 Russia 0.146 Sweden 0.165 Australia 0.197 Sweden 0.211 Australia 0.200 
13 Norway 0.108 Austria 0.139 Australia 0.162 Austria 0.180 Australia 0.206 Austria 0.185 
14 Brazil 0.107 Norway 0.132 Austria 0.152 Spain 0.158 Austria 0.178 Russia 0.181 
15 India 0.099 Argentina 0.122 
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Spain 0.124 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.141 Denmark 0.146 Germany 0.177 
16 Czechoslovakia 0.094 Spain 0.120 Denmark 0.111 Brazil 0.137 Russia 0.143 Denmark 0.169 
17 Denmark 0.090 Denmark 0.112 Lebanon 0.100 Norway 0.136 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.135 Norway 0.163 
18 Venezuela 0.088 India 0.111 Norway 0.100 Argentina 0.132 Egypt 0.131 Finland 0.145 
19 Taiwan 0.087 Australia 0.110 Argentina 0.099 Denmark 0.126 Yugoslavia 0.130 Israel 0.138 
20 Spain 0.080 Brazil 0.098 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.091 India 0.110 Brazil 0.121 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.137 
21 Syria 0.077 Turkey 0.098 Brazil 0.090 Russia 0.110 Norway 0.117 Portugal 0.136 
22 
Saudi  
Arabia 0.077 Czechoslovakia 0.090 India 0.090 Mexico 0.109 Israel 0.108 Poland 0.130 
23 Mexico 0.076 Yugoslavia 0.086 Czechoslovakia 0.090 Greece 0.101 India 0.107 
South  
Africa 0.129 
24 Egypt 0.076 Taiwan 0.086 China 0.090 Israel 0.100 Germany 0.106 China 0.128 
25 Iran 0.070 Lebanon 0.083 Israel 0.089 Nigeria 0.099 Argentina 0.103 South Korea 0.127 
26 Greece 0.070 Venezuela 0.080 Taiwan 0.079 Egypt 0.096 Turkey 0.101 Ireland 0.126 
27 Yugoslavia 0.068 Egypt 0.077 Egypt 0.079 Ivory Coast 0.090 Nigeria 0.100 Argentina 0.124 
28 Lebanon 0.068 Saudi Arabia 0.073 Poland 0.077 China 0.089 Portugal 0.099 Belarus 0.123 
29 Turkey 0.068 China 0.070 Mexico 0.076 Senegal 0.088 Ivory Coast 0.099 Cyprus 0.123 
30 Poland 0.060 Pakistan 0.061 Yugoslavia 0.072 Turkey 0.087 Senegal 0.099 New Zealand 0.122 
 
 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm  
(Degree Centralities; Foreign Student Exchanges) 
 
1960 
 
2000 
 194
 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm (Continued) 
(Betweenness Centralities; Foreign Student Exchanges) 
 
1960 
 
2000 
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 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm (Continued) 
(Flow-Betweenness Centralities; Foreign Student Exchanges) 
 
1960 
 
2000 
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 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm (Continued) 
(Degree Centralities; Arms Transfers) 
 
1950 
 
2000 
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 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm (Continued) 
(Betweenness Centralities; Arms Transfers) 
 
1950 
 
2000 
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 Appendix 1.3 Distributions of Centralities, using Concentric Layout Algorithm (Continued) 
(Flow-betweenness Centralities; Arms Transfers) 
 
1950 
 
2000 
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 Appendix 2.1 Previous Research on Measuring National Power 
 
Single Variable Indicators: Military. There have been several studies using single military indicators to 
define/measure national power. For example, Claude (1962) and Deutsch (1968) focus on gross military 
capability as their proxy for national power. Alcock and Newcombe (1970) use “military expenditures in 
millions of purchasing power-equivalent dollars” as one of their national power indices. Modelski and 
Thompson (1988), in their book Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1983, use the size of naval forces as 
an indicator of projectable national power. 
 
Single Variable Indicators: Economic. Other scholars have used single economic indicators to 
define/measure national power. For example, Davis (1954, 208) argues that national income is one of the 
best indices of national power because it “expresses the grand result of all the productive forces at a 
nation’s command.” Hitch and McKean (1960) argue for the use of a country’s gross domestic/national 
product (GDP or GNP) to measure national power. Russett (1968) posits that total consumption of fuel 
and electric energy is the best index of national power. This idea is also shared by the work of 
Morgenstern, Knorr, and Heiss (1973). For Organski (1958, 436), three determinants of national power 
are the size of the nation-state’s population, the skill and efficiency of its government, and its level of 
economic development. Multiplying two of the elements, population and level of economic development 
(measured by GNP per capita), Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler (1980) argue in their power 
transition theory that national income, measured by GNP, is the best index of national power available 
 
Multivariate Indicators. Instead of using single indicators (either military or economic), many other 
scholars in the field of international relations have used multivariate indicators to define/measure national 
power. For example, German’s (1960) index of national power is based on four dimensions: land (with 
territory and densities of population and railway), population (with workforce and technical efficiency), 
industrial base (with production of steel, coal, lignite, crude oil, and hydroelectricity; the presence or 
absence of directed economy; and surpluses or deficits in steel, oil, minerals, and engineering), and 
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 military size (with military personnel). These four dimensions are then multiplied by a state’s nuclear 
capability. Fucks (1965), using three variables of population size, energy production, and steel production, 
generates nine formulas of national power. By applying his formulas to 29 industrial countries, he argues 
that his last formula fits best. Alcock and Newcombe (1970) provide three equations of national power 
calculation, using the data on GNP per capita, population, and population density. By applying their three 
equations to the factor analysis results from Russett (1968) of the Yale Data Program, they concluded that 
their latter two equations fit best.  
Cline (1980) perceives national power as the product of capability and commitment. He argues 
that capability measures critical mass (including population and territory), economic capacity (including 
income and the production of energy, critical nonfuel minerals, manufacturing, foods, and trade), and 
military capacity (with strategic balance, combat capabilities, and military effort) and that commitment 
measures national strategy and will (including national integration, strength of national leadership, and 
relevance of strategy to national interest). Boulding (1962), Tufte (1983), and Bueno de Mesquita (1981) 
all emphasize the impact of distance on measuring national power. Boulding (1962) argues that national 
power is linked to the distance between the two parties in the relationship. Tufte (1983) uses an example 
of the invasion of Russia to argue how the capabilities of Napoleon’s army and the Russian army 
depended on their distances from home supplies and argues that this directly impacted the defeat of 
French troops. Bueno de Mesquita (1981) suggests that measuring national power should involve 
adjusting for distance between capitals of states and the time required to travel this distance. Deutsch 
(1968) suggests that the capabilities in the Cold War era are nuclear; a similar view is shared by Brodie 
(1946). Organski and Kugler (1980) provide another index of national power by multiplying a state’s GNP 
by its index of tax effort (their other element of power is the capacity of the political system); however, 
they argue that the measure of effectiveness of political system should be “one of the major tasks that 
remains for political scientists to accomplish in the years ahead” (208). The formal definition of their index 
is as follows: National Power = (Internal Component of National Capabilities) + (Externally Provided 
Capabilities); the former component of the index is (Population * Productivity * Index of Governmental 
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 Extraction) = (GNP/Population * Population * Tax Efforta) = (GNP * Tax Efforta) where a=1.75 and the 
latter component is (Foreign Aid * Tax Effort of Recipient).  
Singer and colleagues (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) have developed the 
most widely used national material power capability index (from their Correlates of War Project). They 
use three dimensions of power capabilities: (1) demographic capabilities (using the data on total 
population and urban population), (2) industrial capabilities (using the data on energy consumption and 
iron/steel production), and (3) military capabilities (using the data on total military expenditures and size 
of the armed forces). This Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) has been updated several times 
since its launch, and the current version of the data set (National Material Capabilities v.3.02) runs from 
1816 to 2001. The index is formulated in the following two steps. First, a nation’s share of each capability 
measure is calculated (e.g., a nation X’s share of the entire system’s total population): %TPOPX = TPOPX 
/ (TPOPX + ∑TPOPOTHERS), where TPOPX is nation X’s total population and ∑TPOPOTHERS is the sum of all 
other nations’ total population. After calculating all six components of the index, their arithmetic mean 
comprises the index of CINC (e.g., a nation X’s CINC score is based on the average share of the six 
aspects of capabilities): CINCX = (%TPOPX + %UPOPX + %ENERGYX + %IRSTX + %MELEXX + 
%MELPERX) / 6. 
Despite widespread use of this index, especially in the field of international relations, some assert 
that it should be revised. For example, Doran and Parsons (1980) argue that nuclear capability should be 
incorporated as a distinct element of the Correlates of War (COW) index. They argue that the inclusion of 
a nuclear element would distinguish superpowers from other countries. Bremer (2001) points out that (1) 
we might need to add another aspect of power called the "information society" power aspect, in addition 
to the original three aspects of demographic, industrial, and military power; and (2) we might need to use 
some other measure of the quality of population (e.g., using data based on education) instead of the 
current urban population measure. Kadera (2001) and Kadera and Sorokin (2004) suggest a modification 
to CINC, which they call the GINC indicator; the new index is based on the geometric rather than 
arithmetic mean of COW capability components. 
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 Appendix 3.1 Procedures to Derive the Binary Directional Matrices  
 
All the data for each type of resource dimension are first transformed from the dyadic interaction 
data (state A, state B, Year, Dyadic Data Var.) to the n*n (n=number of states in the international system) 
square matrices of each year (using the SAS Proc Transpose procedure). These valued directional square 
matrices are then transformed to the binary directional square matrices to be used in the social network 
analyses (using the procedures in Ucinet). Appendix 1.1 is included to illustrate these procedures: the 
original and binary matrices of arms transfers and international trade (more specifically, exports) of goods 
and services in 1960 (for only European continent, to save space). For example, for the arms transfers 
matrix in 1960, Russia transferred arms to 8 states in Europe with a minimum transfer of 3 million U.S. 
current dollars to FIN (Finland) and a maximum transfer of 876 million dollars to HUN (Hungary); but it 
received arms from only one state, CZE (Czechoslovakia), with the amount of 572 million dollars (thus the 
directional matrix where the raw and column of the data entries are different). These valued matrices of 
arms transfers are then binalized to be used in the social network analyses using the cutoff point with the 
average amount of arms transfers in the whole system (e.g., in 1960, 1.179 million dollars). For the 
international exports of goods and services matrix, we can see the amount of exports from Russia to all 
other states in Europe in 1960 by taking a look at the raw of RUS (Russia) in Appendix 1.1 (e.g., Russia 
exported goods/services to YUG [Yugoslavia] in the amount of 57 million dollars); the amount of exports 
from all other states in Europe to Russia can be seen by taking a look at the column of RUS in Appendix 
1.1 (e.g., Russia imported goods/services from YUG [Yugoslavia] in the amount of 53 million dollars). 
These valued matrices of international exports are then binalized to be used in the social network analyses 
by using the average value of cells in the whole matrix as the cutoff points (e.g., the cutoff point in 1960 
international exports network is $10.403 million; if the cell is greater than or equal to $10.403 million, the 
cell is coded as 1, otherwise it is coded as 0).  
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 Appendix 3.2 Calculations of Degree Centrality Measures 
 
I will illustrate how degree measures of structural network power are calculated using one type of 
data for the communication dimension (foreign student exchanges) and one type of data for the resource 
dimension (arms transfers) in two time points. For example, in 2000, there were 191 independent states in 
the international system, and this leads to 36,290 distinctive directed dyads (191*191 minus 191) in the 
system. The total arms transfers in 2000 were $13.694 billion, which makes the average arms transfers per 
dyad $0.377 million (network total arms transfers of $13.694 billion divided by network total dyads of 
36,290), which is the cutoff value for the dichotomous 0-1 value for the new directed binary matrix. In 
other words, if state i in 2000 exported more than 0.377 million dollars to state j, then the dyad ij is coded 
as 1; otherwise it is coded as 0. The United States exported more than $0.377 million of arms to 35 states; 
therefore its normalized outdegree is 35/190, which is 0.184. The state with next highest outdegree is 
France who exported more than 0.377 million dollars to 22 states, which makes its normalized outdegree 
0.116 (22/190). In 2000, the mean observed outdegree was 1.047, with a standard deviation of 4.052 
(the maximum outdegree 35 and the minimum 0). The mean observed normalized outdegree was 0.006 
with a standard deviation of 0.021 (the maximum normalized outdegree 0.184 and the minimum 0). The 
network centralization was 0.180 (I will discuss the centralization index later in more detail, but briefly 
what it measures is how centralized each system is compared to the “star” system, where one state holds 
all the powers obtainable in the network—the centralization index of star network equals 1).  
This is compared to 1950, when there were 75 independent states in the international system, 
leading to 5,550 distinctive directed dyads (75*75 minus 75). The total arms transfers in 1950 were 6.166 
billion dollars, which makes the average amount of arms transfers per dyad $1.111 million (network total 
arms transfers of $6.166 billion divided by network total dyads of 5,550), which is the cutoff value for the 
dichotomous 0-1 value for the new directed binary matrix. In other words, if state i in 1950 exported more 
than 1.111 million dollars to state j, then the dyad ij is coded as 1; otherwise it is coded as 0. The United 
States exported more than 1.111 million dollars of arms transfers to 26 states; therefore its normalized 
outdegree is 26/74, which is 0.351. The state with next highest outdegree is the United Kingdom, which 
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 exported more than 1.111 million dollars to 17 states, making its normalized outdegree 0.230 (17/74). In 
1950, the mean observed outdegree was 0.867, with a standard deviation of 3.675 (the maximum 
outdegree 26 and the minimum 0).  The mean observed normalized outdegree was 0.012 with a standard 
deviation of 0.050 (the maximum normalized outdegree 0.351 and the minimum 0). The network 
centralization was 0.344. Compared to the 2000 arms transfer network, the 1950 network shows: (1) that 
the top suppliers of arms transfers were less concentrated in 2000 (for 36 and 22 destinations or 18% and 
12% of the total system member, by the top two suppliers) than in 1950 (for 26 and 17 destinations or 
36% and 23% of the total system members by the top two suppliers); but (2) that there was less variability 
of arms supplies across the actors in 2000 than in 1950, meaning that not many other states (considering 
the increased number of system members) joined in the supplier group (in 2000). The top suppliers (such 
as the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Russia) transferred arms to fewer different destinations in terms of 
the proportions of total international system members (now than before), but only a handful of states 
(such as France and Italy) joined the supplier group of transferring arms.  
For the foreign student exchange network, the total student population abroad in 2000 was 
1,628,275, or an average of 44.868 per dyad (network total students abroad of 1,628,275 students 
divided by network total dyads of 36,290), which is the cutoff value for the dichotomous 0-1 value for the 
new directed binary matrix. In other words, if state i in 2000 received more than 44.868 students from 
state j, then the dyad ij is coded as 1, otherwise it is coded as 0. The United States received more than 
44.868 students from 160 states, and therefore its normalized indegree is 160/190, which is 0.842. The 
state with the next highest indegree is France, which received more than 44.868 students from 121 states, 
making its normalized indegree 0.637 (121/190). In 2000, the mean observed indegree was 9.272 with a 
standard deviation of 23.501 (the maximum indegree 160 and the minimum 0).  The mean observed 
normalized indegree was 0.049 with a standard deviation of 0.124 (the maximum normalized indegree 
0.842 and the minimum 0), and the network centralization was 0.797.    
This is compared to 1960, when there were 107 independent states in the international system, 
leading to 11,342 distinctive directed dyads (107*107 minus 107). The total foreign students abroad in 
1960 were 164,365, which makes the average amount of foreign students abroad per dyad as 14.492 
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 (network total students abroad of 164,365 students divided by network total dyads of 11,342); this is the 
cutoff value for the dichotomous 0-1 value for the new directed binary matrix. In other words, if state i in 
1960 received more than 14.492 students from state j, then the dyad ij is coded as 1, otherwise it is coded 
as 0. The United States received more than 14.492 students from 78 states, therefore its normalized 
indegree is 78/106, or 0.736. The state with the next highest indegree is France, which received more than 
14.492 students from 64 states, making its normalized outdegree 0.604 (64/106). In 1960, the mean 
observed indegree was 5.028 with a standard deviation of 13.996 (the maximum indegree 78 and the 
minimum 0).  The mean observed normalized indegree was 0.047 with a standard deviation of 0.132 (the 
maximum normalized indegree 0.736 and the minimum 0), and the network centralization was 0.695. 
Compared to the 2000 foreign student exchange network, the 1960 network shows: (1) that the top 
destinations of overseas study were more concentrated in 2000 (161 and 121 origins or 84% and 64% of 
the total system member, by the top two destinations) than in 1960 (78 and 64 origins or 74% and 60% 
of the total system members by the top two destinations), but (2) that there was slightly more variability of 
overseas study destinations across the actors in 2000 than in 1960, meaning that many other states also 
joined in the destination group (in 2000). The top destinations (such as the U.S., the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany) host overseas students of more different origins in terms of the proportions of total 
international system members, but many other states (such as Canada, Spain, Australia, Sweden, Italy, 
Austria, and Switzerland) also join in the destination group of hosting overseas students. 
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 Appendix 3.3 Arms Transfer Networks of Asian Region, 1950–2000: Social Network Perspective of International System Structure 
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 Appendix 3.3 Arms Transfer Networks of Asian Region, 1950–2000: Social Network Perspective of International System Structure (Continued) 
 1990 2000 
AFG
AUL
BNG
CAM
CHN
DRV
FRN
GFR
IND
INS
JPN
LAO
MYA
NEW
NTH
PAK
PHI
POR
PRK
ROK
RUS
SIN
SPN TAW
THI
UKG
USA
 
AUL
BNG
BRU
CAM
CHN
FRN
IND
INS
JPN
KZK
LAONTH
PAK
PRK
ROK
RUS
SIN
SPN
SRI
TAW
THI
UKG
USA
 208  
Appendix 3.4 Arms Transfer Networks of Asian Region in 1950: Social Network Perspective of National Power 
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 Appendix 3.4 Arms Transfer Networks of Asian Region in 1950: Social Network Perspective of National Power (Continued) 
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 Appendix 4.1 Displaying Network Data in Graphs versus Tables 
 
There have been discussions on utilizing graphic forms to display network data and on their 
strengths over tabular form. For example, Brandes et al. (1999) and Tufte (1983) emphasize the 
importance of network visualization through representations such as sociograms, arguing that “data 
graphics [in the form of sociograms] can do much more than simply substitute for tabular descriptions….A 
simple description of relational data by means of tables is extremely limited in its explorative power” 
(Brandes et al. 1999, 76–77) and that “at their best, graphics [in the form of sociograms] are instruments 
for reasoning about quantitative information. Often the most effective way to describe, explore, and 
summarize a set of numbers—even a very large set—is to look at pictures of those numbers” (Tufte 1983, 
9). Gelman, Pasarica and Dodhia (2002) posit that tables are best suited for looking up specific 
information, and graphs are better for perceiving trends and making comparisons and predictions (see 
also Meyer, Shamo, and Gopher 1999; Dibble 1997; Jarvenpaa and Dickson 1988; Carter 1947). They 
argue that “one thing we have learned in this research is that there is a good reason to be lazy – it takes a 
lot of work to make nice graphs! But the other, more important, thing we've learned is that nice graphs are 
possible, especially when we think hard about why we want to display these numbers in the first place” 
(129). Brandes, Raab, and Wagner (2001) also argue that the aggregate indices presented in tabular form 
are insufficient to fully appreciate and understand the structural information contained in network data. 
Meyer, Shinar, and Leiser (1997), Remus (1984), Coll, Coll, and Thakur (1994), and Lohse (1993) all 
provide a similar argument of the advantage of using the graphical representation in displaying and 
highlighting network data. 
Recently, other scholars in social science have made similar arguments. For example, Kastellec 
and Leoni (2006, 1) argue that using graphs instead of tables improves the presentation of empirical 
results in political science and that “a move away from tables and towards graphs would increase the 
quality of the discipline’s communicative output and make empirical findings more accessible to every 
type of audience” (see also Bowers and Drake 2005; Epstein, Martin and Schneider forthcoming; Gelman, 
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 Pasarica, and Dodhia 2002). Kastellec and Leoni (2006, 5) point out one of the most important reasons 
why researchers are reluctant to use graphs (with the belief that it is simply infeasible to present certain 
information graphically) and stick instead to the table forms of representing political science data: “It 
simply takes more work to produce graphs. With current software, greater knowledge of the nuances of 
the statistical/graphical packages is needed to produce effective graphs. More importantly, creating 
informative statistical graphs involves repeated iterations, trial-and-error and much thought about both the 
deeper issue of what message the researcher is trying to convey and the practical issue of producing a 
graph that effectively communicates that message. This process can be quite time-consuming; simply put, 
it takes a much greater amount of effort to produce a quality graph than a table.” However, they correctly 
argue that “the costs of producing graphs are outweighed by the benefits, and many of the concerns 
regarding their production are either overstated or misguided altogether. While producing graphs does 
require greater effort, the very process of graph creation is one of the main benefits of using graphs instead 
of tables in that it provides incentives for the researcher to present the results more directly and cleanly” 
(5). 
We can try to prove the advantage of using graphs over tables by comparing Figure 4.1 and the 
table in below. The first sociogram in Figure 4.1 presents the relation data of dyadic disputes among all 
states in the 1950s as well as the network (the conflict network in the 1950s) participants’ (i.e., states’) 
attributional data such as their regions and major-power status. The same information (from the 
sociogram) can be also presented in tabular form as in the table in below. I have opted to present the 
information as a sociogram rather than in tabular form because the latter would fail to reveal some of the 
most important information and the former is a more efficient way of presenting the structural information 
at hand, especially for relational data.82 The exercise of trying to explore the structural patterns that are 
revealed by the sociogram in Figure 4.1, such as “connected,” “recurrent,” and regional conflicts (for 
definitions of these terms, see footnotes 38–40), by looking at the data in the table in below, demonstrates 
                                                        
82 Brandes et al. (1999) posit that “[given] the fact that already a simple description of the data in the form 
of a matrix is difficult to read, it seems obvious that an exploration of the data through tables becomes 
practically impossible. In contrast, a visual presentation allows basic features of the network, as well as a 
great number of additional information on its structural characteristics, to be observed” (77).  
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 the superiority of the sociogram in revealing structural patterns. Contemplating the numbers in the table 
below long enough might allow for discerning some of the patterns that readily emerge from the 
sociogram, but this requires far more (unnecessary) cognitive work (see also Epstein, Martin and 
Schneider forthcoming, the estimated ideology of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in 2000, and Doreian and 
Albert 1989) and is still unable to reveal some of the structural characteristics observed from the conflict 
sociograms.  
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STATE MAJPOW REGION  STATE MAJPOW REGION  STATE1 STATE2 DISPUTE 
AFG 0 4  MYA 0 4  AFG PAK 4 
ALB 0 1  NEP 0 4  CAM RVN 3 
ARG 0 5  NEW 0 4  CHL ARG 4 
AUL 0 4  NIC 0 5  CHN IND 6 
AUS 0 1  NOR 0 1  CHN JPN 2 
BEL 0 1  NTH 0 1  CHN MYA 2 
BOL 0 5  PAK 0 4  CHN NEP 2 
BRA 0 5  PAN 0 5  CHN ROK 2 
BUL 0 1  PAR 0 5  CHN RVN 2 
CAM 0 4  PER 0 5  CHN TAW 5 
CAN 0 5  PHI 0 4  ECU PER 5 
CHL 0 5  POL 0 1  EGY JOR 2 
CHN 1 4  POR 0 1  FRN CHN 2 
COL 0 5  PRK 0 4  FRN RUS 2 
COS 0 5  ROK 0 4  FRN TUN 2 
CUB 0 5  ROM 0 1  GRC BUL 2 
CZE 0 1  RUS 1 1  IND PAK 7 
DEN 0 1  RVN 0 4  IRN IRQ 2 
DOM 0 5  SAF 0 3  IRQ EGY 2 
DRV 0 4  SAL 0 5  ITA ALB 3 
ECU 0 5  SAU 0 2  ITA YUG 3 
EGY 0 2  SPN 0 1  JOR ISR 2 
ETH 0 3  SRI 0 4  MYA THI 4 
FIN 0 1  SUD 0 2  NIC COS 2 
FRN 1 1  SWD 0 1  NTH INS 3 
GDR 0 1  SWZ 0 1  POR IND 2 
GFR 0 1  SYR 0 2  PRK ROK 3 
GHA 0 3  TAW 0 4  ROK JPN 3 
GRC 0 1  THI 0 4  RUS IRN 2 
GUA 0 5  TUN 0 2  RUS JPN 4 
GUI 0 3  TUR 0 2  RUS NOR 2 
HAI 0 5  UKG 1 1  RUS ROK 2 
HON 0 5  URU 0 5  RUS SWD 2 
HUN 0 1  USA 1 5  RUS TAW 3 
ICE 0 1  VEN 0 5  SYR ISR 2 
IND 0 4  YAR 0 2  SYR JOR 2 
INS 0 4  YUG 0 1  THI CAM 2 
IRE 0 1      TUR EGY 2 
IRN 0 2      TUR SYR 3 
IRQ 0 2      UKG CHN 3 
ISR 0 2      UKG EGY 3 
ITA 0 1      UKG RUS 6 
JOR 0 2      UKG SAU 2 
JPN 0 4      UKG TAW 5 
LAO 0 4      USA CHN 2 
LBR 0 3      USA CZE 2 
LEB 0 2      USA ECU 3 
LIB 0 2      USA EGY 3 
LUX 0 1      USA PRK 3 
MAL 0 4      USA RUS 6 
MEX 0 5      USA SWZ 2 
MON 0 4      YUG BUL 2 
MOR 0 2      YUG ROM 2 
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 Appendix 4.2 Dyadic Conflict Onset Distribution in the System, 1950–2000  
1950–2000    1950–2000    
Total 
MIDs 
Total 
% cum. % State ICBs % cum. % State 
196 6.08 6.08 Russia 65 6.53 6.53 U.S. 
172 5.33 11.41 U.S. 53 5.32 11.85 Iraq 
128 3.97 15.38 China 48 4.82 16.67 China 
114 3.53 18.91 Iraq 41 4.12 20.78 Russia 
106 3.29 22.19 Yugoslavia 39 3.92 24.70 Israel 
80 2.48 24.67 United Kingdom 38 3.82 28.51 Vietnam 
77 2.39 27.06 Iran 36 3.61 32.13 North Korea 
66 2.05 29.11 Israel 29 2.91 35.04 Libya 
66 2.05 31.15 Turkey 28 2.81 37.85 Egypt 
61 1.89 33.04 North Korea 24 2.41 40.26 France 
United  
59 1.83 34.87 Thailand 22 2.21 42.47 Kingdom 
58 1.80 36.67 Egypt 21 2.11 44.58 Syria 
58 1.80 38.47 India 18 1.81 46.39 South Africa 
52 1.61 40.08 Japan 16 1.61 47.99 Angola 
50 1.55 41.63 France 15 1.51 49.50 Iran 
48 1.49 43.12 South Korea 15 1.51 51.00 Turkey 
44 1.36 44.48 Libya 14 1.41 52.41 Saudi Arabia 
41 1.27 45.75 Syria 13 1.31 53.71 Jordan 
41 1.27 47.02 Taiwan 13 1.31 55.02 Thailand 
40 1.24 48.26 
Dem. Rep. of 
Congo 12 1.20 56.22 Cuba 
38 1.18 49.44 Pakistan 12 1.20 57.43 Nicaragua 
38 1.18 50.62 Uganda 12 1.20 58.63 Zimbabwe 
35 1.08 51.70 Afghanistan 11 1.10 59.74 Greece 
35 1.08 52.79 Vietnam 10 1.00 60.74 Ethiopia 
33 1.02 53.81 Cambodia 10 1.00 61.75 
German  
Democratic  
Republic 
32 0.99 54.80 Cuba 10 1.00 62.75 India 
32 0.99 55.80 Jordan 10 1.00 63.76 Pakistan 
32 0.99 56.79 Sudan 10 1.00 64.76 
Republic of  
Vietnam 
31 0.96 57.75 Saudi Arabia 9 0.90 65.66 South Korea 
30 0.93 58.68 Zambia 9 0.90 66.57 Somalia 
29 0.90 59.58 Argentina 9 0.90 67.47 Zambia 
28 0.87 60.45 Portugal     
27 0.84 61.28 Ethiopia     
27 0.84 62.12 Nicaragua     
27 0.84 62.96 South Africa     
26 0.81 63.76 Myanmar     
25 0.77 64.54 Morocco     
25 0.77 65.31 Zimbabwe     
24 0.74 66.06 Greece     
 214
 Appendix 4.3 Hypotheses, Measurements, and Results for the Dyadic Dispute Onset Analysis 
 
1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2. The increased levels of economic interdependence (of a less constrained state83) 
decrease the probability of the onset of dispute. 
This hypothesis reflects the unconditional liberal belief that economic ties increase the costs of dispute 
involvement and therefore decrease the probability of being involved in a dispute.84 While a null finding 
for this hypothesis could support either the conditional school or the irrelevant school, a positive finding 
(i.e., interdependence increases conflict) would clearly support realist arguments by Waltz (1979) and 
Gaddis (1986).
 
For an extensive review of theory and literature, see Barbieri and Schneider (1999); 
Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001); Mansfield and Pollins (2001, 2003); McMillan (1997); Reuveny (2000); 
Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003); and the special issue of Journal of Peace Research 36(4) 
(1999). Empirical analyses finding support for the interdependence pillar include Gartzke and Li (2003a, 
2003b); Oneal and Russett (1997); and Russett and Oneal (2001). Authors finding no pacifying effect of 
economic interdependence include Barbieri (1996, 2002); Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998); Keshk, 
Pollins, and Reuveny (2004); Goenner (2004); Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001); and Kim and Rousseau 
(2005). 
 
Hypothesis 3. The increased levels of democracy (of a less constrained state) decrease the probability 
of the onset of dispute. 
This hypothesis probes the “democratic peace” pillar of the liberal peace. The dyadic democratic peace 
argument has received empirical support in Bennett and Stam (2004); Dixon and Senese (2002); Doyle 
(1986); Huth and Allee (2002); Maoz and Abdolali (1989); Maoz and Russett (1993); Peceny, Beer and 
Sanchez-Terry (2002); Rasler and Thompson (2001); Rousseau et al. (1996); and Russett and Oneal 
                                                        
83 The convention of empirical dyadic conflict study is that the likelihood of conflict depends on how 
strong the constraints are on the less constrained state in a dyad (the “weak link in the chain of peaceful 
dyadic relations” in Dixon [1994]) primarily because this state is the principal threat to peace (Russett and 
Oneal 2001, 99). 
84 For more detailed discussion on hypotheses and measurements in this section, see Kim and Rousseau 
(2005). 
 
 215
 (2001). Authors finding support for the monadic democratic peace argument include Bennett and Stam 
(2000b, 2004); Bremer (1992); Huth and Allee (2002); Ireland and Gartner (2001); Morgan and 
Schwebach (1992); Oneal and Russett (1997); Rousseau (2005); Russett and Oneal (2001); and Schultz 
(1999, 2001). 
Hypothesis 4. The shared military alliance decreases the probability of the onset of dispute. 
Realists also claim that shared security interests influence a state’s decision to be involved in a dispute 
because a state fears losing the security benefit that it gains from alliance ties with the other actor in a 
dispute (Bennett and Stam 2004; Huth and Allee 2002; and Russett and Oneal 2001).  
Hypothesis 5. A shared common border increases the probability of the onset of dispute. 
Hypothesis 6. Geographic distance decreases the probability of the onset of dispute. 
Hypothesis 7. When one of the two states in a dyad is a major power, the probability of the onset of 
dispute is increased. 
These three hypotheses are another set of realist constraints. The first two hypotheses on geographical 
proximity are included to test the realist argument that the potential for international violence exists when 
the actor can reach its adversary with military force (Bennett and Stam 2004; Russett and Oneal 2001). 
The other hypothesis is based on the argument that major powers have been engaged in more 
international disputes compared to other states, based on their wider-ranging interests (Russett and Oneal 
2001; Schultz 2001).  
 
2. Measurements 
Lower Economic Interdependence has been operationalized in a variety of ways in the literature 
(for the recent debate, see Barbieri and Peters II 2003; Gartzke and Li 2003a, 2003b; Oneal 2003). 
Although all operationalizations of interdependence have both strengths and weaknesses, I believe that 
imports plus exports divided by GDP nicely captures interdependence.85 Following the weak-link 
                                                        
85 Four strengths of this operationalization stand out (Kim and Rousseau 2005). First, the fact that the 
operationalization has been used extensively in the literature facilitates comparisons with previous 
research (Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and 
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 assumption (Dixon 1994), this variable is measured by using the score from the less interdependent state 
in a dyad. The data for the variable is taken from the Expanded Trade and GDP Data Version 4.1 by 
Gleditsch (2002, 2004). 
Lower Democracy. This independent variable is constructed by subtracting the Polity IV86 
autocracy index from the democracy index to produce a variable that ranges from -10 to 10. The value of 
-10 in the final product indicates the fully autocratic state and that of 10 indicates the fully democratic 
state. Following the weak-link assumption (Dixon 1994), this variable is measured by using the score from 
the less-democratic state in a dyad.  
Shared Alliance Ties. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the two states in the dyad 
share a defense pact, neutrality pact, or an entente. Otherwise the value is 0. Sources for this variable 
come from COW 2 Formal Alliances Version 3.03 (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).  
Contiguity, Distance, and Major Power. If the two states in a dyad share a boundary on land or 
are separated by less than 150 miles of water either directly or through their colonies or other 
dependencies, the variable Contiguity is coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0. The variable Distance is the 
natural logarithm of the great circle distance between the two states in a dyad. Finally, the variable Major 
Power is coded as 1 if at least one of the states in a dyad is a major power identified by the COW project: 
the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China qualify as major powers for the entire 
time period of my analysis, and Germany and Japan gained major power status in 1992. The data for all 
three variables are taken from EUGene Version 2.30 by Bennett and Stam (2000a).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Oneal 2001; Oneal 2003; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). Second, using the ratio of trade to the size 
of the economy allows the measure to capture the importance of trade to the economy. Third, the 
operationalization captures the broad connectedness the two states in a dyad have with the world market 
(Gartzke and Li 2003a). Fourth, the operationalization provides a useful measure of sensitivity 
interdependence: it captures how the economies of trade partners are intertwined (Mansfield and Pollins 
2003: 12-13).  
 
86 Like the conflict data, some other data have been also used to measure democracy in the models of 
conflict behaviors; Freedom House (2006) focuses on the political rights and civil liberty (for 192 states for 
1972-2005) and Vanhanen (2000) focuses on the electoral competition and participation (for 187 states 
for 1810-1998).  
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 Peace Year, Spline1, Spline2, and Spline3. To control for temporal dependences in dyads, I 
constructed the variables for the length and three natural cubic splines associated with non-eventual 
binary spells (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The results from Table 4.7 generally support all the other hypotheses on the dyadic dispute onset. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the coefficient on the Interdependence Low variable will be negative. This 
hypothesis implies that if a state is economically interdependent with its opponent in a dispute, it is less 
likely to be involved in a dispute because it fears losing the benefits of trade. The results support this 
assertion; the estimated coefficient for Interdependence Low is negative and statistically significant in most 
of the models. The “democratic peace” pillar of the liberal peace is strongly supported by the data. The 
Democracy Law variable is negative as expected and statistically significant at better than the 0.001 level 
in all models, meaning that democratic states are less likely to be involved in a dispute. The marginal 
effects analysis for the two variables supports the results. Holding all other variables at their means, 
increasing the level of the Interdependence Low variable from its minimum to its maximum reduces the 
probability of onset by from 74.4% to 77.8%. The Democracy Low variable has the similar effects; 
increasing the level of the Democracy Low variable from its minimum to its maximum reduces the 
probability of onset by from 76.0% to 85.8%.  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the coefficient on the Shared Alliance Ties will be negative. The results 
support this hypothesis; the coefficient on the variable is negative as expected and statistically significant in 
all models (usually, at better than 0.01 level), supporting the realist argument that allies are less likely to be 
involved in a dispute when they fear losing the security benefit of the alliance. Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 are 
also supported by the regression analysis, supporting the realists’ arguments that: (1) the potential for 
international violence exists when the actor can reach its adversary with military force, and (2) major 
powers have been engaged in more international disputes compared to other states, based on their wider-
ranging interests. Hypothesis 5 predicts that a shared common border decreases the probability of the 
onset of dispute. As expected, the coefficient on Contiguity is positive and statistically significant at better 
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 than .001 level (in all models). Hypothesis 6 argues that the geographic distance decreases the probability 
of the onset of dispute. Again, as expected, the coefficient on Distance is negative and statistically 
significant. Finally, hypothesis 7 predicts that when one of the two states in a dyad is a major power, the 
probability of the onset of dispute is increased. As expected, the Major Power estimated coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at better than .001 level in all models. 
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 Appendix 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–1992 
 
ReLogit Analysis  
Clustered on Dyads 
Model 3-1 Model 3-2 
(GNP) 
Model 3-3 
(Degree) 
Model 3-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 3-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 3-6 
(CINC) (Coreness) 
Model 3-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 3-8 
(SNPI) 
 Balance of Power -0.121** -0.116** -0.095*** -0.118*** -0.153*** 0.011 -0.058*** -0.160*** 
  (0.047) (0.045) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.063) (0.017) (0.047) 
 Interdependence Low -19.025 -23.810* -20.333 -26.017* -26.331* -15.979 -19.376 -20.754* 
  (11.926) (13.247) (12.381) (13.853) (13.686) (11.604) (12.104) (12.380) 
 Democracy Low -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 Allies -0.431** -0.421** -0.400** -0.435** -0.387* -0.413** -0.396** -0.414** 
  (0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) 
 Contiguity 2.548*** 2.529*** 2.513*** 2.502*** 2.489*** 2.562*** 2.521*** 2.524*** 
  (0.207) (0.203) (0.208) (0.199) (0.201) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208) 
 Distance -0.580*** -0.568*** -0.554*** -0.553*** -0.558*** -0.574*** -0.558*** -0.553*** 
  (0.078) (0.075) (0.079) (0.071) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
 Major Power 1.734*** 1.865*** 1.692*** 1.844*** 1.829*** 1.682*** 1.668*** 1.747*** 
  (0.166) 
220 (0.186) (0.165) (0.169) (0.168) (0.158) (0.164) (0.167) 
 Peace Year -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.337*** -0.340*** -0.345*** -0.343*** -0.343*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 Spline 1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Spline 2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Spline 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant -0.412 -0.435 -0.551 -0.364 -0.358 -0.638 -0.560 -0.533 
  (0.654) (0.627) (0.670) (0.606) (0.618) (0.670) (0.666) (0.667) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Appendix 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–1992 (Continued) 
 Model 3-5 
XTGEE Analysis 
 
Model 3-1 
(CINC) 
Model 3-2 
(GNP) 
Model 3-3 
(Degree) 
Model 3-4 
(Betweenness) 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 3-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 3-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 3-8 
(SNPI) 
 Balance of Power -0.137* -0.138* -0.072** -0.112*** -0.152*** 0.067 -0.051** -0.139* 
  (0.058) (0.057) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033) (0.077) (0.020) (0.057) 
 Interdependence Low -47.939* -57.880* -49.208* -59.719* -58.950* -41.940* -48.882* -50.256* 
  (20.173) (23.355) (21.107) (23.855) (23.113) (19.941) (21.005) (21.320) 
 Democracy Low -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.062*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 Allies -0.774*** -0.749*** -0.758*** -0.759*** -0.740*** -0.756*** -0.754*** -0.769*** 
  (0.182) (0.181) (0.182) (0.180) (0.180) (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) 
 Contiguity 2.994*** 
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2.983*** 2.997*** 2.984*** 2.973*** 3.009*** 2.994*** 3.001*** 
  (0.228) (0.223) (0.229) (0.223) (0.225) (0.230) (0.228) (0.229) 
 Distance -0.672*** -0.655*** -0.652*** -0.648*** -0.656*** -0.671*** -0.653*** -0.649*** 
  (0.083) (0.082) (0.085) (0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
 Major Power 1.698*** 1.857*** 1.634*** 1.788*** 1.778*** 1.607*** 1.620*** 1.687*** 
  (0.188) (0.218) (0.186) (0.185) (0.187) (0.177) (0.186) (0.185) 
 Constant -1.421* -1.476* -1.631* -1.435* -1.388* -1.703* -1.627* -1.606* 
  (0.701) (0.680) (0.715) (0.684) (0.693) (0.718) (0.713) (0.713) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
 
 Appendix 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Dyadic Dispute Onset, 1950–1992 (Continued) 
 
Logit Analysis  
Clustered on Periods 
Model 3-1 
(CINC) 
Model 3-2 
(GNP) 
Model 3-3 
(Degree) 
Model 3-4 
(Betweenness) 
Model 3-5 
(Flow-
Betweenness) 
Model 3-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 3-7 
(Egonet 
Brokerage) 
Model 3-8 
(SNPI) 
 Balance of Power -0.121*** -0.116*** -0.097*** -0.118*** -0.153*** 0.010 -0.058* -0.161*** 
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.054) (0.023) (0.042) 
 Interdependence Low -19.982* -24.769* -21.296* -26.922* -27.241* -16.988 -20.349* -21.712* 
  (11.647) (13.495) (12.010) (14.205) (13.800) (10.850) (11.715) (12.070) 
 Democracy Low -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 Allies -0.431*** -0.421*** -0.400** -0.435*** -0.387** -0.413*** -0.397** -0.414** 
  (0.135) (0.126) (0.133) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.130) (0.131) 
 Contiguity 2.550*** 2.530*** 2.514*** 2.503*** 2.490*** 2.564*** 2.522*** 2.525*** 
  (0.144) (0.145) (0.140) (0.142) (0.135) (0.148) (0.142) (0.140) 
 Distance -0.581*** -0.569*** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.559*** -0.575*** -0.559*** -0.554*** 
  (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
 Major Power 1.735*** 1.867*** 1.693*** 1.845*** 1.831*** 1.683*** 1.669*** 1.748*** 
  (0.106) 
222 (0.137) (0.117) (0.145) (0.142) (0.103) (0.114) (0.124) 
 Peace Year -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.338*** -0.340*** -0.345*** -0.343*** -0.344*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) 
 Spline 1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Spline 2 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Spline 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant -0.410 -0.433 -0.549* -0.363 -0.357 -0.636* -0.559 -0.531 
  (0.348) (0.319) (0.330) (0.341) (0.326) (0.338) (0.346) (0.334) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
 Appendix 5.1 Hypotheses, Measurements, and Results for the Dyadic Sanctions Onset Analysis 
 
1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Increased levels of economic interdependence (of a less constrained state87) decrease 
the probability of the onset of an economic sanction. 
Hypothesis 2. Increased levels of democracy (of a less constrained state) decrease the probability of 
the onset of economic sanction. 
Hypothesis 1 reflects the unconditional liberal belief that economic ties increase the costs of using coercive 
actions and therefore decrease the probability of initiating economic sanctions. As Lektzian and Souva 
(2003) point out, political leaders in a sender state prefer to sanction states with whom they are less 
economically interdependent because it will cost less in their home states than sanctioning states with high 
economic interdependence. Hypothesis 2 probes the “democratic peace” pillar of the liberal peace. 
Lektzian and Souva (2003) argue that the pacifying effects of democratic institutions extend beyond the 
military arena and into the economic one (see also Drury 2003). 
Hypothesis 4. A shared military alliance decreases the probability of the onset of economic sanctions. 
Regarding hypothesis 4, realists also claim that shared security interests influence a state’s decision to use 
coercive actions because a state fears losing the security benefit that it gains from alliance ties with the 
other actor in an economic sanction. States with similar preferences have less incentive to dispute, so they 
also have less incentive to be involved in sanctions (Lektzian and Souva 2003).  
Hypothesis 5. A shared common border increases the probability of the onset of economic sanctions. 
Hypothesis 6. Geographic distance decreases the probability of the onset of economic sanctions. 
Hypothesis 7. When one of the two states in a dyad is a major power, the probability of the onset of 
economic sanctions is increased. 
                                                        
87 The convention of empirical dyadic conflict study is that the likelihood of conflict depends on how 
strong the constraints are on the less constrained state in a dyad (the “weak link in the chain of peaceful 
dyadic relations” in Dixon 1994) primarily because this state is the principal threat to the peace (Russett 
and Oneal 2001, 99). 
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 The next three hypotheses (5, 6, and 7) are another set of realists’ constraints. The first two hypotheses on 
geographical proximity are included to test the realists’ argument that the potential for coercive actions 
exists when the actor can reach its adversary with military force (Bennett and Stam 2004, Russett and 
Oneal 2001). However, as Lektzian and Souva (2003) point out, political leaders in a sender state prefer 
to sanction states that are far away because it will cost less in their home states than sanctioning states that 
are near; the same also applies to the argument that states that share borders are less likely to be involved 
in sanctions. The other hypothesis is based on the argument that major powers have been engaged in 
more international coercive actions compared to other non-major states, based on their wider-ranging 
interests.  
Hypothesis 8. The onset of militarized interstate dispute increases the probability of the onset of 
economic sanctions. 
Hypothesis 8 is based on Baldwin’s (1985) argument of the ranking order of policy options for decision 
makers: diplomatic negations, economic sanctions, and militarized dispute (see also Drury and Park 
[2004] for the argument that economic sanctions and militarized disputes are more complementary 
policies than substitutable alternatives). Baldwin also argues that economic sanctions, in most cases, 
increase international tension and therefore increase the probability of militarized conflict (143). Blanchard 
and Ripsman (2000) posit that sanctions, as one of the instruments in the national policy toolbox, may be 
applied simultaneously with other types of political instruments of coercion.  
 
2. Measurements 
Lower Economic Interdependence has been operationalized in a variety of ways in the literature (for 
the recent debate, see Barbieri and Peters II 2003; Gartzke and Li 2003a, 2003b; Oneal 2003). Although 
all operationalizations of interdependence have both strengths and weaknesses, I believe that imports plus 
exports divided by GDP nicely captures interdependence. The data for the variable is taken from the 
Expanded Trade and GDP Data Version 4.1 by Gleditsch (2002, 2004). Following the weak-link 
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 assumption (Dixon 1994), this variable is measured by using the score from the less interdependent state 
in a dyad.88
Lower Democracy. This independent variable is constructed by subtracting the Polity IV autocracy 
index from the democracy index to produce a variable that ranges from -10 to 10. The value of -10 in the 
final product indicates a fully autocratic state, and that of 10 indicates a fully democratic state. Following 
the weak-link assumption (Dixon 1994), this variable is measured by using the score from the less 
democratic state in a dyad.  
Balance of Structural Network Power. This variable is measured using structural network power index. 
It ranges from 0, where there is a maximum network power difference between the two states in a dyad, 
to 1, where there is perfect network power parity. 
Shared Alliance Ties. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the two states in the dyad share 
a defense pact, neutrality pact, or an entente. Otherwise the value is 0. Sources for this variable come 
from COW 2 Formal Alliances Version 3.03 (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).  
Contiguity, Distance, and Major Power. If the two states in a dyad share a boundary on land or are 
separated by less than 150 miles of water either directly or through their colonies or other dependencies, 
the variable Contiguity is coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0. The variable Distance is the natural logarithm 
of the great circle distance between the two states in a dyad. Finally, the variable Major Power is coded as 
1 if at least one of the states in a dyad is a major power identified by the COW project: the U.S., France, 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China qualify as major powers for the entire time period of our 
analysis; Germany and Japan gained major power status in 1992. The data for all three variables are 
taken from EUGene version 2.30 by Bennett and Stam (2000a).  
Onset of Militarized Dispute. If there is an onset of interstate militarized dispute between the two states 
in a dyad, it is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as 0. 
 
 
 
                                                        
88 For more detailed discussion on measurements in this section, see Kim and Rousseau (2005). 
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 3. Results and Discussion 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 test the liberal peace arguments on economic sanctions onset: economically 
interdependent states or democratic states are less likely to be involved in economic sanctions. The results 
do not seem to support the hypotheses. Even though most of the coefficients on the two variables have 
the expected negative signs, they are indistinguishable from zero, meaning that there is no evidence of 
either interdependent states or democratic states being less involved in economic sanctions. The two 
hypotheses that have been well-supported in many empirical tests for the onset of militarized disputes 
have failed to be supported for the onset of economic sanctions. Neither democratic regime-dispute onset 
nor economic interdependence-dispute onset relationships in the dyadic dispute studies seem to hold after 
onset of economic sanctions analysis. 
Realists also claim that shared security interests influence a state’s decision to use coercive actions 
because a state fears losing the security benefit that it gains from alliance ties with the other actor in an 
economic sanction situation. In addition, alliance ties can be taken as a proxy for common interests 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Because states with similar preferences have fewer reasons to 
enter a dispute, they have fewer reasons to be involved in economic sanctions (Lektzian and Souva 
2003). Hypothesis 4 tests this claim that the shared military alliance decreases the probability of the onset 
of economic sanctions. The results strongly support hypothesis 4. The coefficients for the variable are 
negative and statistically significant at better than p = 0.001 in all 16 models of sanction onsets.  Dyads 
with shared alliance commitments seem to be less likely to be involved in economic sanctions.  
I will now discuss the next three realist hypotheses. First, geographical distance between the two 
states in a dyad rather increases the probability of sanctions onset; the coefficient on the variable is 
negative and statically significant at better than p = 0.001 in 14 models. The coefficient on the variable for 
hypothesis six is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. Two states at a distance and not 
sharing a common border are more likely to be involved in economic sanctions. These results are in line 
with the argument by Lektzian and Souva (2003) that political leaders in a sender state prefer to sanction 
states that are far away because it will cost less in their home states than sanctioning states that are nearby. 
I also think that the results are partly due to the fact that economic sanctions were primarily initiated by 
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 the U.S. (78 cases) on many states outside of the North American region (see the sociograms in Figure 
5.1). Second, the results show that the presence of a major power in a dyad does not increase the 
probability of sanctions onset; the coefficient on the variable is negative but indistinguishable from zero. 
Finally, the hypothesis derived from Baldwin’s argument of the policy options for decision makers is 
supported by the results; the coefficient is positive as expected and statistically significant at better than 
0.001 in all models. Baldwin (1985, 143) argues that economic sanctions in most cases increase 
international tension and therefore increase the probability of militarized conflict. Blanchard and Ripsman 
(2000) also point out that sanctions, as one of the instruments in the national policy toolbox, may be 
applied simultaneously with other types of political instruments of coercion.    
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 Appendix 5.2 Hypotheses, Measurements, and Results for the Dyadic Sanctions Success Analysis 
 
1.Hypotheses 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Sender of Sanction 
The next seven hypotheses (3–9) are related to the “sender” of economic sanctions.  
Hypothesis (Sender) 3. The greater the international cooperation with the sender, the lower the 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 4. Sanctions by an international institution as a leading sender have the higher 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 5. The greater the international cooperation for sanctions by international 
institutions, the lower the probability of success. 
This set of hypotheses is one of the main controversies in the determinants of sanction success (the 
effectiveness of multilateral sanctions vs. unilateral sanctions, as well as that of sanctions by international 
institutions). First, policy makers in general believe that multilateral sanctions are more likely to be 
effective; empirical research of sanction success has found otherwise. HSE argue that sanctions will be less 
likely to be effective if a greater number of states is needed to implement the denial measures (1990, 89). 
However, for Martin (1992) and other researchers, international cooperation to impose sanctions is the 
most important factor to determine the effectiveness of these sanctions. For example, Martin argues that 
“sanctions cannot work if they are unilateral” and that “cooperation is one step removed from success, a 
necessary if not sufficient precondition” (1992, 6). Another important determinant of sanction success 
would be sanctions by international institutions such as League of Nations, Arab League, and the UN, and 
there have been 24 cases of this type so far. Martin (1992) argues that “the leading sender has to 
demonstrate a credible commitment to the threats [for the success of its sanction]” and that one of the 
important mechanisms that accompany the credible commitments is the use of international institutions 
(413). By making cooperation among other possible sanctioners easier and the free ride among those 
countries more difficult, sanctions by international institutions have a higher probability of success. 
Drezner (2000) finds that without support from international institutions, the increased levels of 
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 cooperation from other states leads to significantly fewer concessions from the target; when there is a 
support from international institutions, cooperation from other states has a positive effect on the target’s 
concessions. Drury (1998) also finds that international cooperation has a negative effect on sanction 
success only when international institutions are not involved. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 6. The higher the cost to the sender, the lower the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 7. Sanctions involving national security issues of the sender have a higher 
probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 8. Sanctions with additional policies by the sender (such as covert action or 
limited use of force) have a higher probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Sender) 9. Sanctions by the U.S. as a leading sender have a higher probability of success. 
HSE find that “the costs imposed on domestic firms in the sender country are generally higher in cases 
that fail than those that succeed” and give us one of their commandments regarding the economic 
sanctions: “if you need to ask the price, you can’t afford the yacht” (1990, 87–8). However, other 
researchers such as Martin (1992) assert that because high-cost sanctions are related to the high credibility 
of the sender, they are more likely to succeed. By communicating the clear message to impose and 
continue its sanctions in spite of their high cost, the sender country can more easily obtain the target 
country’s surrender. Drury (1998, 503) argues that if a sanction involves the national security issue of a 
sender (such as a threat to a sender’s national security), the sender state is more likely to be severe in 
making its effort successful (Powell 1994), and therefore it is more likely to be successful. Following 
Drury’s (1998) argument that it is possible that any relationship between sanction and its success would be 
spurious, I control the effects of the sender’s additional policies (such as covert action and limited use of 
force). In the study of the effect of sender reputation on the success of sanction cases that are measured by 
the sender’s previous sanctions in a period of 10 years, Bergeijk (1989) finds that U.S. sanctions have the 
higher probability of success.  
 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Target of Sanction 
The next three hypotheses (10–12) are related to the “target” of economic sanctions. 
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 Hypothesis (Target) 10. The more international assistance the target has, the lower the probability of 
success. 
Hypothesis (Target) 11. The higher the political and economic stability of the target before sanctions, 
the lower the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Target) 12. The higher the cost to the target, the higher the probability of success. 
If the target can get international assistance, it can easily diminish the damages that are caused by the 
imposed sanctions. For example, if the target has an alternative source to overcome its export and import 
restrictions by the imposed sanction, the goals of senders in sanction cases to dampen the target cannot 
easily be accomplished. For example, the U.S. sanction against Cuba since 1960 has been understood as 
a failure, and many people argue that one important reason is the USSR’s support for the target country—
“[in] 1960, the USSR [began] extensive program of shipping goods, extending credits to Cuba; program 
lasts into 1980s” (HSE 1990, 318). HSE point out that “countries in distress or experiencing significant 
problems are far more likely to succumb to the policy objectives of the sender country. When specific 
goals are at issue, the health and stability of the target country is usually an important determinant in the 
success of the episode” (1990, 83, emphasis added). This is somewhat proved by the failures of such 
episodes as the U.S. 1983 sanctions against France over its nuclear weapons testing and against the USSR 
over its downing of a Korean Airlines plane. In general, a sanction tends to work if it is imposed on both 
politically and economically unstable small target countries in the Third World. HSE also find that 
sanctions that put a heavy cost on the target are generally successful: “Sanctions that bite are sanctions 
that work” (102). 
 
The Hypotheses Regarding the Sender/Target Relationship of Sanction 
The next four hypotheses (13–15) are related to the “relationships between sender and target” of 
economic sanctions.  
Hypothesis (Relationship) 13. The more cordial the relationship between sender and target before the 
sanction imposes, the higher the probability of success. 
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 Hypothesis (Relationship) 14. The closer the prior trade relationship between the sender and the 
target, the higher the probability of success. 
Hypothesis (Relationship) 15. If there is international assistance to the target (“black nights”), the 
positive effect of pre-sanction trade levels will be mitigated. 
“Attack your allies, not your adversaries” is one of the HSE (1990) commandments. A sanction against 
the target country that has long been an adversary of the sender, or has little trade with the sender, is 
generally less successful (HSE 1990, 84–86). This is because “[the] higher compliance with sanctions by 
allies and trading partners reflects their willingness to bend on specific issues in deference to an overall 
relationship with the sender country” (84). Bergeijk (1989) finds in his models that the trade linkage 
variable, which is defined as the sender’s trade flows to the target as percentage of the target’s GNP in the 
year prior to the sanction, has the expected negative coefficient and statistical significance. Drury (1998, 
502) argues that higher trade levels lead to higher cost to the target (i.e., more damage to target), and this 
in turn leads to more effective imposed sanctions. He also argues, however, that when there is 
international assistance to a target, the positive effect of pre-sanction levels will be mitigated (503). 
 
2. Measurements 
The Variables Regarding the Sender of Sanction 
Sender Cooperation. This variable measures the degree of cooperation for the leading sender in 
the sanction episode. HSE (1990, 34–36) measure this variable with values of 1 (“no cooperation: a single 
sender country imposes sanctions, and usually seeks no cooperation,” e.g., the U.S. sanctions against 
Brazil in 1962), 2 (“minor cooperation: the sender country enlists verbal support and possibly token 
restraints from other countries,” e.g., the U.S. sanctions against the USSR in 1981), 3 (“modest 
cooperation: the sender country obtains meaningful restraints—but limited in time and coverage—from 
some but not all the important trading partners of the target country,” e.g., the U.S. sanctions against 
Cuba in 1960), and 4 (“significant cooperation: the important trading partners make a major effort to limit 
trade, although linkages may still exist through neutral countries,” e.g., sanctions related to World Wars I 
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 and II). There have been sanction cases of 53, 28, 20, and 15, respectively (based on the HSE data 
collection). 
Institution Sanction. There have been not a few sanctions imposed by diverse international 
institutions such as the League of Nations, Arab League, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls 
(COCOM), China Committee of the Paris Consultative Group (CHINCOM), Organization of African 
Unity, OECD, and the UN. If so, this variable is coded 1; otherwise, 0. There have been 24 cases of this 
type. 
Sender Cooperation * Institution Sanction. This interaction variable takes the value of 0 when 
international institutions were not involved, and of the values on Sender Cooperation when international 
institutions were involved. 
Sender Cost. HSE (1990, 38–39) try to measure the cost to the sender in each sanction episode. 
They code the sender cost with four values: 1 for “net gain to sender: usually cases where aid is withheld” 
(e.g., U.S. sanctions against Sudan in 1989), 2 for “little effect on sender: cases where a trivial dislocation 
occurs” (e.g., U.S. sanctions against China in 1989), 3 for “modest loss to sender: some trade is lost, but 
neither the size nor concentration of the loss is substantial” (e.g., U.S. sanctions against Panama in 1987), 
and 4 for “major loss to sender: large volumes of trade are adversely affected” (e.g., the U.S. and UN joint 
sanctions against Iraq in 1990). There have been 40 “net gain,” 54 “little effect,” 16 “modest loss,” and 6 
“major loss” cases for each value, respectively. 
National Security. If there was a threat to the national security of the sender, it is coded 1; 
otherwise, 0. The definition of national security comes from Drury (1998, 501): “military dispute between 
any involved nations, nuclear proliferation, threat to sender’s macro-economy, threat to alliance, or threat 
of communist expansion.”  
Additional Policies. If the sender used additional policies such as covert action, limited use of 
force, or regular military, then it is coded as 1; if the sender used no additional policies, it is coded as 0 
(Drury 1998). 
U.S. Sanction. The U.S. has been the primary leading sender in the history of economic 
sanctions: it has imposed 78 unilateral or joint sanctions since 1914. This variable is coded 1 if the U.S. 
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 initiated the sanctions either unilaterally or jointly with other countries or an international institution; 
otherwise, 0. However, the unilateral sanctions by an international institution are not counted as 1 for this 
variable even though the U.S. is one of the participants in that institution (such as the UN). 
  
The Variables Regarding the Target of Sanction 
Target Assistance. This variable is dichotomous; if there was international assistance (overt 
military or economic aid) to the target, it is coded as 1; otherwise, 0. Among 116 sanction cases, the target 
could get international assistance in 27. Recent examples are Libya’s assistance to the target in the U.S. 
sanctions against Panama in 1987, and the USSR’s assistance in the U.S. sanction against Poland in 
1981. 
Target Stabilities. This variable is measured by assessing the overall economic health and political 
stability of the target country throughout the period of the sanction case (HSE 1990, 36–7). This variable 
has three values: 1 for “distress: a country with acute economic problems, exemplified by high 
unemployment and rampant inflation, coupled with political turmoil bordering on chaos” (e.g., Sudan in 
the U.S. sanctions of 1989), 2 for “significant problems: a country with severe economic problems, such as 
a foreign exchange crisis, coupled with substantial internal dissent” (e.g., Iraq in the U.S. and UN joint 
sanctions of 1990), and 3 for “strong and stable: a country with the government in firm country and an 
economy experiencing only the normal range of inflation, unemployment, and small ills” (e.g., China in 
the U.S. sanctions of 1989). There have been 24 “distress,” 52 “significant problems,” and 40 “strong and 
stable” cases of each type, respectively.  
Target Cost. This variable is measured by the annual cost of sanctions to the target as a 
percentage of its GNP. Based on the HSE collection, the mean of this variable is 1.8%; the minimum is -
5.5% (e.g., the U.S. sanction against Ethiopia in 1976 where Ethiopia got much more aid and loans from 
the USSR than their loss from the suspension of U.S. aid and loans). The maximum is 48.0% (the U.S. 
and U.N. joint sanctions against Iraq in 1990). 
 
 
 233
 The Variables Regarding the Sender/Target Relationship of Sanction  
Pre-sanction Relationships. HSE (1990, 37–38) measure this variable of pre-sanction relationship 
with three values: 1 for “antagonistic: the sender and target countries are in opposing camps” (e.g., the 
U.S. with Syria in 1986 sanctions episode); 2 for “neutral: the sender country does not have strong ties to 
the target,” (e.g., the U.S. with Haiti in 1987 sanctions episode); and 3 for “cordial: the sender and target 
countries are close friends and allies” (e.g., the U.S. and the United Kingdom with Somalia in 1988 
sanctions episode). There have been sanction cases of 23, 55, and 38, respectively.  
Pre-sanction Trade Level and Target Assistance * Pre-sanction Trade Levels. The first variable is 
measured as the target’s total bilateral trades (exports to and imports from the sender) as a percentage of 
the target’s total world trade. The second variable is an interactive term of Target Assistance and Pre-
sanction Trade Levels variables. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Several of the other hypotheses concerning sanctions success are supported by the results of my 
sample selection probit and marginal impact analyses. For example, hypothesis 4 argues that sanctions 
that involve an international institution will be more likely to be successful, namely because they display 
credible commitment and prevent free riders among the involved parties in the international institute 
sanctions. The results from the model of sanctions success support this argument; the coefficient on the 
variable is positive and statistically significant in all but one model. Hypothesis 5 of the interactive effect of 
international cooperation and international institution involvement is also supported by the results: the 
coefficient for the variable is negative as expected and statistically significant in all but one model. Adding 
the non-significant results for hypothesis 3 of international cooperation, the results indicate that the 
involvement of international institutions increases the success of economic sanctions, and that 
international cooperation with the sender decreases the success of economic sanctions only when 
international institutions are involved. These results regarding hypotheses 4 and 5 are also in line with 
those from Martin (1992), Drezner (2000), and Drury (1998). Martin (1992) argues that “the leading 
sender has to demonstrate a credible commitment to the threats [for the success of its sanction],” and that 
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 one of the important mechanisms that accompanies the credible commitment is the use of international 
institutions (413). By making cooperation among other possible sanctioners easier and the free ride 
among those countries more difficult, sanctions by international institutions have a greater probability of 
success. Drezner (2000) also finds that without support from the international institutions, the increased 
levels of cooperation from other states leads to significantly fewer concessions from the target; when there 
is support from international institutions, cooperation from other states has a positive effect on the target’s 
concessions. Drury (1998) finds that international cooperation has a negative effect on sanction success 
only when international institutions are not involved.  
The argument by hypothesis 11— that sanctions imposed on the target in distress or experiencing 
significant problems are more likely to be successful— is also supported by the results: the coefficient for 
the variable is negative and statistically significant in all models, meaning that sanctions toward politically 
and economically stable targets are less likely to be successful. The marginal impact analysis (from Table 
5.4) shows that the conditional probability of sanctions success, holding all the included variables at their 
means, is: (1) for Model 1-3, 40.9% (when target is in “distress”), 4.2% (when target experiences 
“significant problems”), and 0.1% (when target is “strong and stable”); (2) for Model 2-3, 35.5%, 3.4%, 
and 0.0%, respectively. These results regarding hypothesis 11 are also in line with those from Bergeijk 
(1989) and partly from Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997). HSE also point out that “countries in 
distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to the policy objectives of the 
sender country. When specific goals are at issue, the health and stability of the target country are usually 
important determinants in the success of the episode” (1990, 83).  
Two other hypotheses from HSE (1990, 84–86) regarding the relationship between sender and 
target are also supported by the results. Sanctions against a target country that has long been an ally or 
friend of the sender (hypothesis 13), or has a cordial pre-sanction trade relationship with the sender 
(hypothesis 14), are more likely to be successful. The coefficients for the two variables are positive as 
expected and statistically significant at better than the 0.10 level in the majority of the models (all but one 
model for pre-sanctions relationship and all but two models for pre-sanctions trade level). The marginal 
impact analysis for hypothesis 13 (from Table 5.4) shows that the conditional probability of sanctions 
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 success, holding all the included variables at their means, is: (1) for Model 1-3, 1.3% (“antagonistic: the 
sender and target countries are in opposing camps”) and 13.5% (“cordial: the sender and target countries 
are close friends and allies”); (2) for Model 2-3, 1.1% and 10.1%, respectively. The marginal impact 
analysis for hypothesis 14 (from Table 5.4) shows that, for Model 1-3, increasing the pre-sanctions trade 
level from one standard deviation below the mean of the variable to its mean, while holding all other 
independent variables at their means, increases the conditional probability of sanctions success by 3.8% 
(3.3% for Model 2-3). Increasing the change to one standard deviation above the mean triggers an 
additional increase of 32.0% (37.0% for Model 2-3). Specifically, the predicted probability of being 
successful increases from 0.1% to 35.9% (from 0.0% to 40.4% for Model 2-3). The results regarding 
hypothesis 13 are also in line with those from Bergeijk (1989) and Bonetti (1998), and the results 
regarding hypothesis 14 are in line with those from Bonetti (1998). The results also show that sanctions 
are less effective as time progresses. A sanction against the target country that has long been an adversary 
of the sender or has little trade with sender is generally less successful (HSE 1990, 84–86); in fact, “Attack 
your allies, not your adversaries” is one of the HSE (1990) commandments. This is primarily because 
“[the] higher compliance with sanctions by allies and trading partners reflects their willingness to bend on 
specific issues in deference to an overall relationship with the sender country” (84). Bergeijk (1989) also 
finds in his analysis that the trade linkage variable, which is defined as the sender’s trade flows to the 
target as a percentage of the target’s GNP in the year prior to the sanction, has the expected positive 
coefficient and statistical significance. Finally, Drury (1998, 502) argues that higher trade levels lead to a 
higher cost to the target (i.e., more damage to the target), and that this in turn leads to greater 
effectiveness of imposed sanctions.  
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 Appendix 5.3 Definitions, Measurements, and Rates of Economic Sanctions Success 
 
 There are three issues regarding the dependent variable in use: definition, measurement, and 
rate of sanction success.89 As in Baldwin (1999–2000), Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), Cortright and Lopez 
(2000), Drezner (2000), and others, there have been ongoing discussions about how to define and 
measure “success” in a sanction episode (also see Baldwin 1985 for a general discussion). Baldwin 
(1999–2000) notes that “[The] debate over whether economic sanctions ‘work’ is mired in a scholarly 
limbo” (80) and that success is a slippery concept (87). He continues to argue that we should ask the 
question of what “success” means before making empirical estimates of sanction success (87). Bolks and 
Al-Sowayel (2000) point out that definition of sanction success is contentious in the literature (see also 
Cortright and Lopez 2000). Hovi, Husby, and Sprinz (2005) argue that there are two plausible definitions 
of sanction success: first, “sanctions are successful if—and to the extent that—they extract political 
concessions from the target country”; and second, “sanctions might be successful, namely, by making 
noncompliance impossible” (483-484). Baldwin (1985) argues for a broad definition of success in 
evaluating the utility of “economic statecraft.”90 Baldwin (1999–2000) also posits that it could be 
measured based on the five dimensions of sanction success: the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving 
goals, costs to the sender(s), costs to the target(s), stakes for the sender(s), and stakes for the target(s) (87–
92). Doxey (1987, 144) emphasizes the importance of identifying whether a goal is coercive or symbolic, 
and that the sanction should be designed accordingly. Malloy (1990) takes a different tack, arguing that 
the effectiveness of sanctions should be judged against the immediate “instrumental” goal (denying goods, 
markets, or finance) and not confused with the effectiveness of the overall foreign policy that sanctions 
serve. Drezner (2000, 73) posits that “sanction success measures the extent to which the target country 
met the sender’s publicly stated demand.”  
                                                        
89 The debate on how to understand “success” in international affairs is not limited to the sanction study. 
For example, see Wayman, Singer, and Goertz (1983) for discussion on how to measure “success” in an 
international dispute (conflict). 
 
90 Some use the terms economic coercion, economic statecraft, and economic sanctions interchangeably 
(Drezner 2003); others differentiate among those terms (Baldwin 1985). 
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  Also related is the issue of the success rate of economic sanctions (see also Drezner 2003 for a 
discussion on selection bias related to the success rate). For example, in the debate between Pape (1997, 
1998) and Elliott (1998), who asked different questions and employed different research designs, the 
former finds that sanctions succeeded in only 5 out of 115 original cases or 4 percent of the total (for the 
period of 1914–1990), compared to the original study (also cited in Elliott 1998), where it was found that 
sanctions succeeded in 40 of 115 cases or 35 percent of the total (one in three sanctions events between 
1900 and 1990, and one in four since 1973). There is also a long and distinguished line of authors who 
argue that sanctions do not work (see Galtung 1967; Knorr 1975; Bienen and Gilpin 1980; von 
Amerongen 1980; Lindsay 1986; Doxey 1987; Pape 1997; Haass 1997). However, other scholars suggest 
that sanctions may be more effective than is contended by earlier empirical research. Drezner (2003) 
asserts that the lack of observed success in sanctions is the result of a selection bias in the research and not 
a failing of sanctions themselves, noting that “the threat of sanctions is often enough to prompt changes in 
the behavior of some states” and “focusing only on cases where sanctions are actually applied ignores the 
large number of episodes where the threat of economic coercion did result in policy changes” (643). 
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 Appendix 5.4 Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990  
 
               (Sanctions Onset Analysis) 
 
  Model 1-1/2-1 Model 1-2/2-2 Model 1-3/2-3 Model 1-4/2-4 
(CINC) (CNP) (Degree) (Betweenness) 
 Interdependence Low -29.259 (19.819) 159.110* (96.103) 1.001 (9.594) -6.317 (14.081) 
 Democracy Low -0.007 (0.008) -0.006 (0.012) -0.004 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) 
 Balance of Power -0.104*** (0.030) 0.000 (0.000) 0.006 (0.011) -0.015 (0.014) 
 Allies -0.237*** (0.050) -0.164** (0.057) -0.217*** (0.051) -0.218*** (0.051) 
 Contiguity -0.436 (0.350) -0.399 (0.293) -0.331 (0.374) -0.366 (0.371) 
 Distance 0.421*** (0.104) 0.205 (0.152) 0.422*** (0.107) 0.412*** (0.103) 
 Major Power -0.102 (0.409) -0.629* (0.256) -0.270 (0.405) -0.234 (0.417) 
 Militarized Dispute Onset 1.045*** (0.130) 0.401* (0.170) 1.106*** (0.135) 1.084*** (0.131) 
 Constant -4.978*** (0.783) 
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-1.789 (1.320) -5.327*** (0.869) -5.136*** (0.816) 
 
  Model 1-5/2-5 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model 1-6/2-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 1-7/2-7 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model 1-8/2-8 
(SNPI) 
 Interdependence Low -4.896 (13.419) 8.120* (3.483) -5.589 (13.262) 2.658 (7.836) 
 Democracy Low -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 
 Balance of Power -0.016 (0.015) 0.173*** (0.024) -0.011 (0.007) 0.022 (0.028) 
 Allies -0.215*** (0.051) -0.194*** (0.048) -0.214*** (0.051) -0.216*** (0.051) 
 Contiguity -0.360 (0.372) -0.284 (0.372) -0.354 (0.374) -0.323 (0.369) 
 Distance 0.410*** (0.103) 0.414*** (0.115) 0.412*** (0.103) 0.422*** (0.107) 
 Major Power -0.242 (0.414) -0.459 (0.401) -0.260 (0.406) -0.290 (0.413) 
 Militarized Dispute Onset 1.083*** (0.133) 1.104*** (0.136) 1.076*** (0.132) 1.113*** (0.134) 
 Constant -5.141*** (0.829) -5.513*** (0.934) -5.158*** (0.828) -5.357*** (0.856) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 5.4 Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
 
                     (Sanctions Success Analysis) 
 
 
 
Model 1-1 
(CINC) 
Model 1-2 
(CNP) 
Model 1-3 
(Degree) 
Model 1-4 
(Betweenness) 
 Relative Power 0.027 (0.102) -0.000** (0.000) -0.138** (0.047) -0.103* (0.048) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.434* (0.202) -0.436* (0.195) -0.481* (0.201) -0.515** (0.196) 
 Institution Sanction 1.397 (0.933) 1.764* (0.954) 0.996 (1.100) 1.585 (1.183) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -0.416 (0.376) -0.671* (0.400) -0.194 (0.481) -0.431 (0.473) 
 Sender Cost 0.094 (0.277) 0.117 (0.275) 0.044 (0.261) 0.003 (0.274) 
 National Security 0.200 (0.377) 0.234 (0.377) 0.194 (0.380) 0.124 (0.374) 
 Additional Policies 0.083 (0.379) -0.068 (0.387) 0.143 (0.400) 0.171 (0.402) 
 U.S. Sanction -0.021 
240
(0.375) -0.018 (0.386) -0.046 (0.349) 0.115 (0.364) 
 Target Assistance 0.260 (0.665) 0.367 (0.686) 0.273 (0.659) 0.451 (0.715) 
 Target Stabilities -0.586* (0.283) -0.533* (0.272) -0.912*** (0.269) -0.832** (0.272) 
 Target Cost 0.125 (0.082) 0.145 (0.089) 0.183* (0.094) 0.124 (0.080) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.651* (0.314) 0.652* (0.317) 0.747* (0.318) 0.724* (0.303) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.004 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.010 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) -0.013 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) 
 Year -0.032* (0.015) -0.036* (0.015) -0.024 (0.015) -0.029* (0.015) 
 Constant 64.056* (28.804) 71.910* (29.575) 49.276* (28.777) 58.636 (29.015) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
  
 
 
 
 Appendix 5.4 Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
 
                     (Sanctions Success Analysis) 
 
 
 
Model 1-5 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model 1-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 1-7 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model 1-8 
(SNPI) 
 Relative Power -0.163*** (0.051) 0.007 (0.176) -0.051* (0.031) -0.135 (0.130) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.456* (0.206) -0.454* (0.195) -0.496** (0.193) -0.481* (0.192) 
 Institution Sanction 1.488 (1.156) 1.387 (0.946) 1.590 (1.130) 1.399 (1.018) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -0.345 (0.483) -0.399 (0.393) -0.467 (0.458) -0.370 (0.414) 
 Sender Cost 0.003 (0.265) 0.089 (0.279) 0.047 (0.276) 0.039 (0.278) 
 National Security 0.218 (0.381) 0.184 (0.370) 0.101 (0.379) 0.169 (0.371) 
 Additional Policies 0.113 (0.413) 0.087 (0.381) 0.175 (0.392) 0.128 (0.389) 
 U.S. Sanction 0.109 
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(0.350) -0.025 (0.454) -0.088 (0.365) 0.083 (0.379) 
 Target Assistance 0.345 (0.715) 0.273 (0.653) 0.344 (0.656) 0.262 (0.677) 
 Target Stabilities -0.987*** (0.282) -0.610* (0.266) -0.758** (0.276) -0.717** (0.274) 
 Target Cost 0.133 (0.086) 0.126 (0.082) 0.138* (0.083) 0.132 (0.082) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.785** (0.299) 0.654* (0.313) 0.702* (0.311) 0.687* (0.307) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.008 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.013 (0.011) -0.010 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) -0.009 (0.010) 
 Year -0.032* (0.015) -0.032* (0.015) -0.029* (0.015) -0.027* (0.014) 
 Constant 65.032* (29.355) 64.501* (29.632) 58.197* (28.913) 54.991* (28.331) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
 Appendix 5.4 Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
 
                     (Sanctions Success Analysis) 
 
 
 
Model 2-1 
(CINC) 
Model 2-2 
(GNP) 
Model 2-3 
(Degree) 
Model 2-4 
(Betweenness) 
 Target’s Power -0.066 (0.106) 0.000 (0.001) 0.170*** (0.050) 0.149** (0.050) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.444* (0.214) -0.453* (0.197) -0.516* (0.219) -0.556** (0.206) 
 Institution Sanction 0.984 (0.955) 1.388 (0.945) 1.043 (1.174) 1.789 (1.317) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -0.229 (0.411) -0.394 (0.391) -0.198 (0.530) -0.507 (0.535) 
 Sender Cost 0.195 (0.296) 0.090 (0.277) 0.061 (0.263) -0.041 (0.275) 
 National Security 0.213 (0.379) 0.184 (0.371) 0.197 (0.397) 0.121 (0.386) 
 Additional Policies -0.052 (0.386) 0.086 (0.379) 0.263 (0.406) 0.275 (0.417) 
 U.S. Sanction 0.185 
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(0.425) -0.015 (0.375) -0.238 (0.362) -0.135 (0.370) 
 Target Assistance 0.005 (0.749) 0.267 (0.662) 0.741 (0.564) 0.859 (0.663) 
 Target Stabilities -0.601* (0.302) -0.601* (0.283) -0.960*** (0.281) -0.884*** (0.277) 
 Target Cost 0.102 (0.078) 0.126 (0.083) 0.223* (0.104) 0.144* (0.084) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.557* (0.320) 0.654* (0.313) 0.778* (0.335) 0.774* (0.307) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.008 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) -0.020* (0.009) -0.016 (0.010) 
 Year -0.039* (0.015) -0.031* (0.015) -0.026* (0.015) -0.027* (0.015) 
 Constant 76.711* (30.008) 62.916* (30.478) 54.886* (29.025) 57.325* (29.600) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 Appendix 5.4 Probit Analysis of Dyadic Sanctions Onset and Success, 1950–1990 (Continued) 
 
                  (Sanctions Success Analysis) 
 
 
 
Model 2-5 
(Flow-Betweenness) 
Model 2-6 
(Coreness) 
Model 2-7 
(Egonet Brokerage) 
Model 2-8 
(SNPI) 
 Target’s Power 0.217*** (0.056) 0.486* (0.256) 0.066* (0.031) 0.326* (0.130) 
 Sender Cooperation -0.498* (0.228) -0.480* (0.197) -0.514** (0.197) -0.531** (0.202) 
 Institution Sanction 1.599 (1.240) 1.512 (1.111) 1.719 (1.213) 1.635 (1.210) 
 Sender Cooperation* 
Institution Sanction -0.369 (0.532) -0.385 (0.452) -0.519 (0.494) -0.447 (0.509) 
 Sender Cost -0.031 (0.270) 0.043 (0.271) 0.046 (0.276) 0.009 (0.269) 
 National Security 0.247 (0.402) 0.156 (0.378) 0.081 (0.383) 0.154 (0.384) 
 Additional Policies 0.216 (0.425) 0.257 (0.385) 0.230 (0.396) 0.287 (0.396) 
 U.S. Sanction -0.218 
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(0.365) -0.030 (0.366) -0.145 (0.367) -0.090 (0.366) 
 Target Assistance 0.889 (0.613) 0.509 (0.659) 0.525 (0.628) 0.666 (0.641) 
 Target Stabilities -1.035*** (0.292) -0.739** (0.271) -0.798** (0.278) -0.856** (0.279) 
 Target Cost 0.173* (0.095) 0.182* (0.093) 0.151* (0.085) 0.169* (0.090) 
 Pre-sanction Relationships 0.862** (0.310) 0.645* (0.307) 0.707* (0.313) 0.711* (0.308) 
 Pre-sanction Trade Level 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) 
 Target Assistance* 
Pre-sanction Trade Levels -0.021* (0.010) -0.013 (0.010) -0.012 (0.009) -0.015 (0.010) 
 Year -0.031* (0.015) -0.024 (0.015) -0.030* (0.015) -0.025* (0.015) 
 Constant 64.371* (29.260) 49.683* (29.432) 60.860* (29.108) 52.814* (29.285) 
 
NOTE: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All significant tests are two-tailed. *p < .10, *p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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